







Policy-making, paradigms and change:  
The origins of the Prevent counter terrorism policy in Great Britain 
between 2001 and 2011 
William Hammonds 
Doctor of Philosophy in Government 
 
 
Department of Government 
















I would like to thank those who have provided me with the advice and support that has enabled 
me to complete this work. I would particularly like to thank my supervisor Professor Shamit 
Saggar who has provided invaluable insight and encouragement throughout. Thanks to Dr 
James Hampshire for his early input and healthy scepticism and Professor David Sanders for 
challenging my ideas later in the process. I would also like to thank Professor Vivienne 
Lowndes and Dr Shane Martin whose comments really helped to clarify my arguments. I would 
like to thank all of those who contributed their time to speak to me about the study. I would 
also like to thank all of my old colleagues at the Change Institute who provided the original 
platform for my interest and work in this area. Any mistakes or misrepresentations are mine 
alone. I have completed this PhD as a part time student with a near full time job which has 
taken time, dedication and the understanding of those close to me. I would like to thank Dr 
Alec Fraser and Dr Melanie Jacques who provided ideas and motivation and Esmeralda Conde 
Ruiz who has reminded me to be proud of the achievement. Finally, I would like to dedicate 
the work to my family, Sue, Jon and Joanna Hammonds. We have endured an extraordinary 







Table of Contents 
Glossary ........................................................................................................................ 6 
List of figures ................................................................................................................ 6 
List of boxes ................................................................................................................. 7 
Summary ....................................................................................................................... 9 
Chapter 1: Introduction ............................................................................................... 11 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 11 
Overview of Prevent ........................................................................................................... 15 
Prevent and security ............................................................................................................ 18 
Prevent and policy-making ................................................................................................. 21 
Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 27 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 28 
Chapter 2: Understanding terrorism ........................................................................... 31 
The terrorist threat .............................................................................................................. 32 
Militant and radical Islamism ............................................................................................. 37 
The Muslim community in the UK ..................................................................................... 43 
The causes of terrorism ....................................................................................................... 48 
Extremism and ideologies ................................................................................................... 51 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 54 
Chapter 3: Theoretical framework .............................................................................. 57 
Theories of the state ............................................................................................................ 59 
Paradigms ............................................................................................................................ 65 
Policy change ...................................................................................................................... 68 
Indicators of change ............................................................................................................ 76 
Hypotheses .......................................................................................................................... 80 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 82 
Chapter 4: Methodology ............................................................................................. 85 
Introduction ......................................................................................................................... 85 
Case study approach ........................................................................................................... 86 
Data collection .................................................................................................................... 88 
Data analysis ....................................................................................................................... 95 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................................... 99 
Chapter 5: Origins of Prevent 2001 – 2004 .............................................................. 101 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 101 
Dealing with the threat of terrorism .................................................................................. 104 
A whole government approach ......................................................................................... 109 
Limits of security powers ................................................................................................. 110 
Limits of the security and intelligence services ................................................................ 113 
Understanding radicalisation ............................................................................................ 117 
The relationships with the Muslim community ................................................................ 120 
Social inclusion policy ...................................................................................................... 128 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 132 
Chapter 6: Establishing Prevent 2005 – 2007 ........................................................... 135 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 135 
Demonstrable action against causes of terrorism ............................................................. 141 





Muslim identity ................................................................................................................. 149 
Broadening community engagement ................................................................................ 153 
Foreign policy ................................................................................................................... 163 
Violent-extremism ............................................................................................................ 164 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 172 
Chapter 7: Reviewing Prevent 2008 – 2011 ............................................................. 175 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 175 
Context .............................................................................................................................. 177 
Centralisation of control ................................................................................................... 180 
Separating Prevent and integration ................................................................................... 184 
Risk based rationalisation ................................................................................................. 192 
Engaging education ........................................................................................................... 197 
Managing community engagement ................................................................................... 199 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 210 
Chapter 8: Institutional change ................................................................................. 213 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 213 
Institutional limits of model Thomas ................................................................................ 215 
Support for model John ..................................................................................................... 217 
Split in model John ........................................................................................................... 222 
Compromise ...................................................................................................................... 225 
Structure of the policy community ................................................................................... 229 
Chapter 9: A new conceptual framework ................................................................. 241 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 241 
The policy agenda ............................................................................................................. 243 
Constraints ........................................................................................................................ 246 
Trade-offs .......................................................................................................................... 249 
The role of evidence ......................................................................................................... 261 
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 264 
Chapter 10: Contribution and conclusions ............................................................... 269 
Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 269 
Contribution ...................................................................................................................... 272 
Hobbes and Locke ............................................................................................................ 274 
Policy change .................................................................................................................... 277 
Endo and exogenous factors ............................................................................................. 280 
Incommensurability .......................................................................................................... 282 
Integration and diversity ................................................................................................... 284 
New Labour and the Conservatives .................................................................................. 287 
Future research .................................................................................................................. 289 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................. 293 
Annexe A: Interviews ............................................................................................... 325 








ACPO: Association of Chief Police Officers 
DCLG: Department for Communities and Local Government 
DIUS: Department for Innovation, Universities and Schools 
FCO: Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
MCB: Muslim Council of Britain 
OSCT: Office for Security and Counter Terrorism 
List of figures 
Number Title Page 
2.1 
Religion by age, England and Wales, 2011 (left) and population 
profile of Muslim population in England and Wales (right) 
47 
3.1 Theoretical model of the decision-making process 69 
3.2 Evolution of policy solutions 82 
5.1 Mentions of ‘Islam’ in Hansard 121 
5.2 YouGov polling of support for military action in Iraq 126 
5.3 Ipsos opinion polling of Tony Blair’s handling of the Iraq war 127 
6.1 Hansard mentions of ‘Muslim community’ and ‘Islam’ 142 
7.1 
Hansard mentions of ‘Muslim community’, ‘Islam’ and 
‘Radicalisation’ 
193 





List of boxes 
Number Title Page  
2.1 The core ideological framework of al-Qaeda and jihadi terrorist 
networks 
33 
3.1 Models of the state and security 61 
3.2 Process indicators of paradigmatic change 77 
5.1  Timeline of events 2001 – 2004 103 
5.2 Examples of engagement work underway by the Home Office 
and policing described in the 2006 Contest strategy 
122 
6.1 Timeline of events 2005 – 2007 139 
6.2 Selected points from Tony Blair’s 12 point plan 144 
6.3 National Indicator 35 147 
6.4 Engagement activities that were undertaken in the aftermath of 
the 7/7 attacks outlined in the Contest strategy published in 2006 
157 
6.5 Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board – five standards 162 
6.6 Principles of British values 168 
7.1 Timeline of events 2008 – 2011 178 












This thesis examines the origins and development of the UK Prevent strategy between 2001 
and 2011, the extent to which it represented a change in policy and the factors that shaped it. 
Prevent was an important element of the UK government’s response to the threat from home-
grown al-Qaeda terrorism following 9/11 and the associated political conflict over Islam and 
the Muslim community. The study argues that the development of Prevent can be understood 
through two competing models of government and security, one centralised and coercive the 
other distributed and consensual. The Labour government combined both approaches in order 
to deliver short-term security objectives whilst embedding these in a longer term process of 
social change. However, whilst this approach enabled a broader response to terrorism, and 
created a new framework for decision-making, it also increased institutional disputes about its 
aims that ultimately motivated a narrowing of the agenda in 2011.	
This study analyses the decision-making process through different lenses in order to understand 
the reasons why Prevent developed in this way. The study is based on a qualitative analysis of 
semi-structured elite interviews with a small targeted sample of individuals involved in 
decision-making, alongside primary documentation, to examine explicit and implicit 
influences on the process. It presents an in-depth narrative account that identifies the main 
decisions, including both formal and informal decisions and exogenous and endogenous inputs 
into the process. It then examines the influence of the decision-making community, including 
the structure of the relationship between central government, local agencies and civil society. 
The study explores how ideas and arguments about the causes of terrorism helped to integrate 
the two competing policy models and the trade-offs between the two. The study concludes by 
examining whether this process represented a significant paradigmatic change in policy and 











Chapter 1: Introduction 
Introduction 
This thesis presents a case study of the origins and development of the Prevent policy in Great 
Britain between 2001 and 2011.1 Prevent is an interesting case study of a complex, high profile 
and contentious area of policy-making. It was developed following the 9/11 al-Qaeda attacks 
on the US in 2001 as one strand of the UK’s wider Contest counter-terrorism strategy and was 
one of the first preventative strategies to address ‘home grown’ radical jihadi terrorism (The 
Change Institute 2008b). It gained public prominence in the aftermath of the terrorist attacks 
on London 7th July 2005 that were carried out by British nationals and influenced subsequent 
policy around Europe and the US. It was notable for its pre-criminal preventative approach that 
aimed to address the causes of terrorism and was framed by the concept of radicalisation, a 
socio-political model of recruitment and participation (Horgan and Taylor 2006; Kruglanski & 
Fishman 2009).  
This study proposes that Prevent was based on a combination of two competing models of 
government and security, a centralised and coercive model rooted in the tradition of Hobbes’s 
Leviathan, and a distributed and consensual model rooted in the tradition of Locke’s Two 
Treatise of Government (Hobbes 1996; Locke 1996). Combining these models served to 
broaden the scope of the political and policy response to terrorism following the attacks of 
9/11. In particular policy making focused on developing a consensual partnership with the 
Muslim community to address the social causes of terrorism. At the same time the combination 
of the models represented a contentious institutional and ideational framework for decision-
making and created trade-offs between the roles of government and society. At the heart of this 
framework was the paradoxical issue of social integration as both a contributing factor to 
radicalisation and an essential pre-requisite for effective government action. The study shows 
	
1 There were a number of different names associated with the policy, however, for the purposes of clarity and 





how trade-offs in the process of integration was fundamental to the short and long-term success 
of Prevent and its perceived failures. 
The study tests this hypothesis by tracing the decision-making process, including the inputs, 
ideas and institutions that influenced them, and their outcomes (Yin 2003; Allison & Zelikow 
1999; Bulpitt 2008; Denscombe 2010; Goodin, Rein & Moran 2006; Hall 1993; Heclo & 
Wildavsky 1974; Lasswell 1936; Lindblom 1959; Pierson 2000a & 2000b; Rhodes 1997; 
Sabatier  & Wieble 2007; Stone 2012; Wildavsky 1979). In this model, policy making is an 
iterative and dynamic process that is founded both on formal powers and the authority that 
accrues from organisational capacity and legitimacy. Decisions are shaped by exogenous and 
endogenous inputs, including events, social and political trends and the impacts of prior 
decisions. These inputs are then interpreted through an iterative processes of deliberation, 
persuasion and feedback that is influenced by institutional relationships and priorities and new 
and evolving ideas, evidence and argument. In particular the study also illustrates how 
decisions interact at different levels, from national to local government and across a variety of 
agencies that can variously represent divergent or coherent networks of activity. Ultimately 
this study views policy as a dynamic and reactive process of decision-making in an open social 
and physical systems. 
The conflict over Prevent is illustrative of the persistent sensitivity of the relationship between 
a strong state guarantor of security and a free and autonomous, and peaceful, civil society 
(Buzan, Waever & de Wilde 1998; Huysmans 1998; Kaldor 2003). The two competing models 
that shaped the development of Prevent articulate competing conceptual and institutional views 
of this relationship. To assist the reader the study labels the two models Thomas and John as 
they are adapted from broader political science traditions that can be traced from Hobbes and 
Locke, but are not directly based on their theories (Pinker 2011). The study shows that the 
combination of these two models produced a new ideational and institutional framework for 
decision-making that dealt with the issue of cohesive political, legal, economic and cultural 





framework was contentious as it institutionalised conflict over the development of Islamic 
identity, minority activism and anxiety about the UK’s cultural and political identity following 
the end of the British empire (Saggar 2010a; McGhee 2008; Goodwin 2011; Gilroy 2004; 
Cantle 2012; Modood 2007). 
Ultimately the study shows how Prevent resulted from political pressure for a comprehensive 
response to terrorism in the aftermath of 9/11. This pressure initiated a process of reform that 
moved beyond a narrow enforcement approach by introducing a distributed and consensual 
approach to addressing the social roots of terrorism. The new combined framework for 
decision-making was integrated by the concept of radicalisation, a socio-political process of 
recruitment and participation, that had its roots in New Labour’s modernisation agenda of 
cross-government approaches to complex problems (6, Leat, Seltzer & Stoker 2002; Barber 
2008; Bleich 2010; Coutts and Uberoi 2010; Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010; Heath‐Kelly 
2012; Jackson 2007; Newman 2001a; Richards 2011; Saggar 2009; Sedgwick 2010; Thomas 
2010). However, the new framework also required decision-makers to navigate conflict over 
the responsibility for the causes of radicalisation and the political aims of Prevent, particularly 
in relation to the Muslim community, their values and motivations. In this respect Prevent 
incorporated broader political debates about the relationship between security and integration 
that were taking place at the time, into a policy framework. 
What this study does not directly answer is whether Prevent actually prevented terrorism. It 
explores how competing ideas about the aims of Prevent, interpretations of success and 
hypothesis about what was likely to work were incorporated into decisions. In particular the 
study will show that one of the main challenges for decision-making centred on how to evaluate 
the trade-off between short-term security objectives and a longer-term process of integration. 
In this respect the challenge that faced Prevent was not unique and is common to many 
preventative policies (Cairney 2007; Gough 2015; Heath‐Kelly 2012). At the same time 
Prevent was a particularly complex problem as it was a response to organized terrorist and 





of society, and sought to avoid scrutiny to in order to achieve this. What this study does show 
is that Prevent itself became the subject of conflict and decision-makers at all levels ultimately 
struggled to establish trust and credibility in the agenda. 
The study focuses on the initial development of Prevent between 2001 to 2011 when the focus 
was on radical Islamist terrorism. Unfortunately this challenge has remained persistent since 
then due to the on-going civil war in Syria and the major attacks in Paris in 2015, Berlin, 
Brussels and Nice in 2016 and Manchester, London and Barcelona in 2017 whilst concerns 
have also grown about the activities of the far right. The causes of these threats and attacks 
resist simple answers but reiterate the importance of addressing a persistent challenge. My 
research draws on a part of my career where I worked as an analyst on a series of projects in 
relation to radicalisation and Prevent, including for the Department for Communities and Local 
Government, English local authorities and regional government and the European 
Commission. My supervisor, Professor Shamit Saggar also worked for the Prime Minister’s 
Strategy Unit and contributed to the early stages of the development of Prevent. My 
professional experience frames some of my perspectives but I have had no direct involvement 
in any of the decisions or organisations described in this study. I hope this perspective helps 
provide an honest assessment of the study’s central questions. 
The thesis starts from the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in 2001 attacks and concludes in 2011 
with the introduction of a revised strategy under the Coalition government. It is structured 
across nine chapters that can be grouped in three sections. This introductory chapter provides 
an overview of the study’s central questions followed by a literature review that explores the 
threat from terrorism and finds a gap in the analysis of the decision-making behind Prevent and 
similar policies. The first section concludes with theory and methods chapters that set out the 
theoretical and analytical frameworks employed by the study, including the theoretical models 
of the state and security and the policy making process. The middle section is comprised of 
three empirical chapters that provide a detailed insight into the key decisions that shaped the 





involved. Following this two analytical chapters explore what the process tells us about the 
institutional and ideational influences on the development of Prevent. The final chapter 
explores the extent to which Prevent represented a change in policy, the study’s contribution 
and final reflections for policy makers and researchers. 
Overview of Prevent  
“The first priority of any Government is to ensure the security and safety of the nation 
and all members of the public.” Rt Hon Gordon Brown, Prime Minister (HM 
Government 2009a) 
Prevent formed part of the UK’s domestic response to the threat from international jihadi 
terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. It was first included in the 2003 UK Contest counter-
terrorism strategy alongside the traditional Pursue strand that was focused on identifying, 
catching and prosecuting suspected terrorists, and the Protect and Prepare strands.2 The Contest 
strategy was developed following the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington and in the 
context of the UK’s involvement in military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq and the US 
led Operation Enduring Freedom, often referred to as the ‘war on terrorism’. During this time 
there were a series of arrests and prosecutions of individuals, including British nationals, for 
plots to attack UK and international targets. There was increased monitoring of Islamist 
terrorist groups and extremists in the UK and overseas by security services that was set 
alongside extended police powers of stop and search, detention without charge and further 
criminalisation of involvement or support for terrorist groups and acts (Evans 2007). 
Prevent itself came to public prominence in 2005 in the aftermath of the 7/7 bombing of the 
London transport system by four British nationals that resulted in the deaths of 56 people, 
including the attackers. After the 7/7 attacks Tony Blair, then Prime Minister, called for more 
concerted action to combat extremists and the causes of terrorism (Blair 2005). This was 
	






followed by a Muslim community consultation exercise titled Preventing Violent Extremism 
Together that was followed by a £6 million pathfinder-piloting fund during 2006/07. The first 
full inter departmental Prevent strategy was published in 2008 (HM Government 2008a) and 
involved the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), the Home Office, 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Department for Children Schools and Families and the 
Department for Innovation Universities and Skills (DIUS). 
Prevent’s stated aim was to stop people becoming terrorists or supporting violent-extremism 
(Department for Communities and Local Government 2007; HM Government 2006, 2008a, 
2008b, 2009a, 2009b). One aspect focused on supporting mainstream voices by helping people, 
particularly youth, to speak out and contradict extremist messages where they came across 
them publicly and privately. Prevent also supported vulnerable individuals through referral 
programmes such as Channel, including training to help communities and public agencies 
recognise warning signs of radicalisation (HM Government 2010a). In addition there was 
support for community organisations to marginalise those promoting extremist and radical 
ideologies alongside broader efforts to promote integration of British Muslims and the 
community’s positive role in British society at national and local levels. The programme also 
incorporated strategic communications, particularly diplomatic engagement with Muslim 
countries overseas, plus research and analysis to inform decision-making. 
The main period of funding covered by this study concluded in the 2009/10 financial year, in 
advance of the 2010 general election. In 2008/09 £140 million was committed to Prevent 
delivery (HM Government 2009a) through a strategy that ran between 2008 and 2010. To put 
this into context the annual commitment on security services and policing at the time was £2 
billion (HC deb 25 July 2007, c841WS). Out of the Prevent budget approximately £45 million 
was allocated by the DCLG, primarily through area based funding to 92 local authorities, based 
on the size of the local Muslim population. This funding was not ring fenced but was attached 
to the National Indicator 35 requirement that set out general expectations in line with Prevent’s 





Based Grant and an additional £5.1 for the Community Leadership Fund to develop leadership 
capacity within Muslim communities. Funding was also allocated to develop schools curricula 
and a referral toolkit for universities and colleges (DIUS 2009).  
Home Office funding, including funding for the police, was £47 million in 2009/10 and £37 
million in 2010/11 (Gregory 2010). This included funding for local neighbourhood policing 
Prevent leads. For example, 137 police officer posts within 23 forces outside London were 
recruited in 2008/9 at a cost of £7,239,000 including training and other expenses, of which 87 
were neighbourhood engagement posts and 50 counter-terrorism intelligence officers. In 
2008/09 £578 million specifically targeted grants were made to support counter-terrorism 
policing, including enabling the establishment of an effective Police Counter-terrorism 
Network (PCTN) to facilitate intelligence sharing. The Home Office also provided £1.2 million 
in additional police funding for specific work with schools, colleges and universities. In 
addition £5.6 was granted to the National Offender Management Service and £3.5 million to 
the youth Justice Board in 2009/10. 
Throughout its development Prevent was characterised by conflict about its aims, its treatment 
of the Muslim community and its effectiveness at preventing terrorism (Communities and 
Local Government Committee 2010; HM Government 2011c). Nevertheless it was retained 
alongside the other pillars across three iterations between 2003 and 2011 and through the 
change in government in 2010 (HM Government 2006, 2009a and 2011b). Under the 2011 
strategy, responsibility for Prevent was allocated to the Home Office, which centralised a 
reduced volume of funding, ending area based grants to local authorities and focused work on 
targeted solutions such as the Channel programme (HM Government 2011a). The political 
context also changed following the withdrawal of troops from Iraq, the assassination of Osama 
Bin Laden and the Arab Spring in early 2011 that had seemingly marginalised more extreme 
jihadist Islamist groups. However the issue has subsequently moved back up the agenda due to 
the participation of British citizens in the Syrian civil war, further terrorist attacks around 





Prevent and security 
That Prevent was a controversial policy is unsurprising, decisions made in the name of security 
are often accompanied by significant conflict over the balance with the principles liberal 
democracy and human rights (Wilkinson 2006; Mulgan 2007). What this study proposes 
however is that Prevent as a policy was founded on different perspectives on of the relationship 
between the state and the protection of a free and autonomous civil society (Pinker 2011).  The 
issue of security as it relates to the legitimate use force, is so fundamental to the authority of 
states that it can exert a particular influence across a range of policy agendas (Huysmans 1998). 
In this respect Prevent incorporated elements of two conflicting models of government and 
security in an attempt to develop a broad based response to the threat from terrorism. However, 
the approach served to expose and exacerbate different, and sometimes incommensurable, 
perspectives on the role of government and society in mediating differences and resolving and 
preventing conflict. 
The first model of government and security, labelled Thomas for this study, is situated in the 
Hobbesian tradition where security is the sole responsibility of the state, is indivisible and 
stands apart and over society. The sovereign allows society to move out of a lawless state of 
nature where an individual’s sole right of self-protection results in the classic “war of all 
against all” and a “nasty brutish and short existence” (Hobbes 1996). Security is based on the 
investment of an individual’s right of self-protection into the sovereign which then has a 
monopoly on the use of force to protect citizens. At the same time the sovereign’s authority 
rests on its reputation for competent protection of a citizens latent right of self-protection 
through fair and consistent use of its power, such as through the rule of law.3 This is well 
illustrated by Hannah Arendt’s argument that the use of violence by governments is a 
	
3 As Hobbes was writing in reaction to the English civil war his perspective is largely framed by the impact and 
consequences of an absence of a government whilst recognising the crucial importance of reputation and 





consequence of the breakdown of the institutional and cultural authority that underpins 
effective exercise of power (Arendt 1970). 
The second model of government and security, labelled here as John, is situated in the tradition 
of Locke’s Two Treatise of Government and shifts the focus back toward society (Locke 1996). 
In this model the authority of government is more distributed and is rooted in its embodiment 
of the material desires and social values of its citizens. The demands of society are diverse, and 
in some cases conflicting, so governments must also be able mediate between these differences 
through the creation of shared institutions. As with the Thomas model a government’s authority 
is founded on its ability to protect the interests of its citizens but in this perspective government 
is more reactive, adaptative and representative of their demands. Effective government has to 
respond and mediate between differences and protect minorities in order to cultivate a cohesive 
and secure political society (Sen 2006). As a result model John places a greater emphasis on 
the effective representation of broader range of social interests and values by government. 
When viewed through the prism of these models of government and security, non-state actors 
use terrorist tactics to challenge the authority the sovereign and to undermine the political and 
civic norms of society. Attacks on vulnerable soft targets, such as transport systems, serve to 
intimidate the public and undermine the authority of their government (Richardson 2006). 
Attacks may also polarise society, both directly and through counter-productive responses by 
government and society (Richardson 2006). Terrorist-style guerrilla attacks may be deployed 
for conventional tactical objectives, such as destabilising economies or degrading military 
forces. However, terrorism is typically used as part of asymmetric political and military 
strategies by non-state groups and is valued for producing wider political and social impacts 
beyond the damage of the immediate attack. As a result terrorism inevitably presents a complex 
political challenge for democratic governments that rely on the rule of law and shared 





Policy responses to terrorism are high contested and sensitive. Terrorism as an operational 
threat can be highly sophisticated or hard to track whilst the direct challenge to government 
authority and social norms makes it inherently political  (Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning & Smyth 
2011). States often have legal and political latitude when responding to security threats, as 
illustrated by the right to self-protection that is enshrined in international law and embedded in 
international human rights standards.4 At the same time the social reactions to terrorism can be 
heightened by the emotive combination of the unlikely but high impact of attacks and their 
deliberate nature (Aradau & Van Munster 2007; Beck 1992). As a result the threat of terrorism 
often has significant impacts on government priorities. It can serve to justify a wide range of 
government actions whilst shaping the legitimacy of ideas or social groups far beyond those 
who are directly involved in violence (Jackson 2007; Williams 2005).  
Understanding what causes terrorism has been a feature of efforts to prevent terrorism 
following 9/11. In practice there are competing views about the relative emphasis on 
organizational, political, psychological, sociological and structural factors (Sedgwick 2010). 
The debate about the causes of terrorism has been increasingly framed by the concept of 
radicalisation that has brought together these different elements (Githens-Mazer & Lambert 
2010; Heath-Kelly 2012; Richards 2011; Sedgwick 2010). The concept of radicalisation itself 
is highly contested. Its origins was directly linked to the post 9/11 security environment and, 
as with much terrorism research, it has been expressly framed by applied questions of how to 
stop it. In particular there has been a tendency for the concept to be treated as an overly linear 
and deterministic conveyor belt (Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010). Nevertheless, this study 
will show that this concept played a key role in moving security policy beyond the pursuit of 
	
4 For example Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights allows that “In time of war or other 
public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating 
from its obligations under [the] Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, 





rational organised terrorist groups, such as al-Qaeda or ISIS, to address broader social and 
political questions.5 
Crucially, the focus on the causes of terrorism has led to debates about what is realistic or 
legitimate for a security policy to address (Richards 2011). This has included scrutiny of Islam 
the values and beliefs of Muslim communities in the aftermath of 9/11. (Kundnani 2009; 
Stevens 2011). As shown by Saggar, policy in this field operates at the dynamic intersection 
between government action and multi-faceted and fissiparous social identities (Saggar 2010a 
& 2009). However, most analysis of Prevent itself has focused on aspects of its delivery. This 
includes analyses of areas such as policing and community relations, theological responses or 
a descriptive overview of the programme at a particular points in the development of Prevent 
(Birt 2009; Bleich 2010; Gregory 2010; Lowndes and Thorp 2010; Spalek and Lambert 2008 
& 2010; Thomas 2010). Analysis has also argued that Prevent has exacerbated the alienation 
of the Muslim community itself and debates about multiculturalism and Islam (Abbas 2007; 
Brighton 2007; Gutkowski 2011; McGhee 2008; Thomas 2010). In this respect most analysis 
of Prevent invariably takes into account both the policy itself and a wider set of social and 
political dynamics.  
Prevent and policy-making 
To examine the influence of the models on Prevent this study examines its development as an 
process of decision-making, mediated by the ideas, interests and relationships of an evolving 
policy community. Policy making is often examined against the high modernist ideal where 
decision-makers strive for rational outcomes based on empirical analysis of clearly defined 
problems (Goodin et al 2006). However, this study examines what ideas influenced how 
problems were understood, conceptualised and explained and guided activity, and how 
institutional histories, interests, cultures and relationships structured decisions (Allison & 
	
5 There are important distinctions between al-Qaeda and ISIS. al-Qaeda viewed itself as a vanguard movement 
that sought to catalyze global change; ‘Islamic State’ seeks to carve out a territorial powerbase through sectarian 
conflict in Syria and Northern Iraq. However, both draw on shared ideological framework of jihadi Salafism and 





Zelikow 1999; Hall & Taylor 1996; Stone 2012; Wildavsky 1987). At the same time the study 
also examines the institutional dimensions that shaped Prevent, including how structures, 
interests and values influenced decision-makers and advocates (Lasswell 1936; Sabatier & 
Weible 2007; Wildavsky 1979). By focusing on both aspects of decision the study shows how 
exogenous and endogenous factors combined to determine what problems and ideas received 
attention and shaped decisions (Bertelli, Jennings, & Beavan 2013). 
What makes Prevent particularly interesting is the idea of trying to prevent people from being 
involved in terrorism and what that then entails. Ideas in policy making provide explicit and 
implicit frameworks for decisions. At the same time they may actively influence change 
through their capacity to clearly explain or communicate to different audiences (Stone 2012). 
Ideas describe problems in ways that make them manageable for decision-makers, or analysts, 
or may serve to place them out of reach (Wildavsky 1979). For example, in this study the 
traditions of Hobbes and Locke represent labels that capture different perspectives on the way 
governments protect rights and mediate differences. Similarly in the case of Prevent the 
concept of radicalisation was a way of understanding and communicating complex problems, 
incorporating personal, social, environmental or mechanical causes (Heath-Kelly 2012; Stone 
1989). To take another example, earthquake policy may use measures to minimise harm from 
earthquakes based on an understanding of seismic activity, but can’t realistically stop them. In 
this respect decisions are often framed in response to failures or gaps, such regulation of 
building in earthquake zones, resulting in incremental changes over time (Pierson 2000a). 
Therefore this study examines how different ideas enabled decision-makers to evaluate their 
options based on an understanding of the problem, their preferences and the likely impacts of 
a solution. For example, tolerance of a phenomenon such as terrorism is set against the 
complexity of its causes when determining a preference for ex ante or ex post solutions. 
Similarly mechanisms such as market competition may produce less equal outcomes than 
central planning but may be valued for producing higher levels of innovation (Newman 2001b). 





in a complex system. Professionally led models may encourage high levels of responsibility 
but may also be resistant to change when necessary. Legal powers or administrative hierarchies 
may produce more uniform outcomes but can be less adaptable to change. Therefore solutions 
can represent proxies for preferred priorities, such as equality and efficiency in health care and 
the merits of planning and markets (Majone 1989; Newman 2001a & 2001b). 
At the same time ideas are embedded in institutional relationships. Policy may be framed by 
ideas but it is done by institutional networks or communities, that include government and its 
departments, its agencies and other organisations, that have responsibilities and powers over 
decision-making (Rhodes 1997). For example, Jim Bulpitt’s seminal work describes the 
development of the institutions of central and local government as a historical process of 
negotiation over territorial control (Bulpitt 2008). In this model central government and local 
agencies have established mutually agreeable areas of competence. The centre is responsible 
for the high politics of government, including security and foreign relations and taxations and 
divests responsibility for the messy work of administration and delivery to local authorities. 
From the alternative perspective, local administration trades away its input into the decisions 
of high government in exchange for authority over local decision-making. Over time these 
boundaries may shift and conflict but ultimately policy is based on a mutually acceptable 
settlement that enables institutions to exert authority over their respective domains. 
A theme of this study is how the size and breadth of the institutional community influenced 
decision-making and its outcomes. The importance of these dimensions was illustrated by 
Heclo and Wildavsky’s classic 1974 account of financial policy making and the role of the 
treasury (Heclo & Wildavsky 1974). They showed that government decision-making was a 
collective process of problem solving by a community of departments and individuals. 
Therefore, the size and shape of a community influenced the range of ideas and interests need 
to be mediated to achieve a workable consensus. Larger communities can increase the range of 
ideas and interests in the process, including some that may be incidental to the central policy 





mask incidental or controversial issues in the process, even if this is not always totally 
successful. Conversely smaller communities may lack sufficiently broad authority or capacity 
to adequately deal with the complexity of the problem at hand. 
In addition to the size and breath of the institutional community, this study also illustrates how 
the structure of these relationships influences policy. Rhodes’s work has shown how reforms 
of government since the late 1980s has made policy communities, and by extension decision-
making, more diverse and diffuse (Rhodes 1997). This has included the growth of non-
departmental bodies and regulatory agencies, with their own interests and competencies, that 
sit outside of Whitehall and the traditional territorial settlement. Similarly, policy increasingly 
works with independent civil society organisations and the private sector as partners for 
delivery (Newman 2001a). In some cases tight knit communities of decision-makers retain 
strong control over policy through shared interests and ideas formed through regular, close and 
reciprocal relationships. However, looser networked structures with more transient 
relationships and wider external scrutiny and inputs may produce more competition over 
decision-making. The structure of these relationships may also change due to internal feedback 
or external scrutiny of decisions, with consequences for decision-making. 
The liberal model of government both recognises the benefits, flaws and limits of interlocking 
institutional relationships, whilst seeking to deliver its priorities through them. Institutional 
breadth can enable responsiveness to social needs whilst clear legal hierarchies can provide 
power and coherence to decision-making. In this respect institutional ideas and interests sit 
alongside the legal status of institutional relationships in determining the options available to 
government. In particular, the implementation of decisions may also be shaped by the way their 
aims and intentions are interpreted, deliberately or inadvertently, at the street level (Lipsky 
1997). There are various levers open to decision-makers in order to influence how decisions 
are implemented across institutional systems, none of which are perfect. There are directive 
models such as contracts for the delivery of services and the enforcement of laws that may be 





governance or incentive frameworks but whose outcomes are less certain (6 et al 2002; Hughes 
2010; Johnson 2010; Newman 2001a; Saggar 2010a).  
Ultimately, in order to understand why prevent developed in the way that it did it is important 
to examine the process through both the ideational and institutional frames (Allison & Zelikow 
1999). Decisions can simultaneously be understood through an empirically informed modernist 
framework and as a negotiated settlement of institutional interests and preferences. A policy 
may be developed as a rational response to a well-understood problem with a clear objective 
and knowable solution. At the same time decisions are also mediated by assumptions, political 
preferences and heuristics employed by policy makers (Wildavsky 1987). The process of 
negotiation within a policy community may balance short-term interests and priorities against 
long-term relationships and objectives (Heclo and Wildavsky 1974; Rhodes 1997). Similarly a 
change in government or public opinion may reshape political priorities whilst interlocking 
institutional relationships may also seek to entrench the status quo. Furthermore, evidence may 
improve the understanding of a problem but may not settle uncertainty about the solution or 
resolve competing institutional interests. 
This interlocking picture might suggest institutional inertia, however policies do change and 
can shift substantially over time or in short periods. Crucial to change is a process of persuasion 
that makes a case for a particular course of action through ideas, evidence and the alignment 
of institutional priorities, values and interests (Lasswell 1936; Wildavsky 1979). Change is 
often driven by a deficit model where existing policy is insufficient or ineffective and there are 
better alternatives (Wildavsky 1979). Ideas and evidence can challenge existing policy by 
describing a phenomena or evaluating a policy’s effectiveness or introducing new preferences 
for its aims. However the influence of evidence is fundamentally linked to how it is presented, 
communicated and interpreted against different priorities and interests. Coalitions with shared 
goals may implicitly adopt shared strategies of influence by presenting complementary 





2007). Ultimately the success of advocacy is dependent on the ability to make a persuasive 
case for a particular course of action to those who have control of decision-making. 
Hall’s paradigms model is a useful tool for exploring how competing ideas influence decision-
making and shape institutional change (Hall 1993). In most policy agendas a stable set of ideas 
is embedded into decision-making across a policy community and results in incremental 
models of change that are focused on refining existing approaches. However, different ideas 
may also compete for control of decision-making. Competing ideas may have fundamentally 
different starting points for the policy problem, may focus on different causes and ultimately 
recommend different courses of action. Hall used the example of monetary policy where there 
is competition over how government can best support economic growth between supply side 
monetarism and demand side Keynesianism (Hall 1993). Hall positions paradigmatic change 
as a zero sum contest between two competing models where ultimately one model becomes the 
dominant ideational framework for policy-making across an institutional community. In 
contrast different models of policy precludes the development of a working consensus in a 
policy community and results in counterproductive conflict over decision-making.  
Hall’s model is useful because it examines change as the pattern of authority of competing 
ideas in an institutional context. However, the extent to which analysis of policy as negotiated 
process of interests, values and ideas enables an evaluation of whether it was was good in the 
modernist sense is dependent on how success was defined by policy makers, analysts, or by a 
public that has to endure its outcomes. A policy may fail to deliver the outcomes that it aimed 
to achieve. Equally a ‘good idea’ that can’t be implemented through the inconvenience of 
reality is a bad policy. The decision-making process that led to this outcome might be seen as 
‘flawed’ (King and Crewe 2014). Flaws may originate from gaps in the evidence, prioritisation 
of narrow political priorities or interests or a failure to attract the support of necessary groups. 
Therefore, failures of policy can be a failure to explain, persuade and compromise but equally 







The study presents a qualitative case study of decision-making and change. The study draws 
on Allison & Zelikow’s multiple frames to analyse this process from a series of from different 
angles (Allison & Zelikow 1999; Cairney 2007). The study is structured around an examination 
of the influence of two competing models of security, a rights based and state-led Hobbesian 
model labelled ‘Thomas’ and a consensual and distributed model in the tradition of Locke 
labelled ‘John’. It presents a detailed narrative account of decision-making and the patterns of 
institutional support, persuasion and inputs that can be observed during the process. It then 
examines this process from institutional and ideational lenses to trace features of the process 
against the expectations of the two models. Finally it concludes by examining the process 
against a series of tests and the features of the models themselves to assess the extent to which 
Prevent represented a change in policy. Through these multiple lenses the study examines why 
Prevent developed in the way that it did. 
The study is a case study of government decision-making that aims to understand the factors 
that influenced the process (Denscombe 2010; Yin 2003). Formal decisions, such as the 
publication of Prevent strategies, are examined as the product of a process of exogenous and 
endogenous inputs and institutional negotiation and persuasion. In order to understand this 
process study presents evidence based on 16 semi-structured interviews with individuals that 
were involved in decision-making at national and local levels. In particular the study focuses 
on a set of advisors, many of whom were explicitly recruited to advise on engagement with the 
Muslim community. Their perspectives are augmented by in-depth assessment of speeches and 
ministerial statements, the parliamentary record and formal policy outputs to trace decision-
making and evaluate the factors that shaped decisions throughout the process. These sources 
are critically assessed to understand their ideas in their institutional context and aims and the 
ideas that framed them. This data was prioritised to help understand the explicit and implicit 






This study explores how policy-making dealt with the complex challenge of preventing 
terrorism in the UK following 9/11. It examines how competing models of security rooted in 
the traditions of Hobbes and Locke, and their competing perspectives of the relationship 
between government and society, influenced the development of Prevent. It does this by tracing 
the ideas and institutional relationships that were embedded in an iterative decision-making 
process between 2001 and 2011. Although a study of this type cannot provide definitive 
conclusions about the merits and success of Prevent it develops a rich case study about the 
decision-making process. The study aims to understand the origins of Prevent, including how 
policy makers understood the problem and the role that ideas and institutions played in shaping 
the decision-making process and change. By analysing Prevent through these frames the study 
aims enhance our understanding of how the policy developed and why it has been the subject 















Chapter 2: Understanding terrorism 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the complex threat from terrorism and its relationship with global and 
national political contexts. It establishes this study’s starting point that a preventative approach 
to terrorism was a legitimate government agenda. The threat from al-Qaeda and associated 
organisations was real and complex due to its organisational structure, support base and 
political goals and patterns of recruitment. This threat was also linked to a wider political and 
social context, including Islamist movements and the experiences of the Muslim community 
in the UK. In this respect the chapter identifies a legitimate debate over the balance between 
disrupting recruitment by terrorist organisations and dealing with a wider set of structural and 
political factors that were directly and indirectly relevant. Therefore, this chapter argues that it 
was legitimate for Prevent to address the relationship between militant groups, a wider political 
Islamist movement and the domestic politics of Muslim identity and integration (Burke 2004; 
Gerges 2011; Kepel 2001; Roy 2004 & 2010; Saggar 2010a).  
The literature on Prevent illustrates the difficulty of dealing with terrorist groups as well as 
their wider social and political context (Richards 2010; Githens-Mazer 2010; Sedgwick 2010; 
Birt 2009). The two dimensions are embedded into the concept of radicalisation, the “process 
by which people come to support violent-extremism and, in some cases, join terrorist groups” 
(HM Government 2009a p43). The broader concept incorporates a complex interaction 
between the organisational, social and psychological dimensions of participation and 
recruitment to high risk activism and terrorism, political mobilisation and escalation of 
violence. However, criticisms of the idea have centred on the nuances of the relationship 
between radical jihadi terrorists, a circle of tacit support and the wider values and attitudes of 
the Muslim community (Saggar 2006). In particular the relationship has been prominent in 





nativist European political parties that are overtly hostile to Islam (Eatwell 2004 & 2010; 
Goodwin 2011; Kestel & Godmer 2004; Malik 2010; Mudde 2007; Silj 2010; Sunier 2010; ).  
Furthermore, the literature also highlights the difficulty of dealing with the active strategic and 
tactical challenge of militant and radical groups. This includes the inherent risk in decision-
making, including the cost of no action, potential unintended consequences and the importance 
of getting interventions right (Cronin 2010; Richardson 2006; Silke 2003). For example, the 
international military response to al-Qaeda helped to turn a disparate network into a cohesive 
militant movement (Cronin 2010). Furthermore, militant groups and their active and tacit 
supporters have used negative experiences of counter-terrorism policing or criminal justice 
powers, or social exclusion and marginalisation, as recruitment tools (Richardson 2006). In this 
respect Prevent was dealing with a challenge from radical Islamist militants that sought to 
expose an authoritarian anti-Islamic hypocrisy at the heart of the Christian West’s liberal 
concepts of democracy and human rights (Silke 2003). At the same time the literature also 
points to the political and practical risks that no action may undermine the authority of 
government and allow extremist groups to advance their political objectives. 
The terrorist threat  
Prevent was originally developed in response to the genuine threat from al-Qaeda inspired 
terrorism following the attacks of 9/11.6 Osama Bin Laden, a Saudi national, established al-
Qaeda (The Foundation) during his time fighting in the Afghan resistance against the Soviet 
Union and via Sudan and ultimately Afghanistan from the mid 1990s under the Taliban. From 
Afghanistan the group set up training bases, developed funding sources and established 
international networks to carry out attacks on US targets overseas, including the 1998 US 
embassy bombings and the 2000 attack on the USS Cole in Yemen’s Aden Harbour. Al-
Qaeda’s high point was the attacks of 9/11 on New York and Washington that killed 2996 
	
6 Since 2013 the principle international Islamist terrorist threat for western governments has primarily centred on 





people. The attacks were planned by senior al-Qaeda leadership and were carried out by a group 
of Saudi nationals that formed the ‘Hamburg cell’. Osama Bin Laden claimed responsibility 
for the attacks in 2004 citing, amongst other things, the presence of US troops in Saudi Arabia 
and its support for Israel. 
Box 2.1. The core ideological framework of al-Qaeda and jihadi terrorist networks 
• Jihadism; a violent interpretation of a spiritual way of life and a permanent and 
individual obligation on all Muslims. 
• Takfir (excommunication from the faith); of Muslim leaders for failing to rule by 
Shari’a, and, for some including the generality of Muslims for complicity or failure 
to believe and practice a form of Islam acceptable to extremists. 
• The world as an abode of war (Dar-al-Harb); the Muslim and non-Muslim worlds 
are assumed to be in a state of war until the rule of Shari’a is established. This means 
all rules for Muslim conduct can be suspended. 
• The principle of non-discrimination between civilian and military targets; 
Civilians are seen as culpable, for example by voting and paying taxes to the state, 
or seen as collateral damage. 
• Attacking the far enemy; a strategic switch from targeting the ‘near’ enemy 
(apostate Muslim governments) to attacking the US and its western allies directly. 
Here the underpinning rationale is probably that nationalist tendencies within the 
jihadist movements are minimised and that a pan-Islamic movement will be 





• Suicide bombing; justified as part of asymmetric warfare and the weak position of 
Muslims. As suicide is a sin in Islam, suicide bombing is recast as self-martyrdom 
and sacrifice for the cause. 
• The killing of other Muslims; is justified on the grounds that they are either 
complicit through voting / paying taxes to Western or apostate Muslim 
governments, that they oppose the establishment of an Islamic state, or that they are 
collateral damage and, as Muslims, martyrs to the cause. Dependent on the school 
of Islam they may also be regarded as heretic. 
• The return of the caliphate; a world government ruled by the precepts of Shari’a, 
beginning with the reestablishment of a caliphate somewhere in the Muslim world. 
(Change Institute 2008a) 
The 9/11 attack framed western security policy for over a decade and secured al-Qaeda a 
significance in security policy far beyond any other terrorist group and most states at the time. 
Its significance was predicated on its position as a well-funded group that undertook a highly 
successful and spectacular act that helped to align a variety of disparate Sunni militant groups 
(Burke 2004; Gerges 2011). It shared ideas with other Sunni Islamist militant groups that drew 
on many of the ideas of Sayyid Qutb that called for a new form of Islamic government to 
replace western clients across the middle east (Qutb 2006). Equally, al-Qaeda’s focus on the 
US as the ‘far enemy’ rather than domestic authorities, was its most important strategic 
innovation (See Box 2.1 for explanation of some key concepts and tenets of al-Qaeda jihadism). 
Bin Laden positioned himself and al-Qaeda as both a titular or spiritual leader of a militant 
Islamist jihadi movement whilst also supporting networks of operatives and local affiliates 
(Burke 2004; Sageman 2008). However, as noted by Cronin the US’s strategic and tactical 





“Al-Qaeda’s global threat was in fact serious but not seamless. The western allies 
inadvertently reinforced it by swallowing the narrative of an endlessly adaptive, 
coherent movement with tentacles reaching throughout the world.” (Cronin 2010 
p837) 
Before 9/11 UK counter-terrorism policy had focused on domestic Irish republican groups and 
their loyalist counter parts until the 1994 ceasefires and 1998 peace agreement (HM 
Government 2009a). Much of this response focused on disrupting nationalist and loyalist 
groups though military patrols and resource for security agencies to identify and track those 
who were considered to be a threat. Special powers of internment were also exercised during 
the 1970s in Northern Ireland to stop, search and detain people suspected of membership of 
groups without charge. There were also physical measures, such as the ‘peace walls’, to keep 
nationalist Catholic and loyalist Protestant communities apart in order to minimise violence. 
Other steps included preventing the voices of the Northern Irish Republican leaders Gerry 
Adams and Martin McGuiness being heard on UK media during the 1980s. Subsequently the 
conflict moved toward resolution through a negotiated integration of the different political 
communities into shared institutions, principally the Stormont legislative assembly and a 
reformed Police Service of Northern Ireland (previously the Royal Ulster Constabulary). 
In contrast, Al-Qaeda and its wider networks were seen as a new form of terrorism that was 
distinct from domestic terrorism or state sponsored threats (HM Government 2009a). The idea 
of a terrorist threat being ‘new’ does risk making it unnecessarily exotic and prone to political 
manipulation (Jackson, Jarvis, Gunning & Smyth 2011). Nevertheless there were features of 
militant Islamist terrorism that presented new challenges to security capabilities and policies, 
particularly where these had focused on other states (Hoffman 2006; Cronin 2010). In 
particular the internationally networked structure of al-Qaeda did stretch the capacity of 
security services to identify and track specific plots. Similarly, the use of suicide tactics 
presented a new challenge for protecting ‘soft’ civilian targets such as transport systems. 





a wider Muslim community, known as the ‘Ummah’, and the Christian West. These features 
presented significant practical and political challenges both in Muslim majority countries as 
well as in western Europe (Wike and Samaranayake 2006). 
Possibly the most significant feature of the al-Qaeda threat was its international reach via 
networks of affiliates and supporters (Gerges 2011; Sageman 2008). Although terrorist groups 
had collaborated in the past, international jihadi networks that linked a variety of national 
conflicts were a new challenge for western security agencies. Between 2001 and 2006 a number 
of British nationals participated in jihadi attacks overseas, including in Israel and Afghanistan, 
as well as in the UK, most notably on 7/7. In 2007 the head of MI5, Jonathan Evans, suggested 
2000 people were being tracked in the UK due to their support for and potential involvement 
in terrorism (Evans 2007). In 2010 Evans also highlighted British citizens travelling overseas 
to new destinations such as to Somalia and Yemen to train and fight with militant groups. In 
the years since the focus has shifted to participation in the Syrian civil war, accessible via 
Turkey, and the growing use of the internet to recruit and disseminate propaganda. 
Furthermore, the risk of participants returning from overseas conflicts was also demonstrated 
by the attacks on Paris in 2015. 
At the heart of this was a debate about methods of mobilisation and recruitment by terrorist 
organisations. This debate was between bottom-up mobilisation by a ‘bunch of guys’ attracted 
to violence and in search of an identity or purpose, versus hierarchical models of organisational 
recruitment and control working to political objectives (Atran 2010; Hoffman 2006 & 2008; 
Sageman 2004 & 2008). In this respect Al-Qaeda was a foreign organisation in terms of its 
leadership and command structures but was also linked to domestic patterns to recruitment and 
participation in the UK and other European countries by networks and affiliates. In terms of a 
policy response the bottom-up model suggested a more distributed preventative response that 
engages with the social dynamics of recruitment, such as the identity factors that drive 
participation. This is in contrast to what might be characterised as a more conventional counter 





work. Aspects of both approaches can be traced through the development and evolution of 
Prevent. 
The two dimensions are illustrated by the London 7/7 attackers who were a social group 
embedded in radical Islamist scene that established links with Al Qaeda networks through its 
ring leader Mohammad Sidique Khan (Briggs, Cole, Gilmore & Valentina 2011). The 7/7 
attacks illustrate Sageman’s socially rooted ‘bunch of guys’ model, with the group coming 
together via the domestic Islamist ‘scene’ made up of social networks of friends and 
acquaintances. On the other hand later investigations showed that the ringleader Mohammad 
Sidique Khan had visited training camps in Afghanistan and was in frequent contact with 
Pakistan, including just prior to the attack, suggesting coordination with international networks. 
As with the 7/7 attaches many of those arrested on terrorism offences between 2001 and 2005 
had attended training camps in Pakistan, Afghanistan or Somalia, or were associated with 
individuals who had (Briggs & Birdwell 2009). For example Khan was known to have 
associated with Omar Khyam, who was prosecuted for the ‘fertiliser bomb’ plot and may have 
been in Afghanistan at the same time. Although MI5 had intelligence of a potential second plot 
Khan was not prioritised and there was no detailed knowledge of their plan.  
Militant and radical Islamism 
The challenge from jihadi terrorism also illustrates how globalisation blurs the boundaries of 
domestic and international problems for governments. The 7/7 attackers were all born and 
raised in the UK there has been a discernible UK contribution to the international jihadi and 
Islamist landscape. For example during the 1990s the presence of dissidents from middle 
Eastern and north African states in the UK was tolerated by authorities, often referred to as the 
Londonistan period (Kepel 2001). Activists and recruiters such as Omar Bakri Mohammed and 
Abu Hamza promoted fundamentalist political Islam and jihadist world views in the UK and 
overseas through groups such as Al-Mujharoun and its successors (Wiktorowicz 2005b). 





1990s also established links with overseas militant groups and adapted radical political and 
religious ideas for European audiences. Furthermore, ideas associated with radical Islam also 
have roots in postcolonial independence and politics, further illustrating the interconnected 
nature of the political challenge. 
Groups such as al-Qaeda choose terrorist tactics to advance their ideological cause (Hoffman 
2006; Pape 2003 & 2006; Richardson 2006). For al-Qaeda and other jihadists the objective was 
to advance Islamic governance on behalf the wider Muslim ‘Ummah’. Groups that use terrorist 
tactics also tend to share similar strategic positions in that they oppose established political 
orders but are unable to realise their objectives through democratic, popular or peaceful means. 
As a result terrorist groups often share comparable ideas and concepts that justify their tactics 
and gather recruits to their cause. Common ideas include vanguardism to justify or encourage 
action without popular support, and concepts such as Takfirism that legitimise the deaths of 
civilians, including Muslims. Propaganda typically venerates those who participate in violence, 
particularly for groups such as the so called ‘Islamic State’ that are seeking to maximise active 
recruits. For example, suicide bombers are considered martyrs who receive special treatment 
in the afterlife.  
As with most terrorist or militant groups, al-Qaeda inspired terrorism also had links with a 
wider body of political or religious thought, in this case Islamism (della Porta 1995; Rapoport 
2006; Richardson 2006; Saggar 2010a). Islamism describes political groups based on a Muslim 
religious identity who support a model of government based on Islamic doctrines. Their growth 
has been traced from the failure of postcolonial Arab nationalism during the cold war and have 
often represented the main organised opposition to authoritarian Middle Eastern governments 
(Kepel 2001).7 In particular the influential radical Islamist text Milestones by Sayyid Qutb 
challenged the corruption of the secular Arab nationalist regime of Nasser during the 1950s 
	
7 Prominent Islamist groups, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, have often been the subject of significant 
state oppression. The most recent example of this was removal of the elected Mohamed Morsi, President of Egypt 





and 1960s and argued for them to be replaced by Islamic government (Qutb 2006).8 However, 
whilst there are differing views on the influence that the Quran should have on politics the vast 
majority of Muslims around the world reject the use of violence in its name (Pew 2013). This 
situates jihadist militants on the violent margins of a political and theological movement that 
has presence and support across much of the Muslim world, particularly in the Middle East as 
well as in Western European Muslim communities.  
The tension between Islamist and western political ideas can be situated in a historical 
ontological divide that was chronicled by Edward Said, including in his 1978 classic 
Orientalism (Said 2003). In practical terms Islamist movements represented a direct challenge 
to incumbent Middle Eastern governments that were supported by the US and UK. The first 
major example of the emergent influence of Islamist politics was the emergence of Shia led 
religious government in Iran following the initial overthrow of the Western-backed Shah. The 
broader challenge from Islamism, and by extension Islam, was expounded by Thomas 
Huntingdon in his influential  paper ‘The clash of civilisations’ (Huntingdon 1993). He argued 
that Islamism was the next strategic challenge facing the United States after the end of the 
Soviet Union. He argued Islamism represented a regressive civilizational challenge to positive 
enlightenment values of western Christian democracy and social and economic progress.  
The Islamist label has been applied to a diverse range of mainstream political groups since the 
1980s. It includes the ruling Turkish AKP party that participates in the secular constitutional 
democracy of Turkey, through to the foundation of the Islamic republic of Iran. The Muslim 
Brotherhood itself, the most prominent Sunni Islamist group, is made up of national chapters 
with a diversity of political platforms that combine urban intellectual groups with support from 
the rural poor (Leiken 2007; Kepel 2001). The label also masks a range of theological, political 
and tactical disagreements, including approaches to implementing Sharia law and the validity 
of participation in democratic systems. Neither is the movement solely a theological one and 
	
8 Much of the book was written whilst Qutb was imprisoned following a crackdown on opposition, including the 
Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb’s subsequent prosecution, and eventual execution, also drew on ‘Milestones’ as 





Kepel himself argues that groups such as Hamas and the Muslim Brotherhood have evolved 
politically (Kepel 2001). This centres on a nascent rapprochement with democratic systems 
that had previously been rejected as western impositions, and the emphasis on other aspects of 
policy platforms, including nationalist identity. Views of this evolution can range between 
‘entryist’ tactics, failure of pure Islamist platforms or the evolution of a political movement 
seeking power, or a combination of all three.9 
Within the broader Islamist landscape, the strand principally associated with militantism in the 
West is jihadi Salafism (Wiktorowicz 2005a). Salafism more generally, including the 
conservative Saudi Wahhabi strand, is typically described as a literalist or fundamentalist 
interpretation of Islam that believes in the original word of God. It rejects human interpretations 
and logic as innovations, known as ‘Bidah’, that divert from the righteous path set by God and 
guided by a literalist reading of the Quran. This includes a rejection of cultural innovations 
from outside of the Arab Middle East, including culturalised or contextualised interpretations 
of Islam or innovations such as western style representative democracy. Instead there is a 
commitment to theologically sound systems of Sharia governance, which may include 
deliberative forums. As a result Salafism typically adopts highly conservative social views on 
the basis of the literal interpretation of Islamic texts, including differing rights for men and 
women and outlawing of homosexuality, and pious normative approaches to worship. 
Even with a commitment to a literal interpretation of the word of God, as with all movements, 
there are a variety of different strategies and outcomes that result from a complex process of 
textual interpretation and preferences. Wiktorowicz, in his anatomy of the Salafi movement 
identified three strands, pietists, politicos and the jihadists (Wiktorowicz 2005a). These three 
strands adopted different approaches to achieving a religious authority, or ‘caliphate’, in 
Muslim lands. This distinction largely centred on their interpretations of the contemporary 
	
9 Perhaps the most significant current Islamist leader is President Erdogan of Turkey, a Nato member and EU 
candidate country, who has come to power through democratic elections on a nationalist Islamist platform. He is 
now reforming Turkey’s constitution to concentrate power in the Presidency and curb the independence of secular 





political and social situation and the degree to which a universal caliphate is considered a 
practically realisable objective or a spiritual aim. For Wiktorowicz: 
“The purists emphasize a focus on nonviolent methods of propagation, purification, 
and education. They view politics as a diversion that encourages deviancy. Politicos, 
in contrast, emphasize application of the Salafi creed to the political arena, which they 
view as particularly important because it dramatically impacts social justice and the 
right of God alone to legislate. Jihadis take a more militant position and argue that 
the current context calls for violence and revolution.“ (Wiktorowicz 2005a p 208) 
Not all Sunni Islamists would necessarily be considered Salafi yet all Salafis would ultimately 
be Islamists by virtue of the commitment to religiously structured society and governance, even 
if purists focus on education rather than political agitation and mobilisation. There are also 
militant Islamist groups who are not Salafi jihadi, such as the Shia Lebanese militant group 
Hezbollah or Sunni Palestinian group Hamas, whose Islamic identities are part of a broader 
nationalist political platform. In particular, a central tenet of jihadi groups is a liberal 
interpretation of the concept of jihad – spiritual struggle - as a violent proactive religious duty. 
They see much of the world as Dar Al Harb – of war – with most authorities in the Muslim 
world considered Takfir – apostate – for failing to implement true Islamic government and for 
oppressing Islamist opposition. Similarly those who do not follow the right path of Islam may 
also be considered Takfir. Prominent examples of apostate Muslim authorities include the 
secular governments of Egypt, the Shia Iranian republic and, for Bin Laden, the Saudi 
government for hosting of US troops on Saudi soil. 
Drawing on Qutb’s ideas, radical Islamists integrate various conflicts into a global violent 
ontological struggle between the Muslim world and the Christian West (Qutb 2006; The 
Change Institute 2008a). This narrative links historical conflicts such as the Crusades with 
various contemporary disputes in the Middle East, particularly the perceived illegitimacy of 





Bosnia, Chechnya, Somalia and more recently Syria. Whilst the majority of militant Islamist 
groups have principally prioritised domestic political objectives, Bin Laden was notable for 
shifting the focus from the ‘near enemy’ of Middle Eastern governments toward ‘the far 
enemy’, their western masters. The attacks on the USS Cole and 9/11 were the high water mark 
of this strategy, though the subsequent invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan ensured that direct 
conflict with the US continued throughout the decade (Cronin 2010; Gerges 2011; Sageman 
2008). 
In the UK, British Muslim youth during the 1980s and 1990s also explored approaches to Islam 
that were distinct from their parents’ traditions (The Change Institute 2008a; Wiktorowicz 
2005b). They used translated Arab texts and materials disseminated through fissiparous social 
networks to explore a variety of empowering progressive, pious or fundamentalist identities. 
One strand of this dynamic can be seen in the appeal of some radical politico Islamist groups 
in the UK, the most prominent of which have been Hizb ut-Tarir as well as its radical offshoot 
Al-Mujharoun. Both share international radical Islamist ideas that espouse a strict adherence 
to Islam, defensive jihad to defend Muslims and the establishment of caliphates. Whilst Hizb 
ut-Tarir only argued for a caliphate in Muslim lands Al-Mujharoun often publicly agitate for 
Sharia governance in the UK. The groups are typically organised around social activities such 
as study circles and activist campaigning to promote the establishment of the caliphate. Both 
have attracted high levels of public controversy for street level agitation, such as burning of 
poppies at armistice commemorations, and overt or tacit support for attacks against British 
soldiers in Muslim lands. 
The fortunes of the two groups have varied over time. Al-Mujharoun and its successors were 
proscribed as a terrorist group after it was found to be actively encouraging and helping 
individuals to travel overseas to join terrorist groups. Hizb ut-Tarir has been threatened with 
proscription on numerous occasions, including in the aftermath of 7/7, but has not been due to 
its non-violent stance, albeit ambivalent, and lack of direct evidence of terrorist recruitment. 





1990s and have been a divisive presence amongst the student body, particularly with Jewish 
and LGBTQ+ student groups (Tyrer 2004). Yet both groups have also had varying fortunes 
over time with some anecdotal evidence suggesting that the popularity of Hizb ut-Tarir 
declined in the period running up to and following the Iraq war (The Change Institute 2008a). 
This has been attributed to the development of alternative political offerings, including the Stop 
The War Coalition and the Respect party that included prominent Islamist strands. 
Islamist ideas in the UK also extend beyond Hizb ut-Tarir and Al-Mujharoun to a variety of 
other organisations have also been subject to scrutiny due to their perceived association with 
or support for Islamist ideas (Maher & Frampton 2009). The Muslim Association of Britain 
(MAB) and the Cordoba foundation are claimed to have formal or informal links with the 
Muslim Brotherhood, denied in both cases. Other groups such as the Muslim Council of Britain 
(MCB), Federation of Student Islamic societies and activist group Cage have been subject of 
criticism due to Islamist political or religious positions (Maher & Frampton 2009; Quilliam 
2011; Simcox, Stuart, Ahmed & Murray, 2011). A number of mosques, charities and events 
have also been criticised for giving platforms to speakers or texts with Islamist or conservative 
leanings, including the East London mosques and the annual Islam Expo (Quilliam 2011). 
Many of these debates have also been replicated at local levels, including conflict over the 
handover the Finsbury Park Mosque to leaders associated with the Muslim Association of 
Britain that had links with the Muslim Brotherhood (Lambert 2008). 
The Muslim community in the UK 
Much of the literature on Prevent has focused on its counter productive impact on the 
relationship between government and the Muslim community (Abbas 2007; Birt 2009; Briggs 
2010; Githens-Mazer 2010; Brighton 2007; Lambert and Spalek 2010; Saggar 2010a; Stevens 
2011; Thomas 2010). The criticism has focused on concern that Prevent actively alienated 
Muslims by explicitly and implicitly framing them as an object of suspicion. This was despite 





with the problem of recruitment to radical Islamist and militant groups. This type of criticism 
highlights the challenge facing Prevent in terms of how it dealt with the relationship between 
jihadists, Islamists, and areas of tacit and potential support in the wider community (Saggar 
2006; Sobolewska 2010). How Prevent addressed the experience and politics of Muslim and 
minority ethnic identities in the UK lay at the heart of much of this debate and associated 
decision-making. 
Analysis of Prevent has focused on its relationship with the political and cultural identity of 
the Muslim community in the UK (Saggar 2010a). As with other minority ethnic communities, 
polling of the Muslim community cited in research and by government illustrated the strength 
of British identity and a lack of affiliation with radical Islamist ideas (Sobolewska 2010). 
Furthermore the vast majority explicitly rejected violent and extremist groups on principle and 
for their corrosive impact on the experience of the wider Muslim community. However, as with 
many radical and terrorist movements, there were common concerns and ideas that were shared 
with the wider community that did not support violence or radical groups (della Porta 1995; 
Rapoport 2006; Richardson 2006; Saggar 2006). For example, radical Islamists frequently 
drew on wider concerns about Israeli occupied Palestinian territories and experiences of racism 
and discrimination in support of their world views. 
In the UK Islamic identity politics has served as a platform to advance the status of the religion 
itself whilst also providing a shared political block and social identity for its constituent ethnic 
communities. This development is set in the context of different ethnic heritages and religious 
traditions as well as wider international Islamist political movements. In the UK Muslim 
identity politics is typically charted from protests against the publication of Salman Rushdie’s 
Satanic Verses (Saggar 2010a).  It has formed the basis for social, cultural and economic claims 
that bridges a number of minority ethnic groups, including those with Pakistani, Bangladeshi 
and East African backgrounds. This identity has served to mobilise otherwise diverse and 
distinct ethnic communities through shared experiences of racial and religious discrimination 





often been based on shared perspectives of Britain and the empire and subsequent overseas 
interventions by the UK, in particular the UK’s support for Israel and US foreign policy 
(Brighton 2007).  
This has also taken place in the context of debates about British cultural identity and the status 
of Islam, Muslims and South Asian ethnic minorities in the context of increasing levels of 
immigration since the end of the Cold War (Cantle 2012; Ford 2010; McGhee 2008; Goodwin 
et al 2010;  Goodwin 2011; Modood 2007; Silj 2009). For example, Paul Gilroy has described 
a growing anxiety about Britain’s national identity as its global political and economic status 
declined following the end of empire (Gilroy 2004). Furthermore, a white ‘native’ identity has 
also been become increasingly salient in UK and European politics, as illustrated by the 
electoral success of a variety of racist, nativist and anti immigrant political parties across 
Europe (Ford 2010; Goodwin 2011 & 2010; Kestel & Godmer 2004). In the UK this includes 
the British National Party between 2001 and 2010 and the UK Independence Party from 2010 
onwards, plus street protests by the English Defence League between 2008 and 2013. All three 
groups have had overt and implicit platforms that oppose to immigration and the ‘islamificaton’ 
of Europe whilst defending the UK’s Christian heritage. 
Equally, although there is an emergent Muslim community identity in the UK it is also diverse 
(Ali 2015; Bowen 2014; ONS 2011b; Saggar 2010a; The Change Institute 2009). The total 
Muslim population grew from 1.5 to 2.7 million people (5 per cent of the population) and 52% 
are men (compared to 49% of the general population). In 2011, of those reporting as Muslim, 
68% were Asian (1.83 million of 2.71 million) and 32% non-Asian and 8% were white 
ethnicity. By far the largest groups are those with Pakistani and Bangladeshi heritage and it is 
these groups who tend to shape the overall socio-economic statistics for Muslim groups in the 
UK (ONS 2011b). There are also significant theological, economic, social and cultural 
differences, including migrant origins and settlement in the UK. For example those groups who 





experiences to educated and professional migrants from the Middle East who have settled in 
west London (Bowen 2014; The Change Institute 2009). 
Notably, the Muslim community in the UK tends to be younger than the general population 
and experiences notable social and economic disadvantages. This creates greater biographical 
availability for high risk activism as well as potential salience for radical identity politics (della 
Porta 1995; Kruglanski et al 2009; McAdam 1986; Saggar 2010a). The median age of the 
Muslim community is 25 years, compared to 40 in the overall population with 33% of Muslims 
15 years old or under in 2011, compared to 19% of the general population (see Figure 2.1). The 
Muslim community has the lowest rates of qualifications and employment and are over-
represented in deprived urban areas. In 2011 46% (1.22 million) of the Muslim population lived 
in the 10% most deprived local authority districts in England, up from 33% in 2001 (Ali 2015; 
ONS 2011a). 10  In 2011 19.8% of the Muslim population was in fulltime employment, 
compared to 34.9% in the overall population and 7.2% unemployed compared to 4.0% in the 
overall population (ONS 2011a). The percentage of Muslims with no qualifications has 
dropped from 39% in 2001 to 26% in 2011 and there is now a similar percentage of Muslims 
(over 16) with degree level and above qualifications to the general population (24% and 27% 
respectively) (Ali 2015). 
	
10 In the 2011 Census only 45% of Muslims were in active employment in 2011 in comparison to 55% of the total 
population. However this figure masks different patterns of economic activity between religious groups. 
Unemployment amongst the economically active in the Muslim population was 13% compared to 6% in the total 
population and rates of inactivity due to looking after home and family was 30% in comparison to 10% in the total 
population. This is in part linked to the younger age structure of the Muslim community meaning that only 12% of 





Figure 2.1: Religion by age, England and Wales, 2011 (left) and population profile of Muslim 
population in England and Wales (right)  
 
(ONS 2011b) 
As a result, mobilisation of Muslim political identity has often centred on experiences of 
disadvantage and the generation gap between younger British born Muslims and older 
generations who migrated to the UK. This has included an interrogation of the settlement 
between an exclusive Muslim identity versus a more nuanced relationship with other aspects 
of identity (see for example Birt, Hussain and Siddiqui 2011). Roy argues that an absence of 
an engaging contextualised Islamic identity that fits the social circumstance of European 
Muslim youth is being filled by normative and radical religious and political identities (Roy 
2010). However, this commentary can fail to capture fully the rapid development of hybrid 
national, ethnic and religious identities by second and third generation Muslim youth in the UK 
that span personal, social and political dimensions. This includes more active political dissent 
against experiences of racism and discrimination than their parents generation that is 
underpinned by social confidence of being born and raised in Britain as British citizens (The 





The causes of terrorism 
A notable theme in analyses of Prevent has been the causes of terrorism and the complexity of 
the process through which individuals and groups develop radical political views and translate 
these into violent action (Birt 2009; Brighton 2007; Githens-Mazer and Lambert 2010; Heath-
Kelly 2012; Richards 2011; Saggar 2010a; Stevens 2011; Thomas 2010). Models of 
radicalisation typically incorporate a range of different types of factors, including structural 
and socio-economic factors, political mobilisation, organisation and objectives, organisational 
recruitment and personal psychological profiles (Atran 2010; Bouhana and Wikstrom 2011; 
Crenshaw 2000; della Porta 1995; Horgan 2008; Krueger & Maleckova 2003; Kruglanski & 
Fisher 2009; Sageman 2004 & 2008; Sageman 2008; Silke 2008; Taylor & Horgan 2006). The 
growing body of research into radicalisation has typically been led by the development of 
policy responses such as Prevent (Sedgwick 2010). However, the complexity and uncertainty 
around the concept has also led to questions about whether it is a useful concept for policy 
making (Richards 2011).  
Conventional analysis of terrorism focuses on the tactics and operations of terrorist groups, 
including methods of recruitment and mobilisation, as notionally rational choices in support of 
political aims (Bloom 2006; Cronin 2010; Hoffman 2008; Pape 2003). This includes the 
formulation of strategic goals, such as polarising a population or claiming ownership of a 
movement by going further than other groups. Adding to this organisational layer are the social 
dynamics and connections that may push a group toward or away from violent tactics (della 
Porta 1995; Gill, Lee, Rethemeyer, Horgan, & Asal 2014; McAdam 1986; Sageman 2004). 
This includes the role of charismatic individuals or entrepreneurs who make contacts with 
training opportunities or ideas, and the intergroup dynamics of solidarity and shared identity. 
Wiktorowicz’s case study of Al-Mujharoun illustrates how the social dynamics of radical 
Islamist groups creates opportunities for recruitment into terrorist networks and activity 





gyms, bookshops, around the margins of religious or educational institutions or in closed 
venues and circles. 
The second layer of analysis focuses on the personal psychology of individual participation in 
violence and high-risk activism. There is little or no clear evidence that participation in 
terrorism is linked to clinically diagnosed psychiatric conditions.11 Similarly although this does 
not discount involvement some groups may even avoid people they consider unreliable for 
such high-risk activities (Silke 2008). Participation is often framed as part of a ‘significance 
quest’ or search for belonging through a new identity as an activist or member of a radical or 
terrorist group (Kruglanski & Fishman 2009; Kruglanski, Chen, Dechesne, Fishman, & Orehek 
2009). Although there isn’t necessarily a direct relationship between poverty and education and 
participation in terrorism experiences of personal trauma or grievances, such as racism and 
discrimination, may create a cognitive opening for identity quests (Krueger & Maleckova 2003; 
Davis 2009). In some cases there may also be an element of risk seeking by those who have 
been attracted by conflict and wish to fight overseas (Sageman 2004). However any 
psychological profile of participation is highly diverse and fundamentally linked to a social 
context and opportunities for participation and recruitment (Crenshaw 2000; Taylor & Horgan 
2006). 
The third layer focuses on the role civic and political institutions and patterns of social 
integration play in the development of militant groups and extremist ideas. This plays a dual 
role in terms of processes through which group identities and social and political movements 
develop and the institutional and political context that influence the use of terrorist tactics. 
Fundamental to  this is the role of civic and democratic institutions in fostering social solidarity 
and resolving and mediating grievances (della Porta 1995; Kaldor 2003). For example, 
intergroup segregation may influence competitive political strategies based on polarised 
	
11 Some recent research has suggested a potential link between depression and pathways of sympathy for violent 
protest and terrorism but this is not yet conclusive. The relationship with social connections, and the negative 






exclusive identities that may undermine identification with a shared political and cultural body 
(Sen 2006). The importance of these relationships is outlined by the way that linking, bonding 
and bridging social capital helps to mediate social differences whilst also enabling collective 
public action (Putnam 2000). How these social dynamics mediate or exacerbate interact with 
civic and democratic institutions provides the wider context for group and individual level 
analyses of radicalisation.  
This brief outline of radicalisation illustrates the complex interrelationship between recruitment 
and rational choices, small group dynamics, personal psychological profiles and wider 
structural and social contexts. The interplay between these factors has variously been framed 
as a conveyor belt or as a situational interplay between different factors. Crenshaw notes that 
the model of identity quest put forward by Kruglanski et all leaves questions about the causal 
relationship around extremism and ideology (Crenshaw 2009; Kruglanski et al 2009). For 
example many terrorists do not focus on ideological aspects of their participation or may have 
very limited engagement with radical ideas or texts (Githens-Mazer 2010; Githens-Mazer & 
Lambert 2010). The work of Bouhana and Wikstrom attempts to address this by exploring the 
relationship between the personal and social circumstance and wider organisational and 
contextual setting (Bouhana & Wikstrom 2011). This suggests a wider frame of reference for 
interventions, away from soley focusing on vulnerability of individuals, to include the 
emergence of and exposure to radicalising settings. 
The potential breadth of these models, including the uncertainty about isolating causes from 
correlations and symptoms has been a prominent feature of the debate about Prevent (Githens-
Mazer & Lambert 2010; Richards 2011; Sedgwick 2010). In particular Sedgwick suggests that 
there are two different approaches to understanding radicalisation and Prevent, namely the 
security field and the integration field (Sedgwick 2010). This dual perspective illustrates 
analysis of the social and organisational aspects of the process but also competing policy 
approaches. This has also led to criticism of the vagueness of radicalisation that has diverted 





or professional knowledge of their applicability (Stevens 2011). Similarly Githens-Mazer and 
Lambert and Brighton criticise the concept for being an overly politicised term that is a vehicle 
for a wider set of political agendas relating to tolerance of religious and political diversity and 
the segregation of Muslim communities (Brighton 2010; Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010). 
Extremism and ideologies 
A central feature of the debate about radicalisation has been the relationship between 
extremism, ideology and violence. In the case of Prevent this study will highlight how 
definitions of extremism became a key feature of the debate about the relationship between 
Islam and Muslim identity and the impact of government policy on alienation and integration 
(Pantazis & Pemberton 2009; Saggar 2009 and 2010a; Stevens 2011; Vermeulen 2014; Youngs 
2010). In particular debates about extremism are ultimately about what ideas are considered 
politically acceptable or illegitimate. Furthermore their relationship with terrorism further 
serves to frame the extent to which they are considered an active threat to wider society and 
government or a minority but private views.  
In the case of Prevent Gregory argues that the definition of extremism was a fuzzy concept that 
presented particular practical and political challenges for enforcement and policy makers. For 
example: 
“For the purposes of the Prevent strategy, the offence categories should be seen not 
so much as providing criteria for the purposes of arrest and charge but rather as 
offering guidance to the police on various types of potential offending behaviour and 
activity that might be identified early enough for interventions to change potentially 
illegal behaviour and activity” (Gregory 2010 p90) 
This study will show that the fuzzy model of extremism that was employed in Prevent was 
indicative of the need to balance the protection of rights and maintain support for Prevent. The 





and is enshrined in international human rights standards, including the Human Rights Act 1998, 
but balanced against crimes of incitement to violence and hatred. The challenge of balancing 
these legal frameworks has been noted in relation to the targeting of counter-terrorism powers 
and the development of community policing and engagement designed to identify potential 
terrorists (Klausen 2009; Gregory 2010). The offence of glorifying terrorism that was 
introduced in 2006 targeted public support for violence rather than just direct or indirect 
participation in terrorist acts. In addition, the police-led multi-agency programme called 
Channel included both social behaviours as well as stated beliefs as indicators for identifying 
and diverting individuals considered to be at risk of radicalisation (HM Government 2010a).  
Although the relationship is contested, it is essential to understand the ideas, ideology and 
values of terrorist groups. As terrorist groups often frame themselves in terms of their political 
objectives this aspect is central to most definitions of terrorism. The ideas of terrorist groups 
and movements also underpins most analyses of organisational objectives and tactics, such as 
John Rapoport’s waves of terrorism thesis (Hoffman 2006; Rapoport 2006). Over time terrorist 
movements have been associated with various ideas linked to national liberation or 
emancipation, socialist or fascist ideologies or religious movements. In this respect 
contemporary Islamist terrorism is predicated on a war between Islam and the West and a desire 
to establish a caliphate in order to free Muslims from oppression around the world. The 
objectives and associated statements of terrorists are overtly political, identifying with 
particular causes and actively seeking support from sympathetic constituencies. As a result 
explicit and implicit political ideas are self evidently central to the motivations and rationales 
of terrorist groups. 
Similarly in most accounts of terrorism there is acknowledgement that radicalisation involves 
changes in the ethical or belief system of groups and individuals (Kruglanski et all 2009; Wilner 
& Dubouloz 2011). The debate tends to centred on the ideological coherence of a group and its 
causal role in radicalisation. In some accounts, ideological discipline is a reinforcement process 





Atran and Keppley-Mahmood emphasise personal or community grievances as the principal 
factors underpinning processes of radicalisation whilst Bjorgo highlights how different 
members of a group may have different levels of ideological attachment (Atran 2011; Bjorgo 
2011; Keppley-Mahmood 1996). For Githens-Mazer, ideology is a secondary consequence 
with comparatively little disciplined practical ideological engagement (Githens-Mazer 2008). 
Whilst this can underplay the role ideology in providing meaning to these personal and social 
factors, it also illustrates how it can be a secondary to personal accounts whilst still being an 
important factor in mobilising and sustaining high risk activism (della Porta 1995). 
The complexity is compounded by differing usages of concepts such as ideology, belief or 
narrative. Kruglanski et al apply a looser approach to ideology that also includes wider sense 
of injustice or belief rather than a highly codified ideology of the types that Githens-Mazer and 
Lambert are querying (Githens-Mazer 2008; Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010; Kruglanski et al 
2009). Halverson, Corman and Goodall point to the role of stories, characters and events, that 
justify and reinforce master narratives, for example support for Israeli occupation of Palestinian 
territories as part of a wider Jewish and Christian conspiracy against Muslims (Halverson, 
Corman & Goodall 2011). These narratives play an important role in integrating individual 
experiences to wider contemporary and historical events in a way that provides a new lens for 
understanding the world (della Porta 1995; Halverson et al 2011). In this respect, ideas and 
ideologies provide frameworks for understanding the world, to explain the origins and reasons 
for grievances and to provide frameworks or pathways for achieving transformational social 
and political change. 
The weight given to ideology and ideas has tactical and strategic implications for counter-
terrorism responses. This includes counter ideological work to disrupt the propaganda and 
combat tacit acceptance of ideas linked to terrorist movements (Hoffman 2006; Rapoport 2006; 
Saggar 2006). Policy responses also need to take into account the ways in which ideology gives 
coherence to grievances and experiences and the potential for responses to at the risk of having 





more traction (Davis 2009; Richardson 2006; Saggar 2009). The other aspect relates to the 
tactics of engagement and the boundaries of acceptability, including tacit support that extremist 
and terrorist groups rely on and the potential to win over ‘fence sitters’, both politically and as 
partners in operational responses (Klausen 2009; Lambert 2009; Mascini 2006; Saggar 2006 
& 2010). The nuanced challenges presented by these questions are central to most responses 
to terrorism. 
This is further complicated by the inherent sensitivity around defining extremism. Terrorist 
groups are extreme by virtue of their use of violence in opposition to accepted social and 
political norms and institutions. However, violence has also been used to challenge illegitimate 
ideas and institutions, such as fascism or apartheid. Equally there can be wildly divergent views 
on the legitimacy of violence in certain cases, such as in the conflict between Palestinian 
militants and Israel. Extremist ideas by definition are outside the dominant social and 
institutional consensus but can supplant dominant political frameworks, such as the divine right 
of monarchs. Furthermore, different perspectives on the boundaries and definitions of 
extremism, such as the role of religion in public life or attitudes toward immigration and race, 
may preclude private beliefs from being shared in public. Ideas influence social prejudices and 
interests or they may remain marginal and niche. At the heart of Prevent is the question of how 
government prioritises, understands and deals with these questions. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has illustrated the complex strategic and tactical challenges presented by 
terrorism. It shows how government has to deal with groups that are actively seeking to 
mobilise support in order to challenge its legitimacy. As a result any response has to deal with 
the relationship between the threat from terrorist groups, a wider set of radical ideas and 
movements and the social and political context in which they operate. This is often framed by 
the debate about the causes of terrorism and the process of radicalisation, including the tension 





highlights the need for decision-making to consider the trade-offs between the use of coercive 
measures to degrade organisational capability and wider approaches for reinforcing social 
solidarity in opposition to terrorists. Ultimately dealing with complex threat and the social 
dynamics of terrorism is a complex short and long-term challenge for government.  
This study will explore how decision-making balanced conventional counter terrorism efforts 
to disrupt terrorist groups and the wider debate about contributory political and social 
dynamics. On one dimension Prevent sought to deal with the complex challenge from al-Qaeda 
due to its international network of jihadi groups and affiliates who shared radical Islamist ideas. 
At the same time it sought to address the reasons why Islamist political ideas had some salience 
amongst the Muslim community in the UK, including patterns of social and political 
disaffection. In this respect, the role of Islamic identity and activism in the experiences of 
second and third generation Muslims is a key factor in any analyses of radicalisation. 
Furthermore, this dynamic was situated in a wider political debate about national identity, 
including mobilisation of white nativist politics. As a result Prevent inevitably highlights the 
tension between developing a practical response to the threat from terrorism whilst dealing 











Chapter 3: Theoretical framework 
Introduction 
This chapter sets out how the study examined the development of Prevent as a process of policy 
decision-making. The study examines the development of Prevent against two competing 
models of the state, a centralised top down model and distributed consensual model, set out in 
box 3.1. These two theoretical models are used as ideational and institutional frames of 
reference for understanding the decision-making process (Allison & Zelikow 1999; Hall 1993; 
Hall & Taylor 1996; Heclo & Wildavsky 1974; Lindblom 1959; Pierson 2000; Rhodes 1997; 
Sabatier & Weible 2007; Stone 2012; Wildavsky 1979 & 1987). The first frame focuses on the 
institutional structure and patterns of decision-making. This includes the actors involved in the 
process, their relationships, interests and values and the institutional origins of ideas. The 
second frame explores the actual ideas that shaped decision-making, including views of the 
core policy problem, different models of causes and trade-offs. These dimensions can then be 
traced against the features of the two competing models to assess whether Prevent represented 
a state centred and coercive model of security or one that was based on a distributed social 
consensus. 
The study argues that the influence of these two models of government and security can be 
traced throughout the development of Prevent. In practice it was the combination of these two 
models that shaped the development of Prevent as an innovative but controversial policy. The 
two models represented competing institutional and ideational framings of the core policy 
problem and solutions that informed an iterative series of decision-making. As models of 
government and security they framed how different exogenous and endogenous inputs were 
interpreted (Lipsky 1997; Power, 2008; Rhodes 1997; Wildavsky 1979). This study aims to 
trace how the models influenced on formal and informal decisions, from high-level strategy 





trade-offs. By examining decision-making through these two models the study can explores 
the factors determined why Prevent developed in the way it did. 
The study has adapted Hall’s model of policy paradigms to establish a series of tests for 
whether there was a shift from one model of decision-making to another, set out in Box 3.1 
(Hall 1993). The paradigms approach is useful as its captures how different ideational models 
of policy making compete for institutional control of decision-making. In this respect the study 
tested whether the process represented a shift from a centralised rights-based model of security 
toward a distributed and consensual model. The models used in the study were rooted in the 
political science tradition and represent implicit and explicit reference points that have shaped 
the development of government and security policy over time (Pinker 2012). As a result the 
models are suited to the paradigms approach as they include both ideational framings of the 
policy problem allied to different institutional models of government and its relationship with 
society. Therefore study used the paradigms approach as a conceptual tool for tracing how 
competing models compete for influence over decision-making.  
The study augments Hall model of zero-sum policy change by tracing how the models 
influence each other through an iterative decision-making process. In this model, set out in 
figure 3.1, problems enter into the decision-making process by virtue of political agendas that 
may be linked to events or feedback from prior decisions. Decisions are then negotiated by 
supporters of the different models who seek to advance their policy preferences, including 
defining the nature of the problem itself. This results in a process of persuasion and negotiation 
that shapes authority over decision-making. Aspects of this process includes modernist or 
utilitarian frames of reference that emphasise the empirical power of ideas and evidence to 
explain phenomena as well as the more relational skills of advocates to align institutional 
interests and values in support of proposals (Goodin et al 2006; Lasswell 1936; Lindblom 1989; 
Schmidt 2008; Wildavsky 1979). Finally the study explores how this translates into formal and 
informal decisions at different levels in the policy making community and how these decisions 





The model of change adopted by this study therefore incorporates three process indicators that 
indicate a likelihood of paradigmatic change that are then augmented by examining of the ideas 
and institutional features of decisions against the two competing models. The volume of 
decision-making was used to identify whether there was feedback into the system, indicating 
that new ideas were challenging incumbent approaches to policy. The next indicator was 
whether the ideas that shaped decisions originated from inside or outside the incumbent policy 
community. The study also tested whether there were formal and informal institutional 
changes, either of existing institutions or the structure size and membership of the policy 
subsystem. In addition the study examined the features of ideas and institutional change against 
the features of the two models of security. This includes the extent to which decision-making 
was centralised or distributed, whether there was an emphasis on process or outcomes and the 
extent to which the problem was framed by social grievances or rational terrorist groups. 
Theories of the state 
As set out in Chapter 1, Box 3.1 presents the two model of the state and security used in this 
study, Thomas and John. Both models can be traced from the writings of Hobbes and Locke 
and forward in to contemporary debates about the structure of government and decision-
making (Almond 1988; Blanco, Lowndes & Pratchett 2011; Krasner 1984; Lipsky 1997; 
Mulgan 2007; Newman 2001a; Nordlinger, Lowi & Fabbrini 1988; Pinker 2011; Rhodes 1997; 
Schmidt 2009;  Skocpol & Amenta 1986). Model Thomas represents a Hobbesian state centric 
model of security that emphasises the role of a strong central government in order to protect 
the basic rights of citizens. On the other hand model John draws on the Locke tradition and 
represents a model of security based around a distributed consensual approach that 
accommodates the interests, norms and preferences of society. These archetypes provide points 
of reference for understanding decision-making that are particularly relevant for Prevent as 
they deal directly with the structural relationship between government and society in reducing 





understanding the ideas and institutional dimensions that shaped decision-making whilst 
placing them in a broader political science tradition. 
Clearly neither Locke and Hobbes, or the Thomas and John models used here, are explicit 
reference points for most modern policymakers. For example, many of the factors that informed 
the writing of Hobbes and Locke in the aftermath of the English civil war, no longer apply, 
even if we are living in an age of apparent growing political discord. However, Steven Pinker 
and Geoff Mulgan have illustrated how these ideas have had direct influence on approaches to 
government and a bearing on the prevalence of violence in society over time that can be traced 
into contemporary debates about policy and security (Mulgan 2007; Pinker 2011).12 Building 
on these traditions the models used in this study have different perspectives on the role of the 
state versus the role of civil society in security and different models of social and political 
norms. Thomas focuses on the investment of collective trust and authority in the central 
institutions of the state to deliver security for citizens. In contrast the John emphasises the need 
for civil society to establish moral and political norms that underpin the authority of the state. 
Both models are concerned with the respective role of governments and society in preventing 
violence and provide valuable organising frameworks for understanding the ideas and 
institutional influences behind Prevent. 
  
	
12 Geoff Mulgan’s 2007 book ‘Good and Bad Power: The Ideals and Betrayals of Government’ and his reference 
to Hobbes and Locke is notable as he was the head of the Downing Street policy unit between 2001 and 2005. 






Box 3.1: Models of the state and security 
 Models of the state and policy-making 
(Almond 1988; Blanco, Lowndes & 
Pratchett 2011; Krasner 1984; Lipsky 
1997; Mulgan 2007; Newman 2001a; 
Nordlinger et al 1988; Pinker 2011; 
Rhodes 1997; Schmidt 2009; Skocpol 
& Amenta 1986) 





Centralised unitary model. Top down 
directive rules based authority. Strong 
central powers but curtailed by ideas 
of rights for individual citizen and the 
need to maintain a reputation for 
competence. Includes a dominant role 
for the core state policy making 
community. Focus on outcomes 
delivered by the state. 
Dominant role for security services and 
Home Office. Focus on rational terrorist 
actors, including disrupting plots and 
recruitment. Use of coercive powers of 
detention and surveillance to directly 
impact on terrorist group organisational 
capability. Civil society is an instrument 





Distributed networked model. Flat 
negotiated norms based authority. 
Constrained role for central decision-
makers and strong street level 
influence. Emphasis on social 
consensus. Risk prevention through 
upstream interventions. Focus on 
government mediation of social 
interests and values. 
Inclusion of non-security and social 
participants in decision making. Focus 
on causes of political grievances and 
social alienation as push factors toward 
support for terrorism. Emphasis on 
indirect outcomes through the process of 
collective action. Civil society partners 






In practice the study does not interrogate the theory of Hobbes and Locke, rather it uses these 
traditions as ways of labelling the competing models. The two models are also based on past 
and present debates about the shape and structure of the state and its institutions (Almond 1988; 
Krasner 1984; Nordlinger et al 1988; Schmidt 2009; Skocpol & Amenta 1986). This debate 
centres on the extent to which the central state is the primary agent in government decision 
making or whether it is reactive to social interests and ideas. On the one hand government can 
be understood as a strong central decision-making apparatus that sets the policy agenda and 
takes decisions on behalf of society. The state is responsive to external inputs, mediated via 
formal structures such as legislatures and elected executives, but remains the dominant actor. 
On the other hand there is a view that government decision-making should be understood as 
primarily reactive or subservient to social trends and interests. In this model the state is less the 
lead institution for decision-making but is a product of the constraints and negotiation of social 
interests and values.  
These two models further illustrate how the institutional structure of government is a key part 
of understanding policy-making. For example, Bulpitt has illustrated how the UK state has 
evolved through negotiated allocation of responsibly for decision-making, particularly between 
national and local territorial decision-making. More recently there has been growing interest in 
the networked models of policy making that explores how a community of policy making 
organisations interact to make decisions. This approach has responded to deliberate steps to 
disaggregate government in the UK through a variety of arm’s-length and next steps agencies 
from the 1980s onwards. This process has increased the range of organisations involved in 
decisions whilst also extending the reach of central government into new areas. For example 
the inclusion of private firms in delivery or the role of civil society in policy making has further 
increased the range of organisations that have a stake in decision-making but have also become 
subject to central government influence and control.  
The networked model of government necessitates a systemic view of the patterns of power and 





own views of a problem and its associated solutions, including front-line decision-making, and 
how they are also embedded in reciprocal and constrained institutional relationships. Rhodes 
has explored who different models of institutional relationships shape decision-making 
processes and outcomes. On the one hand are policy communities that involved a relatively 
stable and closed set of participants in decision-making. These relationships are likely to be 
more hierarchical but nevertheless reciprocal with regular interaction between participants that 
may exert dominant values and empirical norms. Alternatively more issue networked structures 
are flatter with a wider range of competing interests with less consensus and more scope for 
conflict. Nevertheless, organisations may still be constrained by the need to collaborate 
formally and informally to influence decision-making in flatter structures, such as through 
explicit campaigning or through more implicit models of agenda setting influence.  
The study also takes into account how the components of systemic policy-making should be 
understood through their historical, rational and cultural make-up (Allison & Zelikow 1999; 
Hall & Taylor 1996; Wildavsky 1987). In particular, the formal and informal structure of power 
and authority matters can exert influence on the institutional participants to conform to 
dominant cultures or world views (Powell & DiMaggio 1983; Hall 1993). For example, 
institutions in modern liberal states continue to reference rational choice elements of decision-
making that seek to maximise the utility of decisions in the public interest, albeit within 
dominant ideational norms. At the same time institutional decisions may also be shaped by 
cultural factors that introduce preferences into decision-making, such for coercive or 
developmental solutions or the empirical models of decision-making versus more values driven 
models. Finally the historical dimensions of institutions also determines who has power and 
capacity within the system and consequently has the ability to assert power over decision-
making, either formally or informally.  
The lens of Hobbes and Locke help to group these dimensions of government and its 
institutions into two broad models of the state and security policy. Model Thomas represents a 





of power that focuses on the ability of the central state to maintain a binary top down contract 
with its citizens. In this context the state is invested with an indivisible authority to protect the 
natural rights of citizens to self-protection that holds a monopoly over the legitimate use of 
force. Authority in Thomas is based on the reputation for competently and effectively 
protecting citizen’s rights. This is illustrated by Hobbes “Reputation of power is power because 
it draweth with it the adherence of those in need of protection… Reputation of prudence in the 
conduct of peace or war, is power; because to prudent men, we commit the government of our 
selves more willingly than others.” (Hobbes 1994 p62). This makes model Thomas’s 
legitimacy conditional on protecting citizens through the prudent exercise of power (Arendt 
1970).  
If this model were to be translated into Prevent a couple of features would have been expected 
from both the decision-making process and its outcomes. Firstly there would be a clear 
dominant role for central state institutions that have traditionally been responsible for security 
policy, such as the Security Services and the Home Office. These organisations would assert a 
clear hierarchical power and the use of legal tools to implement direct solutions. 
Conventionally this would focus on the use of coercive powers of detention and surveillance 
that are targeted at rational terrorist actors. There would be a focus on the importance of 
government’s reputation for competence in terms of maintaining security that in the main 
would lead to the focus on demonstrable and immediate impacts. However it would also have 
necessitated the need to maintain a reputation for prudent exercise of power in the interest of 
citizens rather than the state itself.  
On the other hand model John represents a distributed negotiated model that places more 
constraints on central government’s authority. In this model there is a more prominent role for 
a moral civil society, in contrast to the individualist ‘amoral’ version described by Hobbes 
(Locke 1996). Security is predicated on the development of social consensus within civil 
society, which is then given form through the shared institutions of government. The authority 





and values of society. This envisages a more distributed consensual model of authority rooted 
in a negotiated contract within society and maintained by the state across three pillars of liberal 
government, the state, civil society and private property. These institutions serve to mediate 
the natural rights of individuals and collective interests of society through the relationship 
between each pillar, rather than the binary axis between state and individual citizens. In this 
respect the authority of government is founded on the integration of society around collective 
interests and values. 
When translating this into counter terrorism policy the study expected a number of features. In 
terms of the institutional structure of decision-making there would be a wider range of 
participants with a more distributed authority that required greater negotiation and consensus. 
In particular this would serve to place a set of social grievances or interest onto the decision-
making agenda. A Prevent policy based on this model would also be expected to place a greater 
emphasis on resolving these grievances both through government action but also through an 
indirect process of collective social action. This would include a negotiation over the 
parameters of shared values and identity that moved beyond a narrow rights based relationship 
between citizens and the state. Consequently the main focus for action and policy making 
would centre on the of civil society and the role of the state in mediating grievances. As a result 
this would place government in a more facilitative or representative role in developing and 
implementing policy. 
Paradigms  
The study uses Hall’s policy paradigms model as a useful framework for understanding how 
decision-making is structured by a framework of ideas and institutional relationships (Hall 
1993; Blyth 2013). Stable paradigms are often found in stable communities where success can 
be defined against a relatively stable set of objectives and technical parameters (Hall 1993). 
This includes security and counter-terrorism where success is evaluated against a stable 





agendas are framed as ‘technical’ competence issues they often have social and political 
dimensions embedded within them (Newman & Head 2017). In the case of economic policy, 
where Hall originally applied the paradigms model, the debate between Keynesianism and 
Monetarism often focuses on technical models of securing economic growth. However in 
practice they also represent proxies for political preferences around the role of the state in 
securing economic benefits to labour or capital.13 
Although different paradigms may share broad objectives, by employing different views of the 
problem different paradigms propose very different, and ultimately incommensurable, 
solutions. This conflict is rooted in the impact of different analyses of causes and objectives, 
as well as being imbued by cultural preferences and values, that may work at cross purposes 
(Hall 1993). These differences also prevent consensus about what constitutes success, meaning 
that a policy consistently receives negative feedback (Baumgartner & Jones 2002; Blyth 2013; 
Pierson 1993). Given this divergence, different paradigmatic models can produce very different 
policy preferences and outcomes. For example, regulation of abortion that places protecting 
the foetus as an unborn child as its central goal produces different decisions to one formulated 
around a woman’s right of self-determination. Similarly environmental policy that prioritises 
variously conservation, carbon reduction or sustainability can produce conflict around the 
relative merits of wind and nuclear power. 
Inherent in paradigmatic models are descriptions of social or physical system and how it should 
be shaped to achieve the desired policy outcomes. In this case the competing models emphasise 
the responsibility of rational terrorist actors versus a wider set of indirect and inadvertent social 
factors. A basic causal model proposes that problem W is produced by a combination of X+Y, 
which can be resolved through solution Z, allowing a complex phenomenon to be understood 
for the purposes of management (Stone 1989). These models identify agents, institutions or 
	
13 In health care for example, the debate in the UK tends to be based on support for ‘free at the point of access’ 
with debate focused on questions of organisation, between planned or market approaches. However they tend to 
act as proxies for values around equality of provision. In contrast in the US much of the debate is about whether 





correlating factors that are part of the problem and the degree of responsibility that may be 
assigned to them, i.e. if X or Y is the principle cause and whether it is mechanical, accidental, 
inadvertent or deliberate. The varying description of causes underpins different approaches or 
priorities when formulating policies. For example, in the case of economic paradigms, 
Keynesianism and monetarism diverge over the relative importance of maintaining stable 
economic demand or stable supply of capital. 
Different paradigms also incorporate assumptions about different solutions, or policy ‘levers’ 
and the implications for the aims and outcomes of policy (Newman 2001a; Majone 1989). In 
this case the tension sits between an emphasis on coercive power versus consensual social 
authority. Differing emphases clearly have significant implications for decisions depending on 
the objectives of the policy. For example, market mechanisms may produce higher levels of 
innovation but are more costly and produce less equal outcomes than a planned approach, yet 
both outcomes can have merit when applied to healthcare (Newman 2001a). The choice of a 
solution is also shaped by the capacity of government (Wildavsky 1979). To take the example 
of earthquake policy, it is unlikely that government can prevent earthquakes but can 
realistically monitor seismic activity and prevent people from building in potentially dangerous 
places. However, where it is not desirable to prevent people from living in ‘dangerous’ areas 
(e.g. the San Francisco Bay area) measures can be introduced that minimise the potential for 
harm, such as building regulations. 
The study used the paradigms model as a way of exploring how competing models of 
government and security shaped the development of Prevent. The paradigms model is primarily 
an ideational model of change, however the size and structure of institutional relationships also 
shapes decision-making (Heclo & Wildavsky 1974). Policy communities become defined 
around a set of reciprocal or diffuse relationships but nevertheless can form collective 
identities, interests and norms through frequent interactions and collaboration (Dunleavy, 
Margetts, Bastow & Tinkler 2006; Hood 2007; Rhodes 1997). In this respect paradigms 





which in turn exerts pressures on actors to conform with the views, values and interests of the 
dominant paradigm (Kuhn, 1962; Powell & DiMaggio, 1983). Where community paradigms 
are strong they restrict contradictory signals, potentially producing forms of ‘group think’ in 
extreme cases. Given these risks, models of network governance are often interested in ways 
of exercising indirect control and influence across communities whilst encouraging space for 
innovation (Blanco, Lowndes, & Pratchett 2011; Power 2008; Reed 1999; Rhodes 2000). 
Policy change  
Ultimately Hall’s policy paradigms model is a way of understanding degrees of change in 
decision-making. In Hall’s perspective a paradigmatic change involves a more fundamental 
restructuring of institutional and ideational authority in decision-making than conventional 
incremental forms of change. This change comes about when the authority of an incumbent 
model is challenges by a new paradigm that may come about due to events or internal failings 
of a paradigm and the presence of alternative ideas. However, paradigmatic change is seen as 
a rare event because it has to overcome the dominant framing of the causes of policy problems 
and their associated solutions (Hall 1993). This is likely to condition decision-makers views of 
what will work that may be embedded structured into institutional interests and cultural 
preferences producing institutional inertia or opposition to change (Hall & Taylor 1996; 
Wildavsky 1987; Powell & DiMaggio 1983; Newman 2001b). In turn this may condition what 
types of information may enter into the a decision-making process and how it is interpreted, 
including what type of evidence may be produced, such the commissioning of research 





Figure 3.1: Theoretical model of the decision-making process (adapted from Sabatier and 
Weible 2007)	
	
In order to better understand how paradigmatic change happens the study developed Hall’s 
model by unpacking the institutional and ideational elements of the policy process. The model 
used by the study is a simplified version of Sabatier’s the advocacy coalition model and is 
illustrated in Figure 3.1 (Sabatier & Weible 2007). The process notionally starts with inputs 
into decision-making communities, typically in the form of political agendas that are often 
motivated by external social trends or events or more internal feedback from decision-making 
(John et al. 2013; Pierson 2000a). This is then mediated by institutional coalitions that may 
hold competing paradigmatic views of the policy agenda or more disparate priorities framed 
by their interests and values (Hall & Taylor 1996; Sabatier & Weible 2007; Wildavsky 1987). 
These loose coalitions then engage in an interactive process of ideational and institutional 
persuasion or negotiation to claim authority over decision-making (Lasswell 1936; Lindblom 
1959; Newman 2001b; Schmidt 2009, 2010 & 2012; Stone 2012; Wildavsky 1979). This 
authority is translated into decisions that may take place a different levels and places across the 
Supporters – groupings, interests, values and 
relationships (Blanco et al. 2011; Hall & Taylor 
1996; Rhodes 1997) 
Authority – causes, concepts, evidence 
(Lasswell 2936; Lindblom 1959; Schmidt 
2010; Stone 1989 & 2012, Wildavsky 1979) 
Decisions – formal and 
informal authority 
(Bachrach and Baratz 
1962; Bulpitt 2008; 
Lipsky 1997; Rhodes 
1997) 
 
Inputs – impacts, events, trends and political 






policy system, the impacts and outcomes of which feed back into decision-making (Bachrach 
& Baratz 1962 & 1963; Bulpitt 2008; Lipsky 1997; Rhodes 1997). 
The process model used in the study is not intended as a strict sequence, rather it illustrates 
how the component parts of decision-making can notionally be understood as an iterative 
process. By using this model the study aimed to understand the strategic process of 
paradigmatic change in decision-making by interrogating the factors that influenced a series of 
first and second order decisions that took place throughout the period (Hall 1993). The model 
explores how decision-making responds to problems, be these external inputs or the result of 
internal feedback in the system. However, the analysis of decision-making was also mindful of 
how decisions, inputs, institutions and their relationships can interact in parallel to put problems 
on to the decision-making agenda. This is a challenge inherent to policy making in complex 
and open systems (Wildavsky 1979). As a result the model was used to trace decisions and 
their influences and whether this process indicates paradigmatic change. 
Inputs 
The first component of the decision-making process is an input or problem that requires a 
response of some form (Kern, Kuzemko, & Mitchell 2014; Stone 2012). The complexity and 
interlinked nature of most public policy-making means it is highly susceptible to external 
inputs, or events. External inputs can expose internal contradictions of action or the limits of 
organisational capacity whilst raising the political profile of the agenda, leading to more 
scrutiny of decisions. Inputs in the distributed model may include social trends that 
progressively reshape values and interests in ways which require a response by decision-
makers. Alternatively in the state-centric model events may require a response by government 
in order to demonstrate its competency and ability to manage problems on behalf of society. 
Equally inputs into decision-making should also include the internal drivers of change (Almond 
1988; Pierson 1993; Skocpol & Amenta 1986). This includes the feedback from the impact of 





Inputs into decision-making may undermine the coherence of the incumbent policy model and 
the expose limits of the capacity of decision-makers to effectively manage a problem. The crisis 
can be framed by two dimensions, a utilitarian dimension focuses on the empirical ability of 
government to deal with an empirical problem as well as a more relational political dimensions 
that challenges the values underlying decisions. As a result political leadership is a key element 
in understanding how inputs are mediated and prioritised for decision-making. In short political 
leadership typically drives the agenda for change in response to a policy problem that is 
typically framed by a deficit of current government action. Ultimately a crisis in the dominant 
model of decision-making can be driven by events, social trends or impacts, which erode the 
authority of an incumbent paradigm. However, paradigmatic it is also inherently linked to the 
success of an alternative account of the policy problem that challenges internally reinforcing 
patterns of ideational and institutional authority (Baumgartner & Jones 2012; Blyth 2013).  
Supporters 
The second element of the process is concerned with the institutional context of decision-
making. In particular the study explored how supporters of different models sought to frame 
the policy problem in line with their own preferences. How supporters develop preferences is 
linked to their own characteristics, such as rational interests that are mediated by cultural values 
and historical underpinnings. Supporters of particular views of the policy problem or 
paradigmatic models may work to advance their preferences in decision-making. This is 
particularly relevant to the paradigmatic model of change policy that is typically rooted in a 
crisis of incumbent ideas and institutional capacity. The crisis is in part linked to the breakdown 
in support for the incumbent approach by key groups or organisations that serves to expose the 
limitations of ideas and solutions. This is frequently driven by political leadership who identify 
a deficit in policy making, or lend support to those within the policy community who support 
change. This may be framed by the need to respond to events allied to more explicit reform 





Crucially different organisations may formally or informally collaborate to advance shared 
agendas. This advocacy coalition model can bring groups together around shared policy 
positions. The composition of these groups matters as they will determine the level of resource 
or agenda setting power that one perspective or other can bring to bear on the problem. In 
addition these coalitions are not static, either in their positioning or in their make up. Coalitions 
may evolve their position in response to iterative decisions or input into the decision-making 
process. These may include short and long term tactical considerations or the defence of core 
values or principles. At the same time the structure of coalitions may also evolve in response 
to evolving landscapes where contradictions in patterns of support may be exposed by different 
decisions that can lead to a realignment of implicit alliances. In this respect the composition 
and evolution of coalitions is an important factor in both identifying change and understanding 
its outcomes. 
Authority 
The third component focuses on the ideas that shaped the process, particularly how ideas gain 
authority in decision-making. The issue of authority element merits some further unpacking as 
it is key to understanding policy making, particularly in Hall’s paradigms model (Hall 1993; 
Stone 2012). In some respects authority is a product of the whole process. However, by treating 
it as a discrete element of the process authority it is positioned as a product of persuasive 
interaction between framing ideas and institutional settings and a requirement for decisions 
(Allison & Zelikow 1999; Lindblom 1959). The authority of ideas can be rooted in a modernist 
utilitarian frame, i.e. what matters is what works (Newman 2001b). However, a utilitarian 
model is also founded on dominant assumptions about what works and why that may also be 
imbued with values and preferences (Blyth 2013). These assumption are a key element of the 
paradigms model as they facilitate decisions in complex and open systems that may have 
multiple and contradictory inputs. In this respect authority is based on an institutionalisation of 
a set of ideas about how the policy should and does work which can in turn limit the scope for 





Equally, authority can also be linked to the explanatory or performative qualities of the ideas 
themselves. For example, where rational utilitarianism is a dominant institutional value the 
authority of ideas may rest on their ability to empirically explain problems, support coherent 
decision-making and deliver positive real world outcomes (Goodin et al 2006; Newman 
2001b). Equally, however, apparently utilitarian ideas may also derive their authority from 
their performative and communicative properties (Blyth 2013; Cox & Béland 2013; Stone, 
2012). For example, concepts and analogies can be readily communicated across diverse 
networks, such as the analogy of prudent personal finances and national fiscal austerity 
(Schmidt & Thatcher 2013). Although ideas may not emerge fully formed as an integrated 
policy paradigm they are likely to possess sufficient explanatory power that challenges the 
coherence of the incumbent approaches and the way inputs into decision-making, such as 
events, should be interpreted. Events or windows of opportunity may also determine the 
success of ideas during periods where certain ideas may be attractive or are able to explain 
particular prominent signals or issues. In either case ideas still need to provide a coherent and 
realistic framework for decision-making that reflect institutional capacity and the complexity 
of the problem (Wildavsky 1979). 
At the same time the utilitarian and performative lenses start to illustrate how authority is not 
solely about the accuracy or the salience of ideas. The final element of authority relates to the 
skill of persuasion or the deployment of institutional resource in support of them. In this respect 
the power and authority of ideas cannot be divorced from their institutional context (Blyth 
2013; Schmidt 2009 & 2010). For example, it is rare or unwise for government to confront a 
problem that it cannot solve (Wildavsky 1979). A paradigm therefore needs to be a practical 
solution that has the support of a variety of actors and institutions, including those that will be 
charged with its implementation. Institutional support can be based on utilitarian factors but 
may also be linked to other rational interests or cultural values which condition an institution’s 
priorities and preferences (Hall & Taylor 1996; Powell & DiMaggio 1983; Wildavsky 1987). 





hold front line discretionary powers that may determine its success (Bachrach & Baratz 1962 
& 1963; Lipsky 1997). As a result authority is also dependent on institutional factors and 
constraints. 
Therefore for the purposes of this study authority is the relationship between utilitarian and 
performative characteristics of ideas and the relational process of institutional persuasion. 
However, for Blyth, and Hall, this model is more likely to reinforce incumbent paradigms, even 
where there are significant challenges to its dominant assumptions. Nevertheless, the 
persuasive skills of advocates can configure ideational and institutional authority (Lasswell 
1936; Torgerson 1985; Wildavsky 1979). In particular, evidence and analysis can play an 
important role to challenge decisions and the legitimacy of incumbent interests or assumptions 
rooted in historical legacies. Evidence can shape decisions at different points in the process 
including farming the policy options that can respond to political agendas. Equally evidence 
may be shaped by the complexity of problem and the capacity of those seeking to influence 
decisions, be it government itself or organisations such as think-tanks that actively introduce 
new ideas. Therefore, the persuasive element of authority is linked to the capacities of the 
organisation or actors presenting the case which in turn can reproduce dominant patterns of 
authority without significant and concerted ideational and institutional challenge.  
Decisions 
The final component of the process are the different types of decision-making involved in 
policy making and change (Hall 1993; Pierson 2000a). The most common type are frequent 
‘first order’ decisions, such as regular front line or operational decisions or regular processes 
such as annual budget allocations. First order decisions include decisions to improve the 
effectiveness of existing policy or refine a target to improve its clarity, for example directing 
investment into updating existing urban river bank defences to improve their effectiveness. 
These types of decisions tend to be less contentious as they don’t involve changes to the core 





frequency decisions meaning that relatively small changes may have a significant accumulated 
impact, such as adjustments to front line welfare assessment criteria. However, as these 
decisions can also be heavily structured by dominant professional identities, assumptions and 
practices, as well as by conflicting resource demands, they can also involve significant 
institutional inertia that may take time to change. As a result they can also be framed as 
systemic failures of delivery that require significant institutional reform. 
The study will also examine second-order decisions that involved changing systems and 
architectures. This might include a machinery of government change that changes 
responsibility or shifts between ex-ante measures or post-hoc cures. For example, a second 
order change in health care policy predicated on achieving efficient delivery of health care that 
is free at the point of use may shift between a market based approach or planned models. In the 
case of social access to university for example a second order type change would be to shift 
focus between university admissions practices and the outputs of the schools system. In the 
flooding model, a second order change would divert investment toward flood plain 
management rather than riverbank defences. As these types of decisions involve re allocating 
resources they may also be constrained by the interests of the policy community and act as 
proxies for more normative debates about policy preferences (Majone 1989). As a result these 
types of decisions can substantially reconfigure systems but may require a longer-term process 
to embed into distributed first order decision-making (Barber 2008). 
The study approached decision-making as both clear high level decisions that are framed by 
strategic objectives and a more messy and contradictory set of decisions across a wider policy 
community. In particular, the study was also mindful of the fact that ideational authority may 
not always directly translate into tangible decisions. This may include examples where 
institutional inertia or front line discretion may diverge from the intent of a policy or ideas may 
ultimately be unworkable or flawed. Crucial to this question was how different types of 
institutional power shaped the decision-making agenda independently of the more persuasive 





ability to interpret high level ideas into local practice plus the decision of different groups to 
participate in decision-making and the consequences for the scope of policy. This gives 
decision-making multiple layers, all of which may have relevance in an iterative process. 
Indicators of change 
In order to understand the influence of the different models over time and where there may 
have been dialogue between them, the study examined the development of Prevent as a 
decision-making process (Allison & Zelikow 1999; Cairney 2007). By focusing on the process 
the study derived a series of process indicators from Hall’s model to assess whether there may 
be paradigmatic change (Box 3.1). The indicators were an increased volume of decision-
making, changes in the institutional structure of decision-making and the introduction of new 
ideas in decision-making. These ideational and institutional process indicators were then 
compared against the expectations of models Thomas and John, with Thomas being treated as 
the incumbent approach at the start of the period and John the notional challenger. This dual 
approach allowed the study to explore the process of paradigmatic change as an iterative and 
discursive process rather than Hall’s narrower zero sum model with a clear start and end point 
(Baumgartner & Jones 2002; Baumgartner & Jones 2012; Blyth 2013; Oliver & Pemberton, 




Box: 3.2 Process indicators of paradigmatic change (Hall 1993) 
Volume of 
decisions 
There is an increased volume of policy activity associated with preventing 
terrorism. There is evidence of increased interest in the issue and associated 





tanks and media. There is an increased volume of output from ministers and 




There are changes in dominant concepts that frame decisions. These ideas 
originate from outside an incumbent policy community and its dominant set 
of ideas. The new ideas emphasise a new or changed causal model and 
associated ways of defining success. The ideas would focus decision-
making on indirect social causes and grievances and associated solutions. 
Institutional 
change 
There are new members of the policy community who exert influence on 
decision-making. These new members introduce new constraints and 
opportunities for decision-making. There is evidence of formal 
organisational change e.g machinery of government. There is evidence of 
informal organisational change, such as evolving advocacy coalitions. The 
changes are orientated around consensual and distributed institutional 
relationships. 
	
The first process indicator focused on the volume of policy activity, including first and second 
order policy changes. A high volume of changes indicates possible paradigmatic change as new 
ideas and their supporters compete for control of decision-making. In itself a high volume of 
decision-making demonstrates an increasing intensity of policy and political activity that 
suggests a previously stable approach is being challenged (Baumgartner and Jones 2012 & 
2007; John et al 2013; Lieberman 2003). Increased scrutiny of decisions can challenge an 
established consensus within a policy community by introducing new ideas, values and 
interests that undermine the old assumptions and relationships that underpinned decision-
making. Ultimately this scrutiny challenges the authority and control of the incumbent 





of competition for control of decision-making and an potential indicator of paradigmatic 
competition and change. 
As the paradigms model is primarily an ideational approach the second indicator examined the 
origins of ideas and how they framed policy problems and solutions. In a case of paradigmatic 
change, new ideas would enter into decision making from outside the dominant paradigmatic 
frame to challenge the foundational ideas of policy-making. These ideas may originate from 
alternative institutional settings, such as parallel policy subsystems, via academia and think-
tanks or may be part of political reform agendas. In Hall’s model of paradigmatic change in 
economics the main shift was from a Keynesian emphasis on economic demand to stability of 
fiscal supply. In the dominant Keynesian model government took an active role in stimulating 
demand and employment through investment, with more tolerance of inflation. In contrast a 
monetarist approach emphasised the need for stable inflation through the use of interest rates 
allied to market led investment, an approach that was advanced by think tanks that supported 
the ‘Chicago school’ of economics. 
Hall’s paradigms model also requires evidence of institutional change. In Hall’s original case 
study the tipping point was when supporters of a paradigm gain institutional control over 
decision-making. The study explored whether there was evidence for internal changes in the 
approach of organisations based on new paradigmatic ideas and values. It also sought to explore 
whether there were more formal more structural changes, such as machinery of government 
changes, which in the case of monetary policy tended to focus on independence for the central 
banks. In addition the study examined whether there were less formal changes, such as 
increased participation of think tanks that increased the supply of ideas to challenge the ideas 
of the incumbent decision-making community. Finally the study examined whether there were 
new participants in a decision-making community and whether this created the potential for 
new patterns of authority in decision-making. Ultimately paradigmatic change in this model 
would include a reconfiguration of institutional relationships as well as the interests and 





The study proposed that model Thomas was the incumbent policy model at the start of the 
period meaning that the process indicators were likely to indicate a change to model John. This 
is not to say that the UK represented a authoritarian Hobbesian state in 2001. The power of the 
sovereign is clearly subject to constraints, including international laws and treaties and 
domestic human rights frameworks. Nevertheless the 2000 Terrorism Act, which introduced 
permanent executive powers for dealing with general terrorist threats across the UK, 
encapsulated the dominant model of counter terrorism policy. This granted coercive powers to 
disrupt organised terrorist groups and prosecute individuals whilst also setting limits to state 
powers that protected the rights of citizens (Wilkinson 2006). Therefore, an intense period of 
decision making that included new ideas and institutional change would potentially be an 
example of a change toward the Lockian model John. On the other hand, if Prevent were an 
example of an incremental change based on the Hobbesian model Thomas there would be 
limited institutional change and few new ideas from outside the incumbent community.  
The study expected to find an incremental change based on Hobbesian model Thomas to be 
led by a centralised community that was focused on improving the targeting of organised 
terrorist recruitment and plots. Decisions would be refinements based on a stable ideational 
framework of causes, solutions and priorities. This would have included improving the 
effectiveness of intelligence and policing to identify and prosecute individuals involved in 
terrorism. The causes of terrorism would be understood in terms of dealing with deliberate 
rational actors who are seeking to recruit support for their violent worldview and operations. 
Social and cultural causes would be viewed as second order issues that are used as instruments 
of recruitment by terrorist groups and beyond the scope of policy. Engagement with social 
groups would have been framed in instrumental terms with a focus on developing the means 
to deliver direct interventions. Social factors would primarily have been seen as issues to be 
mitigated or navigated in order to improve implementation of existing measures. Furthermore 
institutional authority over decision-making would have been linked to a stable policy 





A paradigmatic change toward model John would have been based on a distributed consensual 
approach aimed at resolving the civil conflict as push factors that drove support for and 
participation in terrorism. This objective would have been founded on a belief that resolving 
social grievances, including structural and cultural dimensions, was a pre-requisite for 
successfully preventing terrorism, even where they may not have directly attributable causal 
links. In this model, support for and participation in terrorism was a product of social and 
political grievances, including government policy and solutions would focus on the process of 
resolve these cleavages. Decisions will involve a much wider set of actors, including non-
security agencies and civil society, that presents more opportunities for the formation of new 
advocacy coalitions. Therefore both the ideas and institutional relationships behind decisions 
would be consensual, distributed and focused on collectively addressing social grievances. 
Hypotheses 
The basic hypothesis of the study is that Prevent can be understood as a product of negotiation 
between two competing models of the state and security. The two competing models, Thomas 
and John formed an implicit, and at times explicit, framework for decision-making and the 
ideational and institutional process that shaped it. As the incumbent model, Thomas was 
expected to be the dominant influence on decision-making. At the same time, the study 
assumed that the volume of activity and the introduction of community interests and ideas 
about social causes was indicative of influence from model John. As a result, the study expected 
that the competition between the two models combined to shape an iterative process of change 
that was not a settled linear process. Importantly, the study expected decision-making to be 
shaped by a series of formal and informal relationships at national and local levels that could 
be indicative of a distributed model John or extension of centralised state authority in model 
Thomas.  
The study hypothesised that first and second order decision-making in Prevent broadly evolved 





toward a general integration approach and then to a more targeted model that incorporated non-
violent extremism (Briggs 2010; Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2010; Klausen 2009; Lambert 
2008; Maher & Frampton 2009, Mirza, Senthilkumaran & Ja'Far 2007; Simcox et al 2011; 
Spalek and Lambert 2010; Stevens 2011).14 In this model solutions can be understood in 
relation to a four way axis with the Y axis representing differing emphases on ex post 
enforcement and ex ante integration and the X axis on neutral or values based community 
engagement. For example the emphasis on directly preventing violence through neural 
community partnership was the dominant frame at the start of the policy. Subsequently 
developmental approaches to promoting integration in partnership with community became the 
main focus for policy-making. After this there was a strong focus on more principles based 
engagement, including policing of ‘non-violent’ extremism that focuses on establishing 
parameters of acceptable beliefs and values  This is illustrated in figure 3.2 below. 
The study focused on the decision-making process, including its institutional structure and 
supporting ideas, in order to understand how the evolution of these decisions, and by extension 
the solutions, were determined by the two competing models of security. The study retained an 
open mind about the extent to which decisions and the process that developed them were 
framed by either Thomas or John. Clearly the middle phase of development that focused on an 
integration approach would be expected to be linked to model John. However the shift toward 
values based engagement is not indicative of a Hobbesian model Thomas approach and may 
instead be linked to pressure associated with the development of a social consensus about 
shared values and acceptability. Similarly an enforcement approach may be more closely linked 
to Hobbesian model Thomas but may also be linked to the development of a social consensus 
to support stronger government leadership. Finally the shift toward an integration model could 
also be interpreted as an extension of government control over civil society 
Figure 3.2: Evolution of policy solutions  
	
14 Further details of how this hypothesis framed the narrative analysis and the analytical frameworks are set out in 







This chapter has described the theoretical framework that the study has used to examine the 
decision-making process that developed Prevent. The chapter has set out how the process can 















coercive model or a distributed consensual negotiated model. The two archetypal are based on 
contemporary debates about the relationship between the state as an autonomous agent and the 
influence of socio-economic interests that can be traced back to Hobbes and Locke. The 
relationship is particularly relevant in the case of Prevent as much of the literature and the 
policy itself focuses on the role that civil society should play in preventing terrorism and the 
on-going role of government to lead policy and deliver solutions. As a result there is a particular 
value to using these two models in order to understand what the ideas and institutional 
arrangements that influenced its development can tell us about Prevent. 
The study employed these models to examine whether Prevent should be understood as a 
coercive top down or a distributed consensual model of security. The study employed a 
theoretical model that examined decision-making as an iterative ideational and institutional 
process. The study then traces the influence of these two models through the policy making 
process rather than just focusing on a static outcome. This include tracing the inputs into the 
decision-making process, the organisation of supporters of different approaches and how 
authority over decision-making across a policy system was negotiated. The features of the 
process, including the volume of decisions, the origins of ideas and evidence of institutional 
change can be used as indicators of paradigmatic or incremental change between an incumbent 
and challenging model. At the same time the ideational and institutional features of the process 
can be compared against the expectations of the two models to assess whether Prevent was 












Chapter 4: Methodology 
Introduction 
This chapter sets out the methodology used by the study to examine whether Prevent 
represented a change in policy, to what extent and why. The study uses a qualitative case study 
approach to enables an in-depth examination of decision-making (Yin 2003). Although only a 
single case which limits generalisable findings the case study approach is particularly valuable 
due to the significance of Prevent and the contested nature of its development. In particular, by 
focusing on the decision-making process that developed Prevent the study represents a new 
contribution to the literature on Prevent (Thomas 2017). The case study was structured around 
Hall’s model of paradigmatic change and tests whether Prevent was based on one of two 
competing models of security (Hall 1993). It presents an in-depth narrative analysis of 
decision-making that is compared against the ideational and institutional features of the two 
models and examines the process for indicators of paradigmatic change (Collier 2011; 
Mahoney 2012). By using these different frames of analysis the study developed a rich account 
of change in the decision-making process (Allison & Zelikow 1999; Cairney 2007). 
The case study was based on data collected through 16 semi structured elite interviews and in-
depth analysis of associated speeches, parliamentary statements, media coverage, reports and 
formal policy documents and records. The study used the theoretical frameworks set out in the 
Chapter 3 to examine whether Prevent was founded on a centralised coercive model Thomas 
or a distributed consensual model John (Box 3.2). It does this by presenting a detailed narrative 
account of decision-making to examine the ideational and institutional features of process, 
based on the model set out in Figure 3.1. This framework and associated indicators presented 
in Box 3.1 and Box 3.2 guided the collection and interrogation of data in a complex and 





change being observed.15 However, the study is an in-depth exploration of a complex process 
that also required flexibility in the research design. This necessitated an iterative approach to 
the collection and analysis of data to interrogate multiple and conflicting influences throughout 
the process (Srivastava & Hopwood 2009). Given these complexities the study’s conclusions 
should be treated as contributions to the on-going debate about Prevent rather than definitive 
answers. 
What the study did not attempt to evaluate was whether Prevent was successful in terms of its 
impact on terrorism. Nevertheless, by examining the decision-making process the case study 
also presents an opportunity to evaluate Prevent against its own aims and objectives, including 
those of the participants in the process. In particular, this allows the study to consider the extent 
to which Prevent successfully engaged with the proxies that may have been employed to guide 
action. This is relevant as preventative policies typically rely on a notional theory of change to 
impact on social outcomes outside the direct control of government (Gough 2015; Stone 1989). 
This challenge is further exacerbated in the context of terrorism given the nature of the threat 
and political focus it tends to receive. As a result the study aims to understand how Prevent 
was developed and by extension enable some evaluation of whether it should be considered a 
success. 
Case study approach 
The study uses a series of analytical frames to present an in-depth case study of the decision-
making process (Allison & Zelikow 1999; Cairney 2007; Denscombe 2010; Yin 2003). At the 
heart of the case-study is an examination of whether Prevent represented a change from a 
centralised model Thomas to a distributed model of the state and security policy and if so, the 
reasons why it developed in this way. The study approaches this question by exploring the 
structure of decision-making and influences on the process in order to draw conclusions about 
the characteristics of Prevent. The study assessed the likelihood of change and examined 
	





decision-making against the ideational and institutional expectations of the competing models. 
A focus on the process was used to understand policy as an on-going iterative process that may 
have conflicting features. This approach was used instead of one that compared Prevent as a 
singular and static entity at two distinct points in time. 
The study is founded on a detailed narrative account of decision-making that provides an 
empirical foundation for tracing the institutional and ideational influences on Prevent (Collier 
2011). The narrative account is organised around three high level phases in order to capture the 
interaction between different decisions and inputs over time. The first period ran from the 
attacks of 9/11 in the summer of 2001 until 2005 and covers the initial development of the 
Prevent strand of Contest. This was followed by the period from the 2005 London attacks that 
covers the activity that led to the publication of the full Prevent strategy in 2008. The third 
period ran from 2008 and covered the feedback from the implementation of the full Prevent 
strategy which in turn led to the revised strategy in 2011. These periods organise the narrative 
account but the subsequent analysis shows how the influences on decision-making can be 
traced across the different periods. 
Although a case study approach was chosen as the best way to explore the decision making 
process in-depth it does have two principle limitations that should be taken into account. 
Firstly, as a single case study any generalisable findings can only be really inferred. However, 
Prevent is a significant and interesting area of policy in its own right. Furthermore, the study 
is grounded in the theory of policy change set out in the previous chapter to ensure that its 
findings are useful when looking at policy-making in contested areas more generally. At the 
same time the study chose to adopt a flexible and iterative approach to data collection and 
analysis in order to closely examine the decision-making process in what is a complex and 
contested area of policy making (Denscombe 2010). This created risks of bias in data sampling 
and analysis but these were mitigated these by grounding analysis in the theoretical framework 
presented in chapter three and the presentation of a detailed empirical account of the process 





A grounded but flexible approach to the study was particularly important given the need to 
simultaneously understand and deal with the uncertainty and conflicting views that make 
Prevent interesting. The gaps in knowledge and a priori views that characterised decision-
making at the time were also important factors to consider when collecting and analysing data 
in this study. In some respects it is unrealistic that a study such as this can be shorn of all prior 
assumptions or bias. For example, this study adopts a sympathetic starting point that a 
preventative approach to political violence is a legitimate, and even positive, aim but queries 
the contribution of Prevent. This was shared by most respondents to the study, as indicated by 
their involvement in Prevent, and by the author. The study was mindful of this shared position 
whilst also using it to gain in-depth and candid insights about its development. 
Data collection 
The collection of data was based on the development of a detailed narrative account that 
captured formal decisions and their explicit and implicit influences (Collier 2011). The study 
first compiled a timeline for the whole period that included key events and the publication of 
the main Prevent strategies. The initial timeline represented a high level framework of inputs 
and decisions, as described in the model of policy change set out in Figure 3.1 in the previous 
chapter. This was populated from the secondary literature and existing analyses of Prevent that 
informed the selection of primary documentary sources and interviews. The historical timeline 
was then populated with primary data collected from interviews and contemporary documents. 
This data was then used to trace detailed inputs and decisions and the institutional and 
ideational dimensions of the process. 
The focus on the decision-making process necessitated an iterative approach to identifying 
sources and interviews that was guided by the feedback that was received as the study went on. 
This allowed for a richer inductive approach to data collection. However this did present risks 
that the study might become self-reinforcing by progressively collecting data from sources with 





been on the margins of decision-making but which nevertheless exerted influence in other 
ways. As a result the study sought to identify sources that could provide insight into the 
conflicts and debates in decision-making. At the same time the study was also clear that the 
aim was to identify major decisions and what influenced them. This required triangulation of 
data to evaluate what sources could say about the influences on the process how these were 
interpreted by an interactive and iterative policy process. 
Collecting data on a decision-making process that navigated uncertainty and conflicting views 
has to mindful to navigate the same uncertainties and conflicts (Torgerson 1985; Wildavsky 
1975). As Blyth emphasises, empirical data has to be collected from and evaluated against the 
ideational and institutional contexts that the study wishes to describe (Blyth 2013). Therefore, 
the study sought to piece together the motivations and rationales for decision-making by 
collecting data from a variety of sources. For example, Government publications were treated 
as empirical records of decisions and policy priorities. A speech or evidence to a committee 
may set out detail of a decision but may also be constructed in order to reassure or challenge 
scrutiny. Empirical research, was used to shape the scope and focus of this study questions but 
the questions and findings were also used to understand contemporary policy. Individuals 
involved in the process provided observations on decision-making whilst also being active 
agents in the process.  
The study focuses on the development of Prevent from 2001 to 2011. However, it made a 
particular effort to identify sources relevant to the period prior to 2005, before the London 
attacks, and before 2008 whilst the main strategy was originally negotiated. The study aims to 
understand this period as it was less well covered in existing analyses and there is also less 
detail about the policy on public record as it was still in its formative stages. Although the study 
actively sought to identify primary sources to provide insight into decision-making there were 
few of direct relevance. This presented some challenges for the study as it is exploring a policy 





recall from a period that was over a decade ago. As a result there is a greater use of inference 
about associated policy areas as well as parliamentary debates on related issues. 
Selecting documents 
The study selected documents from two broad categories, documents that record or presented 
government policy and decisions and documents that were intended or did have an influence 
on decision-making. The first set were selected for their direct insight or relevance to Prevent 
decision-making by organisations with formal authority to make decisions relevant to 
development of Prevent. This primarily includes government departments but the wider 
network of institutions involved in decision-making, including organisations that might 
convene local decision-making. These documents were considered part of the record of 
decision-making and include official reports, ministerial speeches or media statements and 
Hansard. These documents provided reference points for how decisions were framed, the ideas 
that were put forward and the different problems that were being factored into decisions. They 
provided a direct record of the influence of ideas and their origins and the focus and location 
of institutional activity at given points in time. 
The second set were documents that are illustrative of influential ideas or organisations in 
decision-making. In particular this category included reports by think tanks or media 
commentary on the topic. These documents were selected on the basis of their potential or 
reported influence or direct or indirect link to decision-making. In some cases this influence or 
link was explicit, such as where reports were cited in subsequent decisions or where reports 
were produced with government support, or where influence was reported by interviewees or 
other documents. In this case media reporting was also useful in terms of being a record of how 
decisions may have been presented which gave further insight into the ideational and 
institutional context or framing for decision. Finally these types of documents were also used 





been more directly critical of the policy itself and so were not directly involved in decision-
making. 
Selecting interviewees 
The study collected primary data through 16 semi structured elite interviews drawn from a 
specific and relatively small group of individuals who had been directly involved in or were 
close to decision-making at national and local levels (Goldstein 2002; Morris 2009). They were 
targeted for their first hand insight into decision-making, including the ideas and institutional 
factors that shaped their work. In addition interviewees were targeted to gather perspectives 
that were not typically on the public record. This means that the study focused on identify and 
targeting a small number of high value responses. This created risks in terms of coverage and 
balance in that there were only a small number of useful sources that were mitigated by the 
nature of the approach, an emphasis on anonymity and my own credentials (Goldstein 2002). 
They were selected on the basis of recommendation or direct reference in commentary or 
literature about the study and in some cases respondents were known to me by virtue of my 
prior work.16  
The central set of interviews were with a set of advisors to government on Muslim community 
affairs. They are all listed as ‘Advisor’ in this study and included independent advisors 
associated with Islamic organisations or with Muslim community networks, ministerial faith 
and cohesion advisors and Muslim civil servants. A full list of interviewees including 
description is included in Annex A. The Muslim community advisors were of particular 
importance they have been identified as both influential and, in some cases problematic (see 
for example Bright 2006). The advisors were prioritised by this study for their insight into how 
government approached the relationship with the Muslim community as this was the primary 
focus for much of the policy and was central to much of the conflict around Prevent. In addition 
these individuals have had limited opportunity to put their own views of the process on the 
	





public record and represented an opportunity to capture their perspectives on the development 
of Prevent. Equally, because these advisors represented a small number and in some cases there 
was known to be a degree of rivalry between them it was important to get a useful spread of 
responses, however it was not possible to secure all of them. 
The study also engaged with the more distributed policy community. This presented a 
challenge for a study that only had resource for a targeted sample of high value interviews. In 
some cases there were individuals who could be identified who played a role in national 
membership organisations to coordinate responses by local authorities or police forces that 
provided a perspective on the interaction between national and local decision-making. At the 
same the study also sought out some perspectives from font line decision-making in local 
government and policing to complement analysis of existing literature. Whilst these 
interviewees and sources could not speak directly for all front line implementation they 
provided an opportunity to understand how problems were interpreted by decision-making at 
different levels of the policy community. The interviewees were targeted on the basis of 
recommendations by other respondents or their involvement in aspects of the local 
implementation of Prevent that fed into national decision-making. 
The third category represented highly influential individuals in positions of formal leadership. 
This included government ministers and the most senior civil servants involved in the 
development of Prevent during the period. In some cases direct interview access was possible 
however in the main the study focused on interrogating statements on the public record, 
including speeches and Hansard. These individuals were identified by virtue of their 
responsibility for decisions in the case of ministers or where they were clearly in prominent 
leadership roles, such as in the case of Charles Farr as director of the Office for Security and 
Counter Terrorism. Using primary sources on public record was different to collecting 
interview data based on recall and discussion. However the study assessed the position and 
views of these individuals and the rationales for the decisions through these sources in a similar 





their positions and approach that aided interpretation of these sources.  
The study was extremely careful to protect the anonymity of interviewees. Reassurance about 
anonymity formed part of the strategy for securing interviews (Goldstein 2002). By selecting 
a small number of interviews from a small pool of those with first hand involvement there is a 
real risk that respondents can be identified from their views, role or personal characteristics. 
At the same time, although experienced professionals, involvement in the agenda has resulted 
in reputational risks that in some cases were on-going and which made many extremely 
sensitive about participating in the study. There were some individuals who declined to 
participate for these reasons. As a result the study has been very careful about how data is 
presented in the final study, particularly where quotes are used or where particular findings are 
attributed to the comments of respondents. In practice, and as illustrated in more detail in the 
analysis section later in this chapter, the study did not rely on interviews alone but sought to 
corroborate themes from multiple interviews and documents. 
Conducting interviews  
The study used semi structured qualitative ‘elite’ interviews to gain first-hand perspectives on 
the ideas and institutional relationships that influenced decisions (Aberbach & Rockman, 2002; 
Morris, 2009).17  Rather than directly asking about the influence of ideas and institutions 
interviews focused on gathering in-depth narrative commentary from which wider conclusions 
could be inferred. In particular interviews were structured around the role that individuals 
played in decision-making, how they attempted to influence the process and their observations 
on the wider process (Goldstein 2002). In this respect the personal and professional background 
and perspectives of the interviewee was central to the interview process and for eliciting views 
on the ideas, values and interests that they carried into the process. This approach helped to 
build personal rapport whilst also providing a narrative structure to interrogate the respondent’s 
recall of events. Ultimately interviews focused on gathering a reflective assessment of the 
	





process, including the objectives and approach of the respondent and the levels of influence 
that they or others had on decisions. Further details of the interview structure is presented in 
Annexe A. 
The structure of interviews was crucial for gaining confidence of interviewees given the 
sensitivity of the subject and their involvement. Interviews used a combination of grand tour 
and targeted questions (Leech 2002). Grand tour or open-ended questions explored the 
respondents’ views of the overall study questions which generated broad and rich feedback. At 
the same time they risked a lack focus and also limited the opportunity to establish credibility 
with the interviewee. On the other hand testing questions were used to focus on specific 
decisions and issues that had been identified from the timeline or background research. These 
helped to establish credibility but care had to be taken not to lead the subject, undermine rapport 
or limit the breadth the interview could offer (Aberbach & Rockman 2002). In practice 
interviews interchanged between the two types of question, often opening with a general 
question and then testing a particular view of Prevent at a relatively early stage. This 
encouraged the respondent to examine their own perspective and establish the interviewer’s 
own knowledge of the agenda (Aberbach & Rockman 2002; Berry 2002; ).  
Although this study is dealing with a defined historical period it is also situated in the context 
of on-going debates about the contemporary approach to Prevent. This raises questions about 
the degree to which interviews accurately represented the issues of the time, or represented a 
reflective interpretation, either inadvertently or deliberately, that was coloured by 
contemporary debates (Morris 2009). The study addressed this challenge by structuring the 
interviews as a historical reflection that created the opportunity to directly probe questions of 
recall and the evolution of views over time. In order to challenge or aid recall it was important 
for the interviewer to introduce knowledge about the period and relevant to the interviewee, 
whilst being mindful to not to implicitly seek to confirm the study hypotheses. However in 
some cases it was helpful to explicitly test certain hypothesis or ideas with interviewees to 





their involvement in Prevent and were able to engage in lengthy, nuanced and detailed 
discussion. 
Data analysis 
The study used a grounded theory approach that interrogated the collected data for evidence 
that Prevent was an example of paradigmatic change based on one of the two competing models 
(Denscombe 2010; Hall 1993).18 The study structured analysis of data based on the model of 
change set out in chapter three. Data was first interrogated to identify decisions and the 
institutional interests and ideas that framed them, whilst examining how these were embedded 
in an on-going process. This was then followed by an assessment of the institutional and 
ideational dimensions against the two models of security, the top down model Thomas or a 
distributed consensual model John. This required an in-depth engagement with the primary 
sources that was iteratively analysed based on the model of policy change. Sources were 
weighted in terms of their significance and triangulated to corroborate their results. Finally the 
study subjected the analysed data to a series of process tests to examine whether this was an 
example of paradigmatic change.  
The study grouped documents and interviews by their proximity to decision making. At the 
same time all sources were treated critically to assess whether they were framed in a particular 
way for a specific audience, including the interviewer. For example, Prevent strategies or 
statements in parliament about government decisions were treated as records of decisions. 
Ministerial or civil servant evidence to select committees, speeches or media briefings were 
treated as directly informative of the factors that framed or influenced decisions. Finally 
interviews, think tank reports and media reporting or commentary were treated as directly or 
indirectly illustrative of influences or debates in decision-making. These categories were not 
always discrete and in some cases the content in sources could be interpreted in more than one 
role, particularly where evidence, speeches or media briefings were intended to communicate 
	





to a particular audience. However this in itself was indicative of an influence on decision-
making.  
The study adopted an iterative approach to analysis that revisited the narrative timeline and 
different sources and interviews as the study progressed (Srivastava & Hopwood 2009). This 
iterative approach enabled the study to build up a rich account of significant decisions and the 
factors that influenced decision-making. As the body of evidence developed different sources 
or contributions provided new insight into the process and how certain events or sources should 
be understood. This included how certain sources should be interpreted in their context, such 
as where insight into the position of certain respondents was gathered from alternative sources 
that may have cast a new light on an interview or statement. This approach did require careful 
reflection on how the research was being led by its findings and sources as it built up. This 
meant that a careful use of triangulation, the process structure for analysis and the final tests 
provided an important grounding for the analysis as well as critical reflection on potential 
biases. 
The study analysed data based on the different elements of the decision-making process set out 
in Figure 3.1 (Denscombe 2010). The first round identified the main second order decisions 
made by government throughout the development of Prevent and traced them against 
significant inputs, primarily terrorist attacks and elections. The first round also identified 
different decisions taken by members of the policy-making community, for example decisions 
to participate in Prevent or approaches to local implementation. This included whether these 
types of decisions were likely to be an upstream influence on, a direct response to, or an indirect 
consequence of second order decisions. The study gave a particular focus to the precursors to 
major second order decisions, such as the decision to prioritise or adopt a particular approach 
to decision-making, and to understand their ideational and institutional influences. This initial 
round developed a detailed picture of the main decisions alongside distributed decisions that 





The next stage focused on the institutional participants in decision-making. This included 
interrogating their explicit and implicit aims and priorities, their organisational interests and 
the values and preferences that were brought into the process. From this analysis of the source 
considered any insight into the tactics or strategy of organisations in the process. Of particular 
interest here was whether there was evidence from the sources that could allow institutions or 
sources to be grouped into advocacy coalitions on the basis of shared interests, priorities or 
tactics. This included how and why these organisations could be grouped in this way, such as 
whether alignment was tactical or values based, and whether it was implicit or explicit. This 
process also sought to identify whether there were changes in the composition of coalitions on 
the basis of shifting priorities or interests over time or in response to certain decisions or trends. 
The next stage focused on the ideational perspective of sources. This included how the core 
policy problem was framed, such as the causes of terrorism and community engagement, and 
the likely effectiveness of different solutions. This stage examined how arguments were 
constructed or were positioned in relation to conflicting views. This sought to identify where 
there was common ground within the policy agenda and where there were points of divergence. 
Points of divergence were then examined to explore whether these were proxies for other 
disputes to identify where the fundamental trade-offs in decisions making lay. In particular the 
analysis examined how arguments and disputes were related to the core policy problem and 
whether they were directly or indirectly representative of fundamental paradigmatic or values 
based conflicts. The study examined how these ideas and debates evolved over the period and 
whether their implicit or explicit influence could be traced through decisions. 
Weighting sources 
In addition to identifying data at face value based on the respondents own recall the coding 
also applied a critical lens to the data sources. This lens assessed the collected data against the 
interests and backgrounds of different individuals and the ideas and how they framed their 





the policy community in order to understand patterns of authority and where there was informal 
or formal alignment between different groups or individuals (Hanneman & Riddle 2005). This 
is relevant to understand both where there may be evidence of institutional change through the 
formation of advocacy coalitions and the sharing of ideas and arguments across the new policy 
community. At the same time the nature of the relationships between these groups provides an 
insight into whether positions were shared on the basis of values or tactics which provides 
further insight into the patterns of authority over decision-making. 
Furthermore, by considering the interests, values and relationships of respondents the study 
also made judgements about the significance of evidence. The weighting of evidence was 
particularly important for a highly contested case such as Prevent where there were conflicting 
commentaries about the process. By considering the weight that should be applied the study 
aimed to develop an accurate account of authority in decision-making whilst also 
understanding the different views and perspectives that were present in the process. For 
example data collected from significant decision makers may be used to draw conclusions 
about the framing of a particular decision. At the same time aggregated data from a number of 
sources in proximity to that decision-maker was used to evaluate the factors that influenced 
that decision. Similarly documents could also be situated within institutional relationships, 
including where there were documents that were cited by policy makers or official records of 
decisions such as strategy documents.  
Analytic tests 
The study then analysed the data to assess what conclusions could be drawn about a discursive 
process of decision-making and its outcomes. The first indicator focused on the volume of 
decision-making as a contextual indicator of paradigmatic change. This was then followed by 
institutional indicators, including changes in the composition of the policy community, the 
range of actors involved in the process and the formation of advocacy coalitions. Paradigmatic 





influence on decision-making. The study then explored the ideational perspective, including 
the origins of ideas, the concepts that drove decision-making and how these related to the 
paradigmatic models. A paradigmatic change to model John entailed an emphasis on resolving 
conflict in civil society over the role of the state in preventing violence. For an incremental 
change the ideas that framed Prevent would have focused on improving government’s capacity 
to target rational terrorists organisations.  
To demonstrate a ‘zero-sum’ paradigmatic shift to John would have required a high bar of 
proof. Furthermore, the indicators used in this study are necessary but are largely not sufficient 
to prove paradigmatic change (Collier 2011; Mahoney 2012). As a result the study infers its 
conclusions through a cumulative assessment of the decision-making process through the 
different analytical lenses described in this chapter. This cumulative approach will be necessary 
as singular ‘smoking gun’ evidence is unlikely to be found in a discursive process of ideas and 
institutional relationships (Mahoney 2012). A failure to find institutional and ideational 
indicators of change was treated as evidence of incremental Hobbesian change based on 
Thomas , but process indicators of paradigmatic change evidence of potential shift toward John. 
By assessing Prevent through the different lenses the study also explores how conflicts between 
the models may have been settled and how they may have exerted influence throughout the 
decision-making process.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has set out how the study developed a case study of Prevent by testing whether 
decision-making was framed by one of two models of the state, Thomas or John. The case 
study was grounded in the theory of policy change set out in Chapter 3 and used a series of 
analytical lenses to build a cumulative assessment of whether the decision-making process 
represented a paradigmatic change. The study traced the main decisions, examined the 
ideational and institutional dimensions of the process and tested its features against two models 





to provide further reference points for the analysis and conclusions. The study uses these lenses 
and indicators to examine in depth a dynamic and iterative process of decision-making that 
resists ‘smoking gun’ style evidence and conclusions. Through this approach the study 








Chapter 5: Origins of Prevent 2001 – 2004 
Introduction 
This chapter explores the period following the 9/11 attacks and concludes with the 2005 general 
election. It shows how the limits of the narrow Thomas model led to an emerging consensus in 
support of a broader preventative approach to terrorism. The limits of the Thomas model were 
exposed by heightened political scrutiny of the government’s capacity to prevent terrorism. 
The security services themselves highlighted the limits of their capability to deal with complex 
terrorist networks that involved British nationals and the impact of foreign policy and domestic 
policing on terrorist and extremist recruitment. However, the legal and political limitations of 
extending and expanding coercive powers were also reached during this period. Crucially, 
these limits included growing concern about the negative impacts of government policy on the 
political grievances of the Muslim community and their support for policing. As a result 
Cabinet took two decisions during the period, firstly to develop a cross government approach 
to counter terrorism and secondly to address the political alienation of the Muslim community.  
Support for a comprehensive approach was linked to the political prominence of security and 
counter terrorism following attacks in the US and Europe. The 9/11 attacks led to the 
development of Contest as a whole government counter-terrorism strategy, under the 
leadership of the then Prime Minster Tony Blair and coordinated by the Cabinet Office. 
However, the first decisions taken by government largely focused on conventional coercive 
measures. The most prominent of these were the overseas military interventions to degrade the 
command and control structure of al-Qaeda and eliminate any security threat from Iraq. 
Domestically the immediate response focused on reinforcing powers that could be used against 
terrorist networks and recruiters in the UK. This included a derogation from the European 
Convention on Human Rights on the basis that terrorist threat represented a specific security 





and active efforts to disrupt domestic networks resulted in a series of high profile arrests and 
deportations of suspected terrorists. 
This period also shows that many in the security policy community itself were concerned that 
intelligence and enforcement alone would be insufficient to address the complex threat posed 
by international terrorist networks and domestic recruitment. This concern situated the short-
term security challenge in the context of a long-term and persistent threat from al-Qaeda 
inspired networks in the UK and internationally. This view can be traced in the initial decision 
to incorporate a Prevent strand as part of a cross-government Contest strategy and the 
subsequent decision to prioritise it after the Madrid bombings in 2004. In particular it was the 
security services themselves who highlighted the difficulties of identifying and stopping all 
terrorist plots even with additional powers and resources. In short, they believed that the 
challenge of dealing with radical networks that had links with Pakistan and Afghanistan that 
had been animated by the political conflict over invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan was likely 
to be beyond their capability, even with increased resources.  
There was also growing criticism from outside the security policy community that a narrow 
state led approach to security was further exacerbating the problem it was trying to solve. This 
was set in the context of growing political conflict around UK foreign policy allied to concerns 
about degradation of civil liberties and religious and racial discrimination. Representative 
groups, such as the Muslim Council of Britain (MCB), as well as Labour Party MPs raised 
concerns about the consequences of political disaffection amongst British Muslims. Similar 
concerns in relation to stop and search were also shared by senior police officers, and the 
Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation. These positions often had different starting 
points, situated in tactical concern about intelligence flows or a principled focus on the long-
term benefits of equality and inclusion. Nevertheless there was broader agreement that the 
negative consequences of enforcement should be considered. Therefore concern about 
community grievances was influential in encouraging a re-evaluation of the approach to 





This period concludes with the Cabinet decision to prioritise the Prevent strand in the aftermath 
of the 2004 Madrid attacks. The decision reflected both the growing and immediate concerns 
about the terrorist threat alongside broader concerns about the impact of foreign policy and 
policing on the alienation of the Muslim community. The chapter shows that this resulted in a 
dual approach that sought to combine strong enforcement with social inclusion, in line with the 
Labour government’s wider home affairs strategy. As part of this the Cabinet Office supported 
an approach based on a socially rooted causal model of radicalisation as a way of framing the 
role of different government departments and agencies in resolving a complex policy problem. 
As part of this the Home Office also drew on previous experience of community engagement 
work that had supported other public order objectives, including with Black Caribbean 
communities in London, Northern Ireland and the community cohesion agenda following the 
2001 riots. As a result this period established a consensus that Prevent should improve 
relationships with Muslim civil society by addressing the root causes of terrorism. 
Box 5.1: Timeline of events 2001 - 2004 
• 9th September 2001: al-Qaeda attacks on New York and Washington killed 2,996 
people 
• 7th October: ‘Operation enduring freedom’, the US led invasion of Afghanistan, 
commenced with British support.  
• 14th December: The Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act received royal assent.  
• 22nd December: Richard Reid (aka ‘the shoe bomber’) attempted to bomb a 
transatlantic flight. 
• Spring/summer 2002: The decision to develop a cross government counter-terrorism 





• 5th January 2003: The Wood Green Ricin Plot arrests were followed by a raid and 
seizure of weapons from Finsbury Park Mosque, which was subsequently closed.  
• 20th March: The US led invasion of Iraq commenced, a continuation of ‘Operation 
enduring freedom’, with support from the UK.  
• 30th April: Two British citizens carried out bomb attack on Mike’s place bar in Tel 
Aviv.  
• 20th November: The British Embassy in Istanbul was bombed, killing 30 people. 
Two synagogues were also bombed five days earlier. 
• 11th March 2004: The Madrid train bombings killed 192 people  
• 30th March: The ‘Operation Crevice’ raids across the Thames Valley area led to 
arrests and subsequent convictions linked to a ‘Fertiliser Bomb’ plot. 
• April: The Cabinet agreed to prioritise the Prevent strand of the Contest strategy.  
• 16th December: The Law Lords ruled that control orders were incompatible with the 
Human Rights Act and European Convention on Human Rights. 
Dealing with the threat of terrorism 
This period was dominated by the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks and the subsequent invasions 
of Afghanistan and Iraq including high profile incidents associated with jihadi terrorism. These 
included the foiled bombing of transatlantic flight in 2001, a military security presence at 
Heathrow in 2003 and arrests associated with a ricin bomb plot in 2003 that resulted in the 
killing of one of the arresting police officers, the ‘fertiliser bomb’ and ‘dirty bomb’ plots in 
2004.19 In addition there were successful attacks on the British embassy in Istanbul in 2003 
	
19 Kamel Bourgass, 31, a suspected al-Qaeda operative from Algeria was sentenced to life imprisonment for the 






that killed 30 people, the bombing of a Tel Aviv night club by two British men and the 2004 
Madrid train bombings that killed 192 people. Radical Islamists such as Abu Hamza and Abu 
Qatada also became prominent in the UK media due to their expressed support for militant 
Islamist groups, including al-Qaeda, and ideologies. Abu Hamza in particular became a cause 
celebre in part due to the public spectacle of his sermons outside Finsbury park mosque 
following his eviction in 2003 until his arrest in 2004.  
One of the most significant decisions during the period was the Cabinet’s decision in 2004 to 
prioritise the Prevent strand of the Contest counter-terrorism strategy (Gieve 2004). This was 
based on concern about growing discontent amongst the Muslim community due to the 
government’s counter-terrorism response and foreign policy. It also linked these grievances 
and alienation to the potential for encouraging support for extremist views and terrorism. At 
the heart of this decision was an emerging idea that Prevent should help to ‘win hearts and 
minds’ within the Muslim community. This contrasted with the other elements of the Contest 
strategy that had primarily been based on coercive models of policing and intelligence, 
primarily underpinned by the Terrorism Act 2000 and subsequent 2001 Anti-Terrorism Crime 
and Security Act. The discussion and decision to prioritise an alternative approach to 
preventing terrorism was set out in correspondence between the Permanent Secretaries to the 
Cabinet Office and Home Office: 
“Cabinet recently discussed relations between the Muslim and other communities here 
in the UK. In a discussion on terrorism, Ministers focused on the need to encourage 
moderate Muslim opinion to the detriment of extremism both at home and overseas, 
	
17 years for plotting to spread ricin and other poisons. Operation Crevice was series of raids in the south east of 
England and resulted in five men being found guilty in April 2007 of conspiring to cause explosions likely to 
endanger life. The plot is often known as the ‘fertiliser bomb plot’ due to the intention to use nitrate fertilisers. 
The group was led by Omar Khaym, a British man with Pakistani heritage from Crawley, East Sussex. Khaym 
allegedly travelled to the Malakand terrorist training camp in Afghanistan with Mohammed Sidique Khan the ring 
leader of the 7/7 London attacks. Mohammed Qayum Khan of Luton, and a potential associated of Omar Bakri 
Mohammed and Abu Hamza, was alleged to have encouraged and helped Khaym and Khan to travel to the camp, 
however no charges were ever brought against him. The dirty bomb plot was led by Dihren Barot, an Indian born 
British Muslim convert, along with seven other British Pakistani men from Luton however the group were 
convicted for possessing information likely to be useful to a person committing or preparing an act of terrorism 





and the extent to which a sense of isolation and disaffection within parts of the Muslim 
community is leading to acts of terrorism.” (Gieve 2004 p1) 
The decision was taken in the context of the government’s wider focus on implementing a 
robust response to an exceptional international terrorist threat. The exceptional nature of the 
9/11 attacks on New York and Washington is illustrated by the fact that Parliament was recalled 
three times in the immediate aftermath. Blair’s statements to the House of Commons also 
highlighted the scale and international coordination of the attacks as evidence of the increased 
chance of catastrophic consequences from terrorism, and supported in much of the subsequent 
debate. The first recall of Parliament was on the 14th of September 2001, 3 days after the attacks 
to provide an initial briefing on the events. In his opening statement Blair set out the likelihood 
of a large number of casualties and anticipated that: 
“In this case, we are talking here about a tragedy of epoch making proportions.” Tony 
Blair (HC Deb, 14 Sept 2001, c605) 
The initial statements to the house also set out the actions that the government had taken or 
was planning to take in response to the attack. The first statement confirmed that NATO Article 
5 of collective defence had been invoked and that the UN Security Council had passed a 
resolution to take all necessary steps to combat terrorism. Blair also outlined the security 
controls that were being introduced at ports, in particular at airports, to restrict movement of 
potential suspects and address vulnerabilities for aviation security. The statement also set out 
the medium term objective of targeting al-Qaeda, its networks and supporters: 
“Our objective will be to bring to account those who have organised, aided, abetted 
and incited this act of infamy” Tony Blair (HC Deb, 14 Sept 2001, c605) 
The next two recalls of parliament illustrated the longer-term policy impact of 9/11. On the 4th 
October 2001 Blair set out the government’s belief that al-Qaeda had coordinated the attacks 
from a safe haven in Afghanistan. The statement also set out the history of the group, including 





of various other attacks prior to 9/11. The third recall, on the 8th October 2001, confirmed that 
military action in Afghanistan had been launched with the intention of degrading al-Qaeda. In 
his statement Blair argued that the problem of al-Qaeda represented a long-term challenge. 
“Even when al-Qaeda is dealt with, the job will not be over. The network of 
international terrorism is not confined to it… We in Britain have the most direct 
interest in defeating such terror. It strikes at the heart of what we believe in. We know 
that, if not stopped, the terrorists will do it again, possibly this time in Britain.” Tony 
Blair (HC Deb 08 October 2001, vol372 c813) 
The framework for security policy appears to have been fundamentally changed by this new 
landscape, the most significant example being the decision to invade Iraq. According to 
statements by Blair at the time and subsequently, the US was justified in broadening the scope 
of its military response to include Iraq, even without direct links to al-Qaeda terrorism, as risk 
assessments had to change following 9/11. Blair also situated this position within the context 
of the government’s decision to maintain a close strategic alliance with the United States, which 
on the basis of existing US policy also meant working toward regime change in Iraq. In his 
evidence to the Chilcot enquiry in 2011 Blair argued that the potential for catastrophic attacks 
meant that potential threats could no longer tolerated: 
“Now where I think the analogy [with Hitler] is valid is in saying even though we may 
look at the world today and say does it really matter? Is Iran that much of a threat? 
Supposing we just let Saddam carry on, would it really have been such a problem? My 
anxiety is that yes, we cannot take that risk, that after September 11th, the calculus of 
risk had to change and change fundamentally.” (Blair 2011) 
Although this view is likely to represent, at least in part, a post-hoc rationalisation of the various 
factors that led to the invasion, the decision itself and the use of this argument do suggest that 
decision-making was fundamentally changed by 9/11. This position also highlights a much 





could prevent potential attacks. Other statements by Tony Blair from the time also corroborate 
this argument, including references to the potential impact of future attacks if non-conventional 
weapons were used: 
“Let us make this reflection too. A week ago, anyone suggesting that terrorists would 
kill thousands of innocent people in downtown New York would have been dismissed 
as alarmist, yet it happened. We know that these groups are fanatics, capable of killing 
without discrimination. The limits on the numbers that they kill and their methods of 
killing are not governed by any sense of morality. The limits are only practical and 
technical. We know, that they would, if they could, go further and use chemical, 
biological, or even nuclear weapons of mass destruction. We know, also, that there are 
groups of people, occasionally states, who will trade the technology and capability of 
such weapons.” Tony Blair (HC Deb, 14 Sept 2001, c606) 
Notably, government statements on international action being taken following 9/11 made 
regular reference to dealing with the root causes of terrorism. This linked short-term concerns 
about the impacts of overseas military action with a longer-term international development 
agenda, including poverty alleviation, international trade and human rights standards. This 
approach also brought together the security and the humanitarian rationales for military 
interventions that had developed under Tony Blair, most notably in relation to Kosovo (1999) 
and Sierra Leone (2000). This framed failed states, including the political, economic and social 
conditions that lead to social civil and ethnic conflicts, as spaces for the development of anti-
democratic international terrorist groups. The link between development and violence was 
applied to Afghanistan where al-Qaeda had established a stable base for operations in the 
aftermath of a civil war and is illustrated by a 2002 Cabinet Office progress report: 
“Addressing the root causes of terrorism is a major task requiring sustained 
international engagement over the long term. Much of this work ties in with the 





events of 11 September, the UK was actively engaged in working to spread the benefits 
of globalisation, to improve respect for human rights and adherence to the rule of law 
and to promote democracy and good governance. We were at the forefront of 
international efforts to break the vicious cycle of poverty, working to reduce debt, 
remove unfair trade barriers, tackle killer disease and increase flows of development 
assistance. The UK was a strong and active supporter of the Millennium Development 
Goals, to which the international community committed itself. These remain the 
benchmark by which our efforts to eliminate poverty and its consequences will be 
judged. Since 11 September, all this work has become even more important.” (Cabinet 
Office, 2002) 
A whole government approach 
The precursor to the 2004 Cabinet decision to prioritise Prevent was the introduction of the 
whole government counter-terrorism strategy, Contest. Contest was agreed toward the end of 
2002 following the invasion of Afghanistan and took effect in early 2003 prior to the invasion 
of Iraq. The strategy was part of Tony Blair’s leadership of the response to 9/11 and was 
supported by the Home Office in order to secure engagement by other departments and 
agencies with the goals of the agenda. Contest was preceded by the appointment of Sir David 
Omand to the new post of Security and Intelligence Co-ordinator and Permanent Secretary to 
the Cabinet Office to improve the ‘capacity to co-ordinate security, intelligence and 
consequence-management matters’ (CNN 2002). The approach aligned with the Cabinet 
Office’s increased policy making role, including the Prime Minister’s Strategy, Policy and 
Implementation Units, which represented a counterpoint to the authority of the Treasury under 
Gordon Brown.  
The strategy was a risk management model in contrast to the preference for US threat 
elimination (Omand 2012). The benefits of the involvement of the Cabinet Office can be seen 





responsibility for transport, energy, health and emergency services (Cabinet Office 2002).  The 
strategy was structured around four strands, Pursue, Prevent, Protect and Prepare. In addition 
to ‘Pursuing’ those involved in terrorism, early activity also focused on ‘Protecting’ potential 
targets and ‘Preparing’ in order to minimise harm. However, there was comparatively less 
activity around preventing people from joining terrorist groups. Some of this was linked to 
uncertainty about the what prevention would entail, and by extension therefore, limited 
engagement from other relevant departments (Advisors 2 and 6). Equally, this also represented 
a prioritisation of the other strands in the immediate response, in particular new security 
powers. 
Limits of security powers 
The whole government strategy, including Prevent, was motivated by a consensus that a narrow 
reliance on counter-terrorism powers to deter or disrupt plots down-stream was insufficient to 
deal with the threat. The Cabinet Office took on responsibility for coordinating Contest whilst 
implementation of the strategy remained the responsibility of the relevant government 
departments. The Home Office delivered the cross-departmental review that underpinned the 
strategic approach set out in Contest, which also shows it retained much of the policy making 
capacity behind Contest and Prevent at the time. The initial policy focus post 9/11 was on the 
extension of counter-terrorism powers. These were justified by the urgent need to stop attacks 
by ideologically committed groups that sought to challenge the authority of the government 
and the rule of law. These powers were also subject to extensive debate about the balance with 
domestic and international human rights laws that represented political and legal limits to 
security policy. 
Following the 9/11 attacks the Home Office introduced the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security 
Act in October 2001. The measures reflected a continuation of the approach that underpinned 
the 2000 Terrorism Act and introduced new powers and offences to detain individuals 





Disorder Act (1998) to include religion alongside racially aggravated offences. This 
represented an acknowledgement of potential public order issues following 9/11 as well as a 
need to allay the concerns of the Muslim community. The Home Office justified the new 
powers on the basis of the complexity of investigating plots involving international networks 
and the sensitivity of covert intelligence. The 2001 Act was explicitly introduced to parliament 
as an updating of the 2000 Act by the Home Secretary, David Blunkett: 
“Although the nature and the level of the threat is different from what was previously 
envisaged, wholesale revision of our anti-terrorism laws is unnecessary. That is also 
the view of the law enforcement agencies. However, we do need specific and targeted 
measures, which is why I intend to introduce an emergency anti-terrorism Bill.” David 
Blunkett (HC deb 15 Oct 2001, c923) 
Although this argument was intended to reassure critics it was also borne out to a degree by 
the prominence of 2000 Act powers throughout the subsequent decade, most notably stop and 
search powers. The 2000 Act itself had been introduced following the 1998 Good Friday 
agreement in order to formalise various temporary counter-terrorism powers that had primarily 
been introduced in response to terrorism in Northern Ireland. It updated the power to proscribe 
groups suspected of being terrorist organisations and prosecute members under terrorism 
legislation. In particular it introduced powers under Section 44 for police to stop and search 
individuals in designated areas without suspicion. However, the use of Section 44 was 
highlighted for having a disproportionate impact on Muslims and became part of the argument 
about the consequences on the police’s relationship with the community. Nevertheless the 
power continued to be an important feature of counter-terrorism policing throughout the 
period.20 
	
20 The Section 44 power was significantly reformed by the Protection of Freedoms Act in 2012. Areas can be still 
be authorized by a senior police officer on the basis of reasonable suspicion that an act of terrorism may take 





The 2001 Act did introduce significant new powers to detain foreign nationals considered a 
risk to national security. The power resulted in restrictions being placed on individuals who 
were thought to represented a potential threat due to their connections with terrorist networks, 
including some who had previously been tolerated, pending their deportation. Although this 
was an immigration power pending deportation the detention was effectively indefinite in nine 
cases as deportation was not possible due to potential human rights violations in the receiving 
country. All the individuals were Muslim men which led to criticism by activist groups, 
including radical groups such as Hizb ut-Tarir, that the power, alongside stop and search, was 
specifically targeted at Muslims. The power required derogation from Article 5 of the European 
convention on human rights, on the basis that there was an immediate public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation (Article 15). The subsequent 2003 Criminal Justice Act also 
extended the pre-charge detention period for terrorist offences from 7 to 14 days. 
The powers were justified on the basis of preventing terrorist attacks and were founded on the 
difficulty of prosecuting terrorist offences due to the sensitivity of sources or the challenge of 
meeting a criminal threshold. Beverly Hughes, then Home Office Minister of State for 
Immigration, Citizenship and Counterterrorism, illustrated this during the debate about 
extending pre-charge detention in the 2003 Criminal Justice Act. She framed the extension of 
pre-charge detention as part of measures to prevent suspected attacks from taking place:  
“In respect of terrorist suspects, somebody is most often arrested to prevent an event 
that intelligence has told the police and the security services might otherwise take 
place.“ Beverly Hughes (HC deb, 20 May 2003, c943) 
Significant political and legal limits were applied to the powers. The extension of counter-
terrorism powers was supported by the Labour and Conservative party leaderships. However, 
parliamentary scrutiny and opposition to the legislation resulted in the inclusion of sunset 
clauses for some powers, particularly the detention of foreign nationals without charge.21 
	
21 A sunset clause in legislation typically means that a particular power is time-limited and required active renewal 





Following criticisms of the 2001 Act by the Newton Committee of the House of Lords in 2004, 
the Home Office sought to defend its measures as a balanced response to upholding the 
government’s contract with citizens to protect their individual rights of security: 
“There is nothing new about the dilemma of how best to ensure the security of a 
society, while protecting the individual rights of its citizens. Democratic governments 
have always had to strike a balance between the powers of the state and the rights of 
individuals.” Forward by David Blunkett in Reconciling Security and Liberty in an 
Open Society (Home Office 2004b) 
On the other hand, the Newton committee argued that the derogation from the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) was unsustainable. The Law Lords supported this view 
in December 2004 when they ruled on the power to detain foreign nationals awaiting 
deportation and the on-going derogation from the ECHR unlawful (HL opinions, 16 December 
2004, UKHL 56). There was also persistent opposition to the powers in the parliamentary 
Labour and Conservative parties as well as civil liberties groups. These opponents shared 
principled and practical concerns that extension of executive powers could undermine the rule 
of law and the relationship between government and citizens. For example civil rights advocacy 
group Liberty argued that Section 44 stop and search powers were likely to result in 
unnecessary detentions and arrests and that the 2001 Act’s provisions for detention without 
charge subverted the principle of habeas corpus. This opposition further contributed to the 
political and legal restrictions on the extent to which these types of powers could be extended. 
Limits of the security and intelligence services 
Although the role of the security and intelligence services was enhanced following 9/11 the 
complexity of the new threat also highlighted the limits of their capabilities. They advised that 
the terrorist threat was likely to be exacerbated by the military interventions in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. They also highlighted the challenge of dealing with an internationally networked 





under the powers of the 2001 Act. The publication of Jason Burke’s ‘Al-Qaeda: The True Story 
of Radical Islam’ in 2004 (Burke 2004), served to broaden understanding of the internationally 
networked nature of Islamist militancy and its range of affiliates amongst threat amongst policy 
makers. The growing understanding of the threat was also influential in encouraging further 
consideration of what role other parts of government could play. This included growing interest 
in how to address the supply of domestic recruits to international terrorist networks. 
The al-Qaeda threat in this period was understood as a core command group linked to Osama 
Bin Laden and a looser global network of affiliate groups that shared radical Islamist and jihadi 
beliefs. Where previously radicals in the UK with relationships with overseas militant Islamist 
groups and networks had been tolerated, including as useful sources of intelligence, these 
individuals and networks were now viewed as a direct threats. The intelligence services also 
believed that this represented a new type of threat that contrasted with the experience of 
Northern Irish or state sponsored terrorism. This included the growing presence of British 
recruits into international jihadist networks, often with familial links to Pakistan that facilitated 
access to training camps in Afghanistan. The Home Office and Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office highlighted these concerns in 2004: 
“The Security Service has some evidence that those who go on to become involved in 
terrorist related activity have been radicalised as a result of associating with loose 
networks that revolve around a respected key individual. Indeed, many have been 
encouraged to retain a low profile and not to be seen to openly expose extremist 
views.” (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Home Office 2004) 
Both MI5 and MI6 clearly played an influential role in counter-terrorism policy during this 
period. This was supported by the hosting of the Joint Intelligence Committee by the Cabinet 
Office that was intended to provide intelligence on the threat from al-Qaeda and coordinate the 
government’s response. This committee played a prominent role in the post 9/11 response and 





the security services also played a role in informing the Home Secretary’s decisions to detain 
individuals under the 2001 Act. This growing role was illustrated by comments from various 
heads of MI5 during this period. For example Stephen Lander, Director-General of MI5 until 
2002, commented on how the relationship with policy makers changed at the time: 
"During the Cold War the day to day work of the Service did not engage ministerial 
attention at all since it concerned the intricacies of security (vetting, visas etc.) in the 
context of a well understood strategic threat. Today with over 60% of our work on 
terrorism, what we do and what we find out can be of direct relevance to Ministers’ 
day to day concerns." (Lander cited in Andrew, nd) 
The complexity of the threat helped the security services to secure additional resources for their 
statutory duty to protect against terrorism, foreign powers and actions intended to overthrow 
or undermine parliamentary democracy. Following the end of the cold war MI6 in particular 
had struggled to renew their role and focus. After 9/11 increased funding for both MI5 and MI6 
reflected the renewed importance of intelligence to the effective implementation of Contest. 
This included a process of building internal capability to deal with the networked organisational 
structure of al-Qaeda that was outlined by then Director General of MI5 Eliza Manningham-
Buller in a speech given in 2003: 
“For the first time in many years, the Security Service is increasing in size. The 
Government has provided increased resources to the Agencies to meet the extra 
demands for our work. Recruitment is at an all time high. Last year, and as a direct 
result of open recruitment, we recruited over 200 new staff to the Service. Recruitment 
from the ethnic minorities remains a priority for me and, again, we had our best ever 
year's ethnic minority recruitment. Counter-terrorism has increased its share of the 
Service's overall effort. Last year over 32% of our effort was devoted to international 





The need to rapidly develop capacity in order to deal with the new threat was evidenced by 
open recruitment by both agencies and the increased proportion of activity tasked to terrorism. 
The Contest strategy itself required a tactical shift away from tolerating the presence of radicals 
and extremists that weren’t actively involved in developing plots targeted at the UK or its close 
allies as intelligence sources. In particular, more aggressive prosecution, deportation or use of 
control orders against those suspected of involvement in terrorism meant this strategy was no 
longer viable. Also notable was Manningham-Buller’s reference to an increase in ethnic 
minority staff. This was likely to be influenced by the on the immediate operational need for 
staff from ethnic, cultural and linguistic backgrounds that could help in generating intelligence 
on the relevant networks and groups. In addition it will have been influenced by the wider 
government agenda of improving workforce diversity following the MacPherson report of the 
Stephen Lawrence Inquiry (MacPherson 1999).22 
	  
	
22 The inquiry found the failure of the Metropolitan Police investigation of the racist murder of Stephen Lawrence 
in 1993 was due to institutionally racist attitudes and made recommendations for race equality reforms that had 






“Our understanding of the radicalisation process (what we have begun to call the 
"Terrorist Career Path") is still developing. Much more work needs to be done to 
identify the steps along the path where Government and community groups can 
intervene and prevent radicalisation. As our research progresses, it will inform the 
cross-governmental work being done on engaging with the Muslim communities.” 
(Turnbull 2004) 
During this period new ideas and evidence emerged about the causes of terrorism that were 
relevant to the subsequent development of Prevent. The security services highlighted the 
networked nature of recruitment, with the roles of individuals and social groups. The Home 
Office also undertook a wider analysis of various social and identity process that were thought 
to be contributing factors to recruitment. This analysis was developed as part of an assessment 
of policy options for preventing terrorism upstream and was influential in framing the response 
to the Cabinet’s decision to prioritise Prevent. The briefing bought together input from a variety 
of sources, including the security services, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Cabinet 
Office’s Strategy Unit and the Home Office. In particular framing recruitment as a process of 
radicalisation enabled consideration of different types of upstream interventions and the 
potential roles for different government departments not traditionally involved in security 
policy.  
This model went beyond just a narrow focus on the strategy, tactics and recruitment practices 
of terrorist groups. In many ways it aligned with the bottom up ‘bunch of guys’ model put 
forward by Marc Sageman in his 2004 book ‘Understanding Terror Networks’ (Sageman 
2004). This focused on the small group dynamics, often formed around friendship or kinship 
networks, and an entrepreneurial member who had relevant contacts and leadership skills. At 
the time the briefing acknowledged gaps in understanding, including how grievances were 





However, the briefing encouraged consideration of the formation of identity in a wider social 
context, including the socio-economic experiences of Muslim communities in the UK. One 
respondent who worked as an advisor to the Home Office and other departments during the 
period noted the role of the Home Office in leading this analysis at the time: 
“The Strategic Policy Team at the Home Office were doing cross departmental work 
looking at Muslims and disaffection after the 2001 riots and 9/11, before 7/7. What 
was interesting at that time was how much the research literature looked at issues of 
social exclusion employment and education and Muslim identity politics and role that 
it plays, and that complexity wasn’t in the public debate.” Advisor 2 
The analysis also argued that Prevent had to address the ideological framework and narrative 
promoted by the radical Islamist groups such as Hizb ut-Tarir and Al-Mujharoun. It set out 
how the two groups sought to mobilise community grievances into a unified Muslim political 
bloc. The briefing also identified the personal and political salience of Muslim identity to the 
community that helped to frame contemporary concerns about foreign policy and policing. In 
addition it also positioned the socio-economic context for Muslim communities as a structural 
factor that was aiding the mobilisation of radical Islamist politics (Saggar 2010a). However 
this stopped short of a direct causal relationship between terrorism and with socio-economic 
status and noted that individuals involved in terrorism and extremism could come from a 
variety of educational and economic backgrounds. It also highlighted that the young age of 
Muslims in the UK presented a challenge to the traditional authority of community and family 
institutions that may increase the attractiveness of radical political and religious identities. 
The analysis highlighted the importance of Muslim identity and political views in comparison 
to other faith groups, particularly amongst younger generations of the Muslim community born 
in Britain. This was allied to significant concern about foreign policy, including a widespread 
view that the war on terror was a war on Islam (57-70%) and opposition to the Iraq war (80%). 





For example between 7-15% thought the September 11 attacks were justified but a much 
greater proportion - between 67-85% - thought they were not justified; 67-87% felt very or 
fairly loyal/patriotic towards Britain while between 8-26% felt not very or not at all 
loyal/patriotic; 15-24% thought it was ok for British Muslims to fight with the Taliban but 62% 
disagreed. These figures were not benchmarked against the general population but were 
interpreted to indicate the presence a small group with antithetical views of Britain and the 
West, which had some tacit support in the broader Muslim population (Saggar 2006). 
The focus on a set of causal factors also aligned with other multi-agency approaches that dealt 
with social exclusion. The Cabinet Office at the time had a strategic role for ‘incubating and 
catalysing change’ and challenging business as usual in Whitehall’ (Institute for Government 
2014). Tony Blair described the Strategy Unit of the Cabinet Office as looking ahead ‘at the 
way policy would develop, the fresh challenges and new ideas to meet them’ (Blair 2011b 
p339). By developing an understanding of social causes policy makers could develop a 
strategic and systemic view of policy problems, failures and interventions and the role of 
different agencies (Newman 2001a & 6 et al 2002). In particular, the Strategy Unit 
commissioned and produced a number of reports looking at the root causes of policy problems 
in order to shape cross government policy interventions. The Cabinet Office was also able to 
disseminate expertise across government and beyond as well as coordinating national and local 
delivery. 
This type of approach was particularly championed by the Social Exclusion Unit (SEU). The 
unit, which worked to improve policy-making specifically around social exclusion transferred 
in 2004 from the Cabinet Office to the Office for the Deputy Prime Minister, which had 
responsibility for local government delivery. Examples of reports prepared by the SEU 
included ethnic minorities in the labour market, jobs and enterprise in deprived areas, mental 
health and social exclusion, reducing reoffending and neighbourhood renewal (ODPM 2004). 
Notably, the 2003 report on ethnic minorities in the labour market set out a disaggregated view 





economic exclusion. These included historic migrant origins and settlement patterns, 
educational performance and local engagement with public authorities and services. Similarly, 
the proposed solutions went beyond non-discrimination legislation toward proactive 
developmental activities to build the skills and capabilities of ethnic minority communities and 
support advancement in the labour market. 
The relationships with the Muslim community 
“[After 9/11] We were in and out of government offices. That is when we became 
engaged with government about radicalisation and extremism”. Advisor 3 
The government decision to increase active engagement with the Muslim community 
responded to growing concern shared across government about the consequences of counter-
terrorism policy. The first and most public engagement was motivated by public order concerns 
about potential increases in racially motivated attacks and intimidation against the Muslim 
community in the aftermath of 9/11, including public statements by Tony Blair in the aftermath 
of attacks. The second element related to concerns about the operational impact of alienating 
large sections of the Muslim community that was shared by the Association of Chief Police 
Officers (ACPO) and the Security Services. Finally there were growing political concerns in 
relation to Muslim public opinion, particularly about the negative impact of overseas 
interventions, that was directly relevant to a number of Labour party MPs, including Cabinet 
members. This was influenced by the MCB, who had adopted a leadership position on behalf 
of the Muslim community by virtue of being a representative organisation for a large number 
of Mosques.  
Following 9/11 much of this work focused on managing public order in the context of increased 
scrutiny of the relationship between Islam and the threat from al-Qaeda. In particular this 
included reassurance activity with the community to address concerns about reprisals against 
Muslims. There was a significant increase in the media scrutiny of Islam that focused on the 





is illustrated by the increase in mentions of Islam in Hansard following 9/11, many of which 
are examples of MPs stressing the need to avoid linking Islam and terrorism (Figure 5.1). Tony 
Blair’s own initial statement on October the 4th 2001 emphasised that Muslims were victims of 
9/11 who shared the outrage at attacks that were contrary to the teaching of Islam. There were 
also a series of events and outreach activities by Blair and other senior ministers, including 
joint condemnation of terrorism with Muslim leaders at events and press calls, often held at 
mosques. 
Figure 5.1: Mentions of Islam in Hansard 
 
 (www,parli-n-grams.puntofisso.net retrieved 22 Feb 2017) 
 During this time Labour MPs representing constituencies with large Muslim populations also 
highlighted concerns around community relations. Cabinet members with significant Muslim 
populations included Jack Straw, who represented the constituency of Blackburn and as 
Foreign Secretary would have been involved in the 2004 Cabinet decision. Backbench MP Ann 
Taylor, MP for Dewsbury, which was home to three of the four 7/7 bombers, was also Chair 
of the Intelligence and Security Committee would have had the intelligence briefings about the 
threat to the UK following military action. Other backbench Labour MPs also made regular 





Asian communities. For example, Ann Cryer, MP for Keighley, made a series of parliamentary 
contributions about the segregation of Muslim communities in schools, abuse of immigration 
policy by families arranging marriages with cousins from Pakistan or Bangladesh (for example 
HC deb, 22 November 2001, vol375 c448-51; HC deb, 07 February 2002, vol379 c1027-40; 
HC deb, 19 March 2003 vol401 c270-94WH and HC deb, 17 September 2003 vol410 c264-
71WH).  
Box 5.2: Examples of engagement work underway by the Home Office and Policing as 
described in the 2006 Contest strategy (HM Government 2006):  
• “We are discussing with Muslim representatives their community's concerns about 
the operation of anti-terrorist powers. Substantial progress has been made in 
building a closer relationship with the Muslim Council of Britain.  
• The MCB letter of 31 March to Imams and Mosques urging them to be clearer about 
the incompatibility, of terrorism with Islam and about the need for Muslims to co-
operate with the police represented a significant step forward.  
• The Association of Chief Police Officers-chaired Muslim Safety Forum has become 
an increasingly important channel for Muslim/police relations and will be developed 
as necessary.” 
In addition to community reassurances, engagement was also driven by growing operational 
concern about the need for positive community relations for effective counter-terrorism 
policing (see for example Box 5.2). This initial rationale was highlighted in the 2002 Cabinet 
Office update: 
“Liaison between the police and all sections of the community across the UK has been 
vital to provide essential reassurance and isolate those extremists seeking to promote 





that increased security demands do not have a detrimental effect on community 
relations – helped by the network of key community contacts and, most recently, by the 
embryonic Muslim Safety Forum.” (Cabinet Office 2002) 
The operational consequence of poor engagement with the Muslim community was highlighted 
by senior police officers and the security services around 2003. Concerns raised by members 
of ACPO centred on the ability to identify potential terrorist networks and recruiters. This 
included mistrust fostered by underdeveloped institutional relationships and experiences of 
racism that were exacerbated post 9/11 by overuse of Section 44 stop and search powers and 
the use of detention without trial. Some police outreach initiatives, including the Muslim Safety 
Forum and the Muslim Contact Unit of the London Metropolitan Police, were established to 
address this problem. However, there was a view that the use of coercive counter-terrorism 
powers was doing significant damage to community relationships: 
Prevent wasn’t really on the table with a raft of active measures that you could point 
to and say that we were trying to do things, so the only thing was enforcement… They 
used Section 44 because 'what a great power it is', but that did us no end of harm, not 
just in terms of getting broader community support.” Chief Police Officer 
At the time the MCB was actively working to establish its own position as the lead 
representative body for the wider Muslim community. It was set up in 1997 with the aim of 
representing Islam in the UK and to promote issues that concerned the Muslim community. 
Although it was structured as a membership organisation for Muslim religious organisations it 
adopted a much broader mission that included reformist Islamist positions that sought to 
actively advance the place of Islam in public life. The MCB’s mission framed ethnically diverse 
South Asian and Middle Eastern communities in the UK through a shared Muslim identity. Its 
members included prominent institutions such as the East London Mosque, the Islamic Institute 
at Markfield and the Green Lanes mosque in Birmingham. Through this work the MCB had 





and Industry to raise awareness on the Employment Equality Regulations on sexual orientation, 
religion and belief between 2001 and 2005. 
In the aftermath of 9/11 the Home Office and Cabinet Office and MCB discussed community 
safety concerns and ways to mitigate the negative impacts of policing. In these discussions the 
MCB actively highlighted the concerns about the impact of counter-terrorism policing on the 
Muslim community (MCB 2003) as well as via a number of other private and public channels. 
In particular the MCB gave evidence to the Home Affairs select committee as part of an inquiry 
into counter-terrorism policing in late 2004 and to the Independent Reviewer of counter-
terrorism powers. Both agreed with the MCB view that stop and search was being overused on 
Muslims, with negative consequences for relations with the community. The MCB’s view of 
the impact of counter-terrorism powers was presented to the Home Affairs committee in July 
2004 by Sadiq Khan, then Chair of the MCB Legal Affairs Committee, and subsequently 
elected as Labour MP for Tooting in 2005: 
“We believe it’s use, as perceived in the community, is an extremely negative one and 
it is doing a disservice to the partnership that we believe there must be in fighting 
terrorism. Also we believe there are serious issues about the use of the intelligence 
with regard to Section 44 and query how that intelligence is being analysed. There are 
one or two explanations: either the intelligence is extremely flawed which begs serious 
questions or, frankly, the exercise of discretion by the police is seriously flawed which 
also requires examination.” (Home Affairs Committee 2005) 
The MCB also actively opposed the Iraq war, reflecting the broader opinion in the British 
Muslim community. The primary reason for opposition to the invasion in the Muslim 
community was founded on humanitarian concerns about the impact of an invasion on 
Muslim’s living in Iraq. This opposition was also shared by a many, if not a majority of the 
UK public, depending on the extent to which there was evidence of weapons of mass 





rationale for opposing the Iraq war was articulated by Charles Kennedy’s at a rally in Hyde 
Park on the 15 February 2003, as part of international protests against the invasion. The 
rationale put forward was that any intervention required the full mandate and legitimacy of the 
United Nations and that it had to be based on full information from the UN weapons inspectors. 
The MCB was an active participant in the Stop the War Coalition that bought together a range 
of campaigning groups in opposition to the invasion. This aligned the MCB with left wing 
groups in opposition to the government, including the Labour Socialist Campaign Group that 
included backbench MPs Jeremy Corbyn and John McDonnell, plus London Mayor Ken 
Livingston. This group shared the MCB’s humanitarian opposition to western interventionism 
and argued that military intervention was unlikely to solve the political and social problems of 
Afghanistan or Iraq. They advocated a strategy of non-intervention, plus political engagement 
and economic development and questioned the ability and likely commitment of the US 
government to undertake the necessary rebuilding work after military intervention. For the 
radical socialist and Islamist groups these arguments were also underpinned by shared anti-
imperialist critiques of western foreign policy. This critique focused on US and UK support for 
Israel as well as questioning western support for other authoritarian governments in the Middle 
East. 
Iraq was a highly divisive political issue for the Labour government and a persistent personal 
vulnerability for Tony Blair. Although public opinion about the invasion was split, as noted 
previously it tended to turn on the presence of WMD and UN support. In final polling before 
the invasion a quarter of the public told Mori polling (26%) that they would support British 
troops being used without proof that Iraq is hiding weapons or a new Security Council 
resolution, while 63% would oppose (Mortimore 2003). In contrast three quarters were in 
favour if inspectors did find evidence of WMD and a second Security Council resolution was 
passed. In contrast YouGov found a majority in support for the war at the time of the invasion 
but also found a progressive shift in attitudes against the decision over time (Figure 5.2). 





light of the failure to find WMD and problems of occupation it did not prevent Labour from 
winning the 2005 election (Box 5.3). 
Figure 5.2: YouGov polling of support for military action in Iraq
 
(Dahlgreen 2015) 
Although Labour won the election in May 2005 the result highlight the Blair’s political 
vulnerabilities associated with the post 9/11 response. Labour’s majority fell from 160 to 66 
which whilst still a comfortable working majority was a substantial reduction. In contrast the 
Liberal Democrats who had opposed the war won an extra 11 seats, up to 62 in total. Labour’s 
vulnerability amongst Muslim voters was also emphasised by the victory of George Galloway 
for the Respect Party in Bethnal Green and Bow, a constituency with a large Muslim 
Bangladeshi population. Respect was formed out of elements of the Stop the War Coalition 
and brought together a number of far left and Islamist groups. Galloway defeated the sitting 
Labour MP Oona King, overturning a large majority of 10,000 to win by 823 votes, a swing of 
26.2%. The campaign was highly controversial and included a number of accusations of voter 







 (Ipsos Mori 2007) 
The Home Office believed that the conflict between the government and the Muslim 
community over the invasion of Iraq required pro-active management. Home Office ministers 
undertook a programme of outreach and engagement with Muslim community organisations 
and groups during 2003 (Advisor 7). However feedback from this engagement and its 
consideration in the Prevent agenda further highlighted the ongoing political conflict over the 
decision to invade Iraq. Given the contentious nature of the decision Blair had underpinned the 
government’s authority through a parliamentary vote. Although taking the vote to parliament 
was potentially a high-risk strategy only 217 MPs supported an amendment opposing 
intervention. However, the government relied on Conservative support as 139 of its own MPs 
voted against, more than its official majority of 88 at the 2001 election. The vote afforded the 
Box 5.3: Ipsos opinion polling of Tony Blair’s handling of Iraq war  
Q Do you approve or disapprove of the way the Prime Minister, Tony Blair, is handling 









% % % 
Approve 32 28 17 
Disapprove 55 63 77 
Don't know 13 9 6 
Net approve -23 -35 -60 











government’s decision constitutional and parliamentary authority for the invasion but it 
continued to be an issue of ongoing political conflict and vulnerability for the Labour party.23 
Persistent questioning of the decision to invade further exacerbated the Labour leaderships’ 
political sensitivity. The Hutton Inquiry and Butler review, published in January and June 2004 
respectively, raised questioned about the legitimacy of aspects of the decision. The Hutton 
inquiry reviewed the circumstances of the death of Dr David Kelly, a government advisor who 
had been the source of criticisms of the intelligence used in support of the invasion. This was 
followed by the Butler inquiry into the use of intelligence that criticised an informal sofa style 
of decision-making by the Blair government. Butler noted that the detailed use of intelligence 
in advocacy for military intervention was unique and that it went beyond a dispassionate 
assessment of intelligence on Iraq’s nuclear, biological, and chemical and ballistic missile 
programmes. However, he also found that the publication did not go beyond the JIC position 
and suggested that the nuance had been lost in the process of translating material from the 
original assessment. Given the nature of the findings the invasion continued to be a significant 
division within the Labour party and point of conflict with Muslim community groups and 
representatives. 24 
Social inclusion policy 
“The overriding assumption in the Labour government was that multiculturalism was 
about right. Other issues and tensions between different communities were essentially 
economy and poverty related; so as we got things going on living standards and tax 
credits things would be fine. We had a commitment to rigorous equal opportunities 
legislation but New Labour did not do identity. So when the Cantle report comes along 
	
23 The ongoing salience of the decision to invade Iraq and the controversy in the Labour party can be traced to the 
election of Jeremy Corbyn, a perennial backbench rebel, as Labour leader by Labour members and supporters 
following the 2015 election defeat and again in 2016 after the referendum to leave the EU. 
24 The Butler report was actually highly critical of the quality of decision-making that led to the invasion. 
However, although its analysis was fascinating for those interested in the anatomy of such a sensitive and 
significant decision, it was of less interest for those looking for a smoking gun of culpability. Neither were its 





and says there is a whole heap of stuff about physical segregation but its also about 
values, identity and whether we have a common story, that was challenging.” 
Government minister 
The Labour government’s wider programme for government, set out in the 2001 manifesto, 
framed much of the emergent response around the causes of terrorism and community 
engagement (The Labour Party 2001). Firstly there was an overarching agenda of public 
service renewal to deal with complex policy problems through institutional reform. The second 
important dimension was focused on local approaches to welfare and social inclusion that 
directed funding through the new deal for communities and new deal for employment. This 
focused on supporting individuals and communities to address problems barriers to 
employment through different types of tailored support. There was also a commitment to 
address racial inequalities in services by working with the voluntary sector including 
community and religious groups. Finally, and perhaps most importantly there was an on-going 
focus on criminal justice that positioned strong enforcement alongside community 
empowerment. This is illustrated by the following ambition set out in the 2001 manifesto: 
Fourth, we will strengthen our communities. We will reform the criminal justice system 
at every level so that criminals are caught, punished and rehabilitated. And because 
we know that without tackling the causes of crime we will never tackle crime, we will 
empower local communities by combining resources with responsibility. Ambitions for 
Britain, Labour’s manifesto 2001 (The Labour Party 2001) 
The dual focus on public service reform and community development framed much of the 
Home Office and Cabinet Office’s work during this period, including the initial development 
of Prevent. The approach was predicated on working with the Muslim community to address a 
variety of social issues that were indirectly linked to the causes of terrorism. This would help 
to improve relationships with the community whilst also developing opportunities to It promote 





the Muslim community due to political conflict and mistrust. The Cabinet Office highlighted 
the challenge of implementing a complex programme that required the involvement of a range 
of agencies and organisations with little prior experience. This produced a consensus that 
Prevent would require a developmental approach with high-level and long-term objectives of 
social change, whilst emphasising short term partnership between the Muslim community and 
government agencies. 
The broad approach to Prevent was set out in the briefing paper on Young Muslims and 
Extremism, which accompanied correspondence between Home Office and Cabinet Office 
following the Cabinet decision to prioritise Prevent (Turnbull 2004). The Home Office 
emphasised that a small but vocal minority were attempting to promote a radical approach to 
Islam by capitalising on alienation linked to counter-terrorism policing. Given this, the Home 
Office recommended the development of an engagement strategy that emphasised winning 
allies amongst the majority of the community, most of whom considered themselves British 
and were not especially religious or ideological. This also highlighted a particular need to give 
young people opportunities to explore Muslim and British identities in order to counter 
alienation and polarisation toward a narrow radical identity. Specific recommendations at this 
point also included avoiding alienating the wider community by linking expressions of Muslim 
faith and identity to extremism through use of phrases such as `Islamic fundamentalism'. 
The briefing paper also drew on the Home Office’s community cohesion work that had 
developed following the 2001 riots and other community engagement experience. Cited as an 
author of the briefing paper is Mark Carroll, Director for Race, Cohesion, Equality and Faith. 
This was a historic post that had its origins in the 1980s in response to the Brixton and Toxteth 
riots and the need to improve dialogue with black Caribbean communities. The Home Office 
and other public agencies were also responding to the MacPherson report that had found 
evidence of institutional racism and required public bodies to evaluate their engagement with 
minority communities for potentially discriminatory attitudes and practices (MacPherson 





should play in fostering empowered local communities with shared identities. It had 
highlighted how community relations in local areas could be undermined by national policy 
decisions and a failure to proactively develop relationships between community groups and 
public agencies. 
The cohesion work also highlighted the limited capability of central government to deal with 
complex issues of community identity. The Ministerial Group on Public Order and Community 
Cohesion, set up in response to the 2001 Cantle report (Home Office 2001a) recommended that 
government aim to promote community cohesion by acting as an enabler and supporter of local 
community partnerships (Home Office 2001b). There were a variety of follow up activities 
during this period that explored how local authorities could implement local community 
cohesion strategies. This included 2002 guidance to local authorities and a 2003 report 
‘building a picture of community cohesion’ that encouraged local authorities and local agencies 
to develop a detailed understanding of the nature of the communities they serve in order to 
assess how well equipped they are to build community cohesion (Home Office 2003). The 
Home Office also published a report on improving consultative relationships between 
government and faith groups in February 2004 titled ‘Working Together: Co-operation 
between Government and Faith Communities’, further illustrating the faith community centred 
partnership work that was already underway (Home Office 2004a). 
David Blunkett as Home Secretary championed the idea of active citizenship and engagement 
with civil society as part of his broader political strategy in relation to the extension of counter-
terrorism powers. Many of these ideas about civic renewal were influenced by Robert Putnam’s 
Bowling Alone (2000) that emphasised the role of social relationships, or ‘capital’, in mediating 
community identities and relationships with public institutions. This recognised the importance 
of developing confidence and trust by actively working with communities on issues that 
concerned them. In an essay published by the Foreign Policy Centre think tank he positioned 
active citizenship and cohesion as a core component of security policy, but which also relied 





Office response to the Newton Committee’s criticisms of counter-terrorism powers in 2004 
(Home Office 2004b) and highlights their influence on the subsequent development of Prevent: 
“What this means is that we have to nurture trust, confidence and the capacity to get 
things done in communities. None of that is possible if an area is plagued by crime, 
disorder and social disintegration, any more than maintaining liberty and making 
progressive change is possible if the state is threatened. Establishing basic order and 
security is a prerequisite of building social capital.” (Blunkett 2002) 
The adoption of high-level objectives around issues of radicalisation and extremism also 
aligned with approaches to policy reform supported by the Cabinet Office. For example a 2001 
discussion paper by the head of the Performance and Innovation Unit, Geoff Mulgan, titled 
‘Better policy delivery and design’ evaluated different models of policy development and 
implementation in a variety of social policy areas (Mulgan and Lee 2001). It highlighted how 
many policy priorities of modern governments, including crime, were dependent on changing 
behaviours and cultures by working with organisations outside of direct government control. 
The paper proposed that in cases of limited knowledge about the problem and a diverse set of 
delivery partners, policy implementation should be designed in collaboration with stakeholders 
based on high-level objectives. Similarly, Michael Barber’s model of deliverology, developed 
at the department for education and the Prime Minsters Delivery Unit, promoted strategies for 
delivering objectives across a complex delivery chain of agencies and organisations (Barber 
2008). Many of these themes can be seen in the initial development of Prevent, including aims 
of influencing attitudes and cultures by working with non government partners to address a 
shared objective of stopping terrorism. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the complexity of the terrorist threat challenged the legal and 
political limits of the security community’s conventional enforcement approach. At the same 





increasing political focus on engaging with Muslim representative groups and organisations. 
The complexity of the challenge and the sensitivity of the agenda increased political support 
for considering new ideas about the wider causes of alienation in the Muslim community. The 
Cabinet Office supported this idea as a way of framing the role that different government 
departments could play in preventing terrorism. Similarly the Home Office recommended a 
tactical approach to community through a dialogue around the question of longer-term root 
causes of alienation. These strands resulted in the decision to prioritise engagement with the 
Muslim community as part of the longer-term development of an integrated British identity. 
This represented the start of a consensual and socially orientated model of policy. 
At the same time a number of important decisions were also left open that were indicative of 
areas of conflict within the new policy community over how Prevent should be implemented. 
The issue of socio-economic disadvantage and discrimination amongst the Muslim community 
was included as contextual political grievances rather than a direct causal factor. A wider set 
of non-violent extremist ideas were included as a tactical question that was subordinate to the 
short-term priority of improving engagement with the community without alienating potential 
allies. In addition there continued to be a strong political defence of counter-terrorism powers, 
as well as foreign policy, despite the prominence of significant concerns amongst the Muslim 
community. This in part reflected Prevent’s origins in the desire to improve the effectiveness 
of traditional counter-terrorism powers and policing in face of political and legal limits. Instead 













Chapter 6: Establishing Prevent 2005 – 2007 
Introduction 
This chapter covers the period between the terrorist attacks in London on 7th July 2005 and 
concludes with the publication of the cross-government Prevent strategy in 2008. During this 
period decisions emphasized a distributed socially orientated approach based around collective 
action with the Muslim community to address the social causes of terrorism. In particular the 
approach was a response to the growing political scrutiny of the attitudes and integration of the 
Muslim community following the 7/7 London attacks. This resulted in the decision to bring a 
broader range of organisations into decision-making, including Muslim community 
representatives, the DCLG and local authorities. Many decisions sought to establish and 
maintain a consensus and support across a broader policy community. This included the 
decision to adopt a neutral approach to engagement with the Muslim community that 
emphasised collective action against violent-extremism and framed wider questions of non-
violent extremism around shared values. 
During this period Prevent was positioned as an approach that could reduce longer-term 
reliance on enforcement measures whilst also improving their effectiveness. Central to the 
approach was the decision by Number 10 and the Home Office to broaden the range of 
community organisations involved in the development of Prevent. The approach built on the 
Labour’s wider programme of institutional modernization and reform to improve government’s 
capacity to deal with complex social inclusion. The idea of dealing with the root social causes 
of terrorism provided a rationale for the involvement of a much wider range of groups and 
individuals in Prevent. Community engagement proceeded through the Preventing Violent 
Extremism Together working groups and the decision to give the DCLG and local authorities 
a leading role in the initial ‘pathfinder’ programme and the local coordination of Prevent. 





aftermath of the 7/7 attacks due to growing political scrutiny of the attitudes and values of 
Islam and the Muslim community. 
The chapter will illustrate how community engagement balanced competing views of the 
causes of terrorism and the role of extremism. The Cabinet Office under the leadership of Tony 
Blair pushed for an approach that dealt with radical Islamist ideologies and beliefs and the 
reasons behind their support. This position acknowledged the Muslim community’s 
experiences of discrimination and marginalisation but challenged religious institutions and 
leaders to take responsibility for failures of community integration and to confront extremism. 
This position also drew on arguments that communitarian multicultural models of community 
engagement had emphasised separate ethic identities at the expense of developing a cohesive 
society. This included criticism that multiculturalism had resulted in relativist acceptance of 
Islamic identity politics that would undermine shared democratic principles and values. As a 
result many supporters of this position argued that Islamist and conservative Islamic thought 
were at best antithetical and at worst actively seeking to subvert western society and should be 
in scope of the policy. 
In contrast many Muslim interlocutors, including advisors engaged by the Home Office and 
DCLG, and political allies, argued for an approach that dealt with the community’s experiences 
of discrimination and exclusion as the main drivers of alienation and segregation. This group 
agreed on the need to improve integration and to deal with radical ideas but argued that this 
was also indicative of the failure of government and wider society to recognize Muslims and 
Islam as a legitimate part of British society. Many supporters of this position also sought to 
defend the legitimacy of conservative and normative Islamic practice and views. This informed 
a persistent criticism that Prevent implied a link between Islamic identity, activism and 
terrorism. Instead many advocates argued that UK foreign policy and military interventions in 
Muslim countries should be recognised as a both a direct cause of grievance and emblematic 





engagement with Muslim community organisations in policy-making and prioritised issues of 
discrimination and disadvantage. 
This chapter starts to show how this debate resulted in a series of ultimately unsustainable 
compromises, primarily by the DCLG, in order to establish a workable consensus around 
Prevent. These compromises were intended to facilitate widening engagement with the Muslim 
community through Prevent whilst managing the wider political risks associated with the 
agenda. The first priority was broadening the voluntary engagement of both the Muslim 
community and local authorities was necessary to broaden the breadth of the response and at 
the same time open up space to challenge extremist ideas and groups. However this necessitated 
a tactical compromise in relation to definitions of extremism that focused on violent-extremism 
whilst working with ‘moderate Muslims’ to promote shared values. This was accompanied by 
steps to broaden community engagement by actively identifying new and supportive partners 
whilst also maintaining the support of incumbent community leaders and institutions and the 
wider community itself. Similarly community input resulted in support for developmental 
activities in relation to integration and cohesion but at the same time substantive consideration 
of foreign policy was excluded by the Labour leadership.  
Context 
Decision-making during this period was dominated by the aftermath of the 7/7 on London 
transport system that killed 56 people, and failed attacks on 21st June in the same year and 
attempted attacks in London and Glasgow in 2007. The 7/7 attacks, and the failed attacks two 
weeks later led Tony Blair’s 12-point plan for preventing terrorism followed by a programme 
of active consultation with the Muslim community by the Home Office. Prevent objectives 
were also incorporated into existing activities such as the Home Office’s faith community fund 
(Home Office 2005b). The attacks also led to the Terrorism Act 2006 which included the 
offence of glorification of terrorism and the publication of the Contest strategy for the first 





a failed counter terrorism raid in the summer of 2006 as well as global protests against cartoon 
depictions Mohammed in Danish newspaper in early 2007. This was followed by the 2007 
attacks on Glasgow airport and the Tiger Tiger nightclub in London.  
The Labour government was elected in May 2005, prior to the 7/7 attacks and its programme 
for government continued the themes of social and civic renewal and public service reform 
from the previous term (The Labour Party 2005). A number of priorities had close connection 
with the development of Prevent. Firstly there was a view that the necessary counter terrorism 
powers had been introduced and the principle challenge was effective enforcement, although 
new powers of glorification of terrorism were subsequently introduced in 2006. There was also 
a clear commitment to local neighborhood policing models and an emphasis on local 
community development and service delivery, both of which were prominent themes in 
Prevent. This included self government for local communities and a role for voluntary sector 
to support the delivery of services and a commitment to addressing racial discrimination. There 
was also a commitment to expand the school academies programme to bring more autonomy 
and diversity to governance and missions. 
This period also took place in the context of the transition between Tony Blair and Gordon 
Brown as leader of the Labour party and Prime Minister, as well as a series of departmental 
restructures. The Department for Communities and Government (DCLG) was set up in 2006 
out of the old Office for the Deputy Prime Minister to lead the government’s localism agenda, 
with the support of both the Cabinet Office and the Treasury. At the same time the Home Office 
was declared ‘not fit for purpose’ by then Home Secretary John Reid due to a series of failures, 
principally on immigration, with a separate Department for Justice established in 2007. Hazel 
Blears, a Blair ally and former Home Office minister for Policing, was appointed Secretary of 
State for Communities and Local Government in June 2007 when Brown took over as PM. The 
Cabinet Office’s role coordinating Contest was also handed to the Office for Security and 
Counter Terrorism (OSCT) after it was set up in mid-2007 with the appointment of Charles 





Prevent was launched as a stand alone policy during this period in the aftermath of the 7/7 
attacks. This included an initial programme of community consultation and funding for 
engagement work by the Home Office, including work that would lead the Mosques and Imams 
National Advisory Board (MINAB). This work transferred to the DCLG in 2006, along with 
the faith communities’ fund and parallel work associated with the Independent Commission 
for Community Cohesion. The DCLG initiated a pathfinder programme that ran between 2006 
and 2007 to support a range of local and national projects, which was then followed by the 
publication of a standalone Prevent strategy in 2007. This set out the department’s plan for 
delivery of Prevent, including the allocation of funding to local authorities, for delivery 
between 2007 and 2010. Local police forces also established community policing initiatives 
typically through the appointment of a local Prevent Officer. During this period the Home 
Office commenced piloting of the Association of Chief Police Officers’ Channel programme 
in London and Lancashire. 
Box 6.1: Timeline of events 2005 - 2007 
• 7th July 2005: The attacks on the London transport system killed 56 people including 
the 4 perpetrators. 
• 5th August: Tony Blair made a statement that set out a series of proposals allied to a 
statement that the ‘rules of the game; were changing.  
• 3rd February 2006: Islamist groups protested outside Danish Embassy against a 
cartoon depicting the Prophet Mohammed with a bomb for a turban in a Danish 
newspaper, Jyllands-Posten on 30 September 2005. 
• 30th March: The Terrorism Act received royal ascent, which included the offence of 





• 5th  May: Ruth Kelly was appointed Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government  
• 23rd May: John Reid, Home Secretary, described the Home Office as ‘not fit for 
purpose’. 
• 2nd June: Forest Gate police raid resulted in shooting of one man with no charges 
• 27th of June: Gordon Brown took over as Prime Minister following resignation of 
Tony Blair 
• July: Al-Mujharoun/ Al Ghurabaa/ Saved Sect were proscribed under 2000 
terrorism act for eliciting support for terrorism.  
• 9th August: 24 arrests were made in relation to a plot to blow up transatlantic aircraft 
• April 2007: The Department for Communities and Local Government published its 
Prevent action plan ‘Winning hearts and minds’ strategy  
• May: Home Office was restructured, including the formation of the Office for 
Security and Counter Terrorism.  
• June: Hazel Blears was appointed secretary of state for communities and local 
government resignation of Tony Blair 
• 29th and 30th June: an attempted car bombing of Tiger Tiger night club in London 
was followed by an attack on Glasgow International Airport. 








Demonstrable action against causes of terrorism 
“The first pillar is prevent… Effective security measures, intelligence and policing are 
essential. But ultimately, modern terrorism will be defeated only by addressing the 
political and social issues by a debate about values, by democracy and by public 
solidarity. That is why we are working with all communities to tackle the social factors 
underlying radicalisation, to block the ways radicalisation takes place, and to counter 
the radicals’ arguments. But it is not just the Government that have a role in preventing 
radicalisation. Muslims and the wider community in the UK must also play their part 
if we are to be successful.” John Reid (HC Deb 10 July 2006 c 1116) 
“In April 2007 the Government set out a series of practical actions to mobilise 
communities against violent extremists. These actions were based on the idea that it is 
ordinary people, with their extraordinary capacity for courage, who are best placed 
to stand up to terrorism, to make this country a safer place, and to celebrate the 
common values that bind us together as a society.” Hazel Blears (DCLG 2008 p4)  
The need to demonstrate a practical response to home grown international terrorism following 
the 7/7 attacks dominated the development of Prevent. This helped to put Prevent high on the 
political agenda in a way that went beyond a community engagement agenda to include wider 
questions of the root causes of terrorism. The fact that the attackers were all British men moved 
the agenda from being an intelligence led problem to the top of the national political agenda. 
There was extensive public interest in the root causes of terrorism, particularly the link between 
integration, extremism and terrorism and the extent of the government’s response. The 
prominence of Prevent in the Labour administration was also illustrated by a series of high 
profile interventions by Tony Blair and Gordon Brown. The agenda was picked up by 
opposition politicians, including by David Cameron who made a speech on the issue early in 
his time as leader of the Conservative party and Michael Gove who made a series of 





The growing prominence and breadth of the debate around Prevent was directly linked to 
growing public concern about terrorism and its causes. For example the Ipsos Mori public 
issues tracker showed a 42% point increase in the priority given to security issues in the 
immediate aftermath of the 7/7 attacks, to a higher point than following 9/11 and the invasion 
of Iraq (Ipsos Mori 2006). The Glasgow attacks in 2007 also produced high profile media 
images and personal accounts which kept the issue high in the public consciousness. Other high 
profile events included a public argument between the home secretary John Reid and Islamist 
radical Abu Izzadeen following a shooting during a counter-terrorism raid in Forest Gate, East 
London (BBC 2006a). Similarly, high profile protests around Europe following the publication 
of cartoons of the prophet Mohammed also gained widespread media attention. As a result the 
public perception of the threat from terrorism and radical Islamist activism remained a 
prominent theme throughout the period. 
Figure 6.1: Hansard mentions of ‘Muslim community’ and ‘Islam’
 
 (www.parli-n-grams.puntofisso.net retrieved 22 Feb 2017) 
The debate about the causes of terrorism was accompanied by growing public scrutiny of the 
Muslim community itself. In the aftermath of the 2005 attacks parliamentary scrutiny of the 





Muslim public opinion and attitudes in relation to the UK highlighted areas of potential or 
perceived tacit support for extremism, in line with the 2004 Home Office analysis. An ICM 
poll in February 2006 for the Daily Telegraph reported that 20% of Muslims had some 
sympathy with the 7th July bombers, although 99% also thought the bombers were wrong (Poll 
reveals 40pc of Muslims want sharia law in UK, 2006). The poll also reported that 10% did 
not feel loyal to the UK and 40% support for introduction of Sharia laws in predominantly 
Muslim areas, albeit with 41% opposing. In contrast a 2007 Ipsos Mori poll of the wider UK 
population for the Commission on Integration and Cohesion found that respect for the rule of 
law was considered the most important value for living in the UK, followed by tolerance for 
others, freedom of speech and respect for religions (Ames 2007).  
This contributed to an important and, by this point, increasingly rare consensus amongst the 
senior Labour leadership. Tony Blair took on more public ownership of domestic counter-
terrorism policy, where previously he had focused on the international dimension. As 
Chancellor, Brown gave public financial backing to the policy including personally launching 
the 2006 Pathfinder Funding. Brown’s support also aligned with his broader positioning as 
Prime Minister-in-waiting and he also made public contributions on the importance of British 
values in the social and institutional response to global challenges such as terrorism and 
extremism. Despite this, Blairite ministers retained control of much of Prevent during this 
period. Hazel Blears and Ruth Kelly held the DCLG ministry and Blears, who had previously 
been Home Office Minister for Policing from 2004 to 2005 and was a key Blairite, was retained 
as Secretary of State after Brown became Prime minister in 2007. During this time John Reid 
also replaced Charles Clark as Home Secretary in May 2006, but handed over to Jacqui Smith 
under Brown. One respondent highlighted the importance of the general consensus and support 
for Prevent in the Labour party: 
“There wasn’t much exciting happening in labour policy so if you were a junior 





Box 6.2: selected points from Tony Blair‘s 12 point plan 
1. New grounds for deportation including fostering hatred, advocating violence to 
further a person's beliefs or justifying or validating such violence. 
2. New anti-terrorism legislation in the autumn to include offence of condoning or 
glorifying terrorism in UK or abroad. 
4. Consultation on expanding the power to strip citizenship from individuals with 
British or dual nationality to apply to naturalised citizens engaged in extremism. 
9. Ban on Hizb ut-Tahrir and the successor organisations of Al-Mujharoun. 
10. Review of citizenship ceremonies to make sure they are adequate and a 
commission to advise on better integration of those parts of the Muslim community 
that are less so than others. 




The political focus on Prevent pushed the Labour government beyond narrow questions of 
enforcement powers on to questions of national identity and values. This was a new area for 
the Labour leadership and was a topic more commonly associated with Conservative politics 
(Government Minister). Tony Blair’s initial 12 point plan signalled the policy interest in the 
relationship between identity, citizenship, cohesion and terrorism (see Box 6.2). The statement 
balanced conventional criminal justice measures, including incitement to hatred, with a specific 
element around the integration of the Muslim community. However, at this point there was not 
yet a settled view across the government about the objectives for the wider agenda and how it 





were not implemented due to various legal and political limitations, such as the ban on Hizb 
ut-Tarir, closing of places of workshop and stripping of citizenship. 	
Local implementation 
“There were various novel elements to Prevent but the big thing was moving it out of 
the Home Office into DCLG. If there was any point in it, other than politics, it was 
about broadening the engagement and specifically getting local authorities engaged 
in that process more.” Civil Servant 2 
“If you are thinking about some of the wider policy shifts at that time, the top down 
approach wasn’t working and wasn’t likely to. Local authorities are closer, 
theoretically, to their local communities, and are more likely to understand some of 
the more nuanced issues on their patch. If you look in other areas, local authorities 
have a big role in safe-guarding children or vulnerable adults, why should this be any 
different just because its got security implications. These are the theoretical 
positions.” Regional government officer 
The most notable decision during this period was to give the DCLG a leadership and 
coordination role in the delivery of Prevent. This was in part linked to the wider localism 
agenda being pushed by the Cabinet Office as part of the Labour government’s on-going 
agenda of public service reform. Equally it also indicated a commitment to a distributed and 
consensual model for Prevent that prioritised engagement with the Muslim community. Local 
authorities were seen as best placed to engage with local communities and to coordinate local 
delivery alongside the community cohesion agenda.25  The decision was also taken in the 
context of a restructuring of the Home Office between 2006 and 2007. As a result the DLCG 
published its own Prevent strategy in 2007 and the subsequent 2008 strategy included Prevent 
	
25 The community cohesion agenda had originally been led by the Home Office as a public order agenda but was 





objectives in local funding frameworks, Local Area Agreements, for local authorities with a 
significant Muslim population. 
The enhanced role for local authorities and was linked to the wider localism agenda. The 
rationale was set out in the letter from Tony Blair appointing Ruth Kelly as the first Secretary 
of State for Communities and Local Government (Blair 2006b). The localism agenda was 
intended to improve local service delivery and interventions by improving coordination 
between local agencies to resolve complex problems. The DCLG was formed in 2006 out of 
elements of the Office for the Deputy Prime Minister and was tasked with devolving more 
powers to local neighbourhoods aligned with new models of accountability and leadership. 
This agenda incorporated Local Area Agreements (LAAs) and local strategies to address 
relevant local challenges. Local Strategic Partnerships bought together relevant local agencies, 
including education, heath and social care and policing, and were coordinated by local 
authorities. 
The DCLG was a new department and Prevent gave it a prominent role in a high profile agenda 
alongside the Home Office and other ministries. A described by Ruth Kelly, Secretary of State 
for Communities and Local Government at the time, a small team consisting of one director 
and two senior staff, along with a supporting team joined from the Home Office and the 
department had to develop its understanding of extremism and radicalisation quite rapidly 
(Mirza et al 2007). There was a continuation of national level funding programmes, including 
the citizenship funding programme and the Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board that 
had been set up by the Home Office. The department also set up a pathfinder-funding 
programme of approximately £6 million pounds for local authorities to explore local level 
activities in advance of a fuller funding round. This was followed by the publication by the 
DCLG of a dedicated Prevent strategy in April 2007 that set the basis for providing core 
funding to local authorities from 2008 onwards with performance assessed against National 





Box 6.3: National Indicator 35  
• Understanding of, and engagement with, Muslim communities; 
• Knowledge and understanding of the drivers and causes of violent-extremism and 
the Prevent objectives; 
• Development of a risk-based preventing violent-extremism action plan, in support 
of delivery of the Prevent objectives; 
• Effective oversight, delivery and evaluation of projects and actions. 
(DCLG 2007) 
The prominence of DCLG’s role was in part linked to the wider challenges facing the Home 
Office at the time. The Home Office was criticised for its performance in a variety of other 
areas, including immigration policy and detention of foreign criminals. This had led John Reid 
to describe the department as ‘not fit for purpose’ shortly after being appointed Home Secretary 
in 2006. The Home Office’s work on counter-terrorism policy, including Prevent, had 
previously been criticised in an internal review by the Prime Minister’s Delivery Unit that was 
subsequently leaked to the Sunday times (Labour’s war on terror is failing, says leaked report 
Sunday Times 2005). One advisor noted that the Blair’s 12 point plan following the 7/7 attacks 
highlighted the pressure on the Home Office: 
“Tony Blair did the announcement that the rules of the game have changed but civil 
servants at the Home Office were wondering where the proposals had come from. My 
sense is that Blair said his piece but the Home Office knew that it was not going to 
work, so they had the summer to come up with an alternative plan before the PM came 





Although the Home Office did retain a role in the delivery and coordination of Contest and 
Prevent the delivery of Contest was not part of its public service agreement. For example, the 
Home Office targets for 2005 – 2006 included no specific reference to terrorism and security 
and its strategic objectives associated with communities engagement racial and religious 
tolerance were dropped for 2006 – 2007. Although the Home Office did not prioritise issues 
related to the root causes of terrorism a number of important decisions were taken during this 
period that influenced the Home Office’s future role in relation to Contest and Prevent. 
Following the restructure of the Home Office and the Department of Justice, and the 
downgrading of the Cabinet Office’s general role under Brown, the Office for Security and 
Counter Terrorism was set up in later 2007. In addition in 2007 the Home Office started funding 
initiatives to develop targeted solutions to radicalisation, including ACPO to develop a local 
referral model for individuals at risk of radicalisation called ‘Channel’. 
The Home Office also continued to support local Prevent policing. The local approach to 
Prevent aligned with the neighbourhood policing agenda developed by ACPO, with the support 
of the Home Office. Norman Bettison, writing later in 2009, emphasised the role that 
community policing played in the police response and the need for improved engagement and 
soft intelligence from the Muslim community (Bettison 2009). The Association of Chief Police 
Officers published “practice advice on professionalising the business of neighbourhood 
Policing” (ACPO 2005) and the Home Office had also published its local public order strategy 
‘Building communities beating crime’ in 2004 (Home Office 2004c). Neighbourhood policing 
was predicated on improving links with local communities to identify and address relevant 
crime and disorder problems as well as development of softer interventions outside typical law-
enforcement. It was a relatively important element of policing, including development and 








“When we take time to stand back and reflect, it becomes clear that to address almost 
every one of the major challenges facing our country… you must have a clear view of 
what being British means, what you value about being British and what gives us 
purpose as a nation.” (Brown 2006)  
The political focus on broader questions of Muslim identity reinforced the DCLG’s role due to 
its work on community cohesion which addressed similar issues of segregation and grievances. 
This focus was supported by intelligence assessments of the role of Muslim identity in the 
recruitment and mobilisation strategies of extremists and terrorists. The Cabinet Office, the 
Home Office and DCLG supported a broader agenda of promoting a contextualised liberal 
version of British Islam as a counter-point to orthodox literalist interpretations. The focus on 
Muslim identity had some qualified support from Muslim community advisors and 
representatives as part of developing the place of Islam in the UK. However this was also 
tempered by strong opposition to the conflation of Islam with the causes of terrorism. 
Nevertheless, many advisors and representative organisations treated Prevent as an opportunity 
to address issues of concern within the Muslim community and to develop the role of Muslim 
faith identities in UK public life (Advisors 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6). 
The decision to focus on Muslim identity followed on from the 2004 Cabinet decision and was 
a response the mobilisation of Muslim identity in opposition to western governments and 
societies. Blair argued that efforts to prevent terrorism had to combat the ideology globally and 
preventing it from gaining traction in the UK. Blair linked these ideas with pre-feudal 
interpretations of Islam emanating out of the Middle East and argued that it was necessary to 
articulate the values within Islam that aligned with modern liberal ideas, as illustrated in this 
speech: 
“This terrorism will not be defeated until its ideas, the poison that warps the minds of 





mean telling them terrorism is wrong. I mean telling them their attitude to America is 
absurd; their concept of governance pre-feudal; their positions on women and other 
faiths, reactionary and regressive; and then since only by Muslims can this be done: 
standing up for and supporting those within Islam who will tell them all of this but 
more, namely that the extremist view of Islam is not just theologically backward but 
completely contrary to the spirit and teaching of the Koran.” (Blair 2006a)  
Blair’s position moved Prevent beyond a narrow strategy of community engagement to 
mitigate the impacts of policing toward a broader social change agenda to counter extremist 
ideas. This aligned with the community cohesion agenda that had developed following riots 
involving Asian and White youth in the summer of 2001. The initial focus of the community 
cohesion agenda under John Denham, as the ministerial lead in the Home Office prior to 2003, 
was on improving collaboration between local institutions, including community groups and 
politicians, in order to manage public order. This was then followed up by the Home Office 
‘Building communities beating crime’ strategy in 2004 that reiterated a commitment to 
addressing causes of crime and to developing engagement led neighbourhood models to 
policing (Home Office 2004c). When the work transferred to the DCLG in 2006 a Commission 
on Integration and Cohesion was set up to develop broader proposals about how to develop 
shared British and community identity and break down ethnic divisions (Commission on 
Integration and Cohesion 2007). 
The cohesion agenda had sought to move away from multi-cultural community engagement 
around fixed ethnic groups. This shift was recommended by Ted Cantle in his report on the 
2001 riots, and supported by prominent leaders in the race equality sector, including Lord 
Ousely who had produced similar findings, and Trevor Phillips as chair of the Commission for 
Racial Equality. Phillips also made a speech titled ‘Sleep walking to segregation’ in September 
2005 that made a direct link between community segregation, polarisation and extremism 
(Philips 2006). The speech addressed themes of national identity and highlighted issues of 





communities. Phillip’s speech compared the UK positively with the United States’ experience 
of entrenched racial segregation but warned about the potential for similar patterns developing 
without proactive government policy. This included addressing issues of social and economic 
marginalisation of minority groups but also actively working to bring different groups together 
around a shared social identity. 
In contrast Prevent specifically engaged with Muslim religious and social identity and groups. 
This approach was an expedient response to the political focus on the Muslim community and 
the need to manage specific issues around policing and recruitment. It was also supported by 
the argument that Prevent needed to actively establish a positive place for Muslim identity as 
part of a shared British identity to counter the specific challenge from extremist Islamist ideas. 
In 2007 Ruth Kelly cited a literature review by Tufyal Choudhury that explored the nuanced 
role of identity in radicalisation. Choudhury argued that public disparagement of Muslim 
identity, including a sense of blocked social mobility and distorted medial portrayal led to 
greater in-group identification, with a particular emphasis on a defensive masculine identity. 
He also highlighted evidence from the Home Office citizenship survey to suggest that religious 
identity could mobilise positive civic activism and identification with Britain. In short 
Choudhury argued that Muslim identity dynamics amongst British youth should be channelled 
productively in support of integration: 
“There are signs of a ‘British Muslim’ identity forming in reaction to violent 
radicalism, which is proposing a ‘receptive, integrationist and dynamic’ Islam. It is 
receptive because it is open to Western influences; it is integrationist because it 
believes Muslims ought to take full part in British society and political processes; and 
it is dynamic because it acknowledges that as contexts change, so will the ways 
Muslims conceive of and practise their religion. Thus, while Muslim identity politics 






The opportunity for Prevent to engage with a more nuanced picture of the relationship between 
Muslim identity and Britishness was also borne out by opinion polling at the time. This 
included polls on behalf of the BBC, the Sun and the Telegraph that highlighted a strong British 
identity amongst Muslim communities that was comparable to that of wider British society 
(Sobolewska 2010 p30). In addition the government’s own citizenship survey showed a 
nuanced picture of political alienation. Muslim communities reported high levels of trust in 
institutions, a sense of belonging and reported high levels of influence and participation in 
society (Sobolewska 2010). Sobolewska did suggest that these patterns may also have been 
influenced by local experiences, including segregation, which could mask broader patterns of 
alienation. Nevertheless these findings lent weight to an approach that sought to engage with 
the nuances of British Muslim identity. 
The Ajegbo review of citizenship education also recommended engaging with nuanced 
questions of citizenship and ethnic identity and was cited in DCLG’s 2007 Prevent strategy 
(Ajegbo 2007). The review found that issues of issues of ethnic identity and diversity were 
often neglected or lacked depth, and where it was covered ethnicity and ’race’ tended to be 
addressed more often than religion. It also found that much citizenship education in secondary 
schools did not sufficiently engage with contemporary local, national and international issues 
and how governments could deal with them. To address this gap the review recommended a 
strand of the curriculum called living together in the UK. This included critical thinking about 
ethnicity, religion and ‘race’, an explicit link to political issues and values and the use of 
contemporary history in teachers’ pedagogy to illuminate thinking about contemporary issues 
relating to citizenship. As a result citizenship education framed much of the initial role for 
schools in Prevent. 
There was also support for a discussion about the impact of conservative Islamic orthodoxies 
on British Muslim identity amongst senior members of the Labour party. This was illustrated 
by comments made by Jack Straw in 2006, as leader of the House of Commons, about the 





its increased prevalence as "a visible statement of separation and difference" that was “bound 
to make better, positive relations between the two communities more difficult" but 
acknowledged the sensitivity of the topic as he had “thought a lot before raising this matter a 
year ago, and still more before writing this” (Straw in plea to Muslim women: Take off your 
veils Lancashire Telegraph 2006). The comments generated significant media coverage but 
produced a rare area of agreement between the MCB and the Labour Party. Hazel Blears, as 
chair of the Labour party, framed it as a local constituency issue, defended the right of 
individuals to decide what to wear and emphasised the need for debate. The MCB adopted a 
similar position positioning it as an issue of theological interpretation and debate between 
different strands of Islam and ultimately personal choice (BBC 2006b). 
Broadening community engagement 
“Within DCLG there seemed to be different advisors who represented different parts 
of the Muslim establishment. There were people who represented the MCB wing, there 
was the Sufi Muslim council which was a new organisation that Ruth Kelly launched 
and there was Khurshid Ahmed's British Muslim Forum. They all represented very 
different ethnic and religious strands within the British Muslim community” Advisor 
2 
“An interrogation and understanding of the root causes of terrorism (e.g., 
discrimination, deprivation and alienation facing British Muslims; UK foreign policy; 
the plight of Muslims across the across the world; etc.), their respective weight and 
how they relate to each other – i.e., it is not enough to tackle only the act of terrorism 
itself without addressing its root causes.” Young People Working Group (Home 
Office 2005a) 
The role for the DCLG and local authorities was also based on deepening and broadening 
relationships with local Muslim communities. As with the cohesion agenda this emphasised a 





put a range of community concerns onto the national and local policy agenda. This included a 
decision to broaden the range of engagement in order to help mobilise community support and 
to move beyond a narrow set of community interlocutors. In the case of Prevent the broadening 
engagement presented a challenge to incumbent groups, particularly the MCB, whilst 
presenting opportunities for others who wanted to engage with government. Many of those 
who became involved in dialogue with government viewed the problem of radicalisation as a 
symptom of negative experiences of being Muslim in Britain that had been compounded by the 
UK’s foreign policy. As a result Prevent was seen as an opportunity to address community 
concerns around religious discrimination, education and employment.  
Following the 2005 attacks there was a programme of ministerial engagement with Muslim 
community groups around the country. To this point engagement with the community had 
largely focused on managing conflict in relation to issues of policing, foreign policy and 
extremist recruitment. Increasingly however community engagement also actively 
acknowledged the limitations of government in combating extremist ideas within a community, 
as illustrated by Blair in 2006: 
“We are trying to engage with [the Muslim community] but in the end Government 
itself cannot go and root out the extremism in these communities. I am probably not 
the person to go into the Muslim community and persuade them that this extreme view 
of Islam is completely mistaken and completely contrary to the proper tenets of the 
religion of Islam. It is better that you mobilise the Islamic community itself to do this.” 
Tony Blair (HC Liaison Committee 4th July 2006 Q 355) 
The meetings were framed as a ministerial listening exercise in order to hear community 
concerns and start the process of deeper engagement on shared solutions to terrorist recruitment 
and extremism (see Box 6.4). The Home Office also convened a series of workshops over the 
summer of 2005 titled Working Together to Prevent Extremism to develop policy 





of Muslims in the media, opposition to the Iraq war and wider concerns about access to services 
and employment. These issues were cited as both direct and indirect drivers of recruitment and 
a barrier for effective policy. These issues had been frequently cited in discussions around the 
community cohesion programme and at local level. The workshops directly linked these 
questions to the Prevent agenda and provided structured feedback about community concerns 
to the heart of government, including personal presentation of findings to Cabinet ministers 
and senior civil servants (Advisor 5). 
Prevent also broadened the range of engagement with Muslim organisations. This approach 
aligned with the community cohesion agenda of developing broad based community 
engagement and avoiding reliance on a small set of gate-keepers or interlocutors. It was also 
in part motivated by the damaged relationship between the MCB and the Labour government 
over the invasion of Iraq and the government’s desire to move away from the MCB as the main 
representative for the Muslim community. A group of advisors from different community 
backgrounds were retained by the Home Office, and subsequently the DCLG, to provide advice 
on ways to engage with the Muslim community. Activities such as Preventing Violent 
Extremism Together workshops and regional events actively incorporated a broader range of 
groups and individuals, including various groups and individuals working with government or 
in political parties. The arrival of ‘new faces’ was noted at this point by some who had been 
engaged in engagement work prior to 2005 (Police Officer).  
The explicit focus of Prevent on engaging with groups on the basis of their Islamic identity 
contradicted the recommendations of the cohesion programme. Prevent incorporated elements 
of the community cohesion focused on the inclusion of women and younger generations in 
community institutions and challenging those who did not support social integration and shared 
values. At the same time the cohesion agenda recommended moving away from single group 
funding to prioritise action by organisations, including civic institutions and political parties, 
that would actively improve integration between ethnic groups. In contrast Prevent focused on 





relations, manage grievances and address wider questions of identity. However proponents of 
cohesion argued it was necessary to challenge the way local authorities and community leaders 
approached their relationships: 
“[The cohesion agenda was] challenging the models of social development that had 
become established, both in terms of the leadership of certain types of men and the 
conservatism in the community about education that is being worked out in places like 
Birmingham [Trojan horse case]. So there were an awful lot of people whose 
behaviour was challenged” Government minister 
Some community advisors and representative groups supported broadening engagement as an 
opportunity shape Prevent and government policy more generally. The Home Office and 
DCLG were being advised by other groups and individuals that the MCB, whilst legitimate, 
was not representative of the whole Muslim community. The status of the MCB was challenged 
for representing particular theological strands and for not being representative of the experience 
and backgrounds of the whole Muslim community. This was predicated on a perception that 
the organisation was predominantly formed of London professionals from Wahhabi and 
Deobhandi backgrounds, rather than the Pakistani Kashmiri tradition of many British Muslims. 
Some also had concerns about the MCB’s knowledge of community issues, extremism and 
terrorism and the sophistication of their approach to influencing government policy. As one 
advisor suggests: 
“Very quickly in that process I began to feel that the community response wasn’t really 
adequate that there wasn’t really a coherent policy response coming out of the 
community, most of it was posturing. The MCB was already there and was trying to 
represent and that’s its business, to represent Muslim voices to government. However, 
it wasn’t really able to offer a coherent policy analysis of the issues or to then filter 






Box 6.4: The engagement activities that were undertaken in the aftermath of the 7/7  attacks, 
as outlined in The Contest strategy that was published in 2006: 
• 19 July 2005: meeting between the Prime Minister and 25 Muslim community 
leaders to discuss the need to work together to prevent extremism in our 
communities. 
• 20 July 2005: meeting chaired by The Home Secretary with Muslim community 
leaders which to establish seven community-led working groups to develop 
recommendations for tackling extremism. 
• October 2005: the Minister for Women’s biannual meeting with representatives of 
the Muslim Women’s Network discussed the role women can play in tackling 
extremism in Muslim communities. Membership of the network included 
representatives from academia, non-governmental organisations and grass-roots 
community groups. 
• November 2005: the Prime Minister attended a discussion group in Leeds of 50 
people aged between 16 and 25 to find out about the challenges facing young British 
Muslims. 
• February 2006: Dr Kim Howells met a group of successful and influential young 
Muslim men and women in Whitechapel, London. 
• May 2006: the Prime Minister and Ruth Kelly hosted an event for 40 Muslim women 
at Downing Street, aimed at boosting understanding of the community through 
meeting a wider range of people from within it. 






At the same time government did recognise the MCB’s influence and networks and as a result 
maintained its relationship, despite a number of significant conflicts. This included conflict 
over the Iraq war and the MCB’s criticism of the abortive attempt to set up the Sufi Muslim 
Council in 2006. There had been an attempt to improve relationships earlier in 2005, including 
a letter from Hazel Blears in 2005 setting out how the government intended to improve 
engagement with the Muslim community. The MCB also participated in a round table 
discussion with Tony Blair in the aftermath of the 7/7 bombings and participated in the 
formation of MINAB. It also continued to receive government grants to support education 
initiatives domestically and overseas. Although it was the only significant national 
representative organisation, with by far the largest number of mosques in its membership, as a 
relatively new and developing organisation the MCB was also very defensive about its position.  
The MCB’s defensiveness about its status as the main representative body was illustrated by 
its trenchant criticisms of the Sufi Muslim Council when it was launched in 2006. The Sufi 
Muslim council was launched with support from Ruth Kelly at the Houses of Parliament. Its 
founder, Haras Rafiq, who went on to be involved in the Quilliam Foundation set out the 
objective for the council at its launch: 
"Sufis count among the vast silent majority of Britain's two million strong Muslim 
community. Up to now they have lacked an externally visible voice and the intent of 
forming this council is to provide just such a strong voice. There is an urgent need for 
the British Muslim community to engage in an internal debate to isolate the ideologies 
who falsely claim to represent Islam, to develop a strong field of moderate, 
intellectually astute, forward-thinking leaders and scholars who can promote the 
moderate values of civic society, engagement and diversity which characterize 
classical Islam." (Haras Rafiq quoted in Casciani 2006) 
The MCB actively criticised the council as an attempt to undermine its position due to its 





sanctioned version of ‘moderate’ Islam. A Guardian report on the launch of the council 
included this comment by an MCB spokesperson: 
“When contacted by Guardian Unlimited, the spokesman for the MCB, Inyat 
Bunglawal, claimed Mr Rafiq was an "unknown". "Who is he? Who does he represent? 
Let's wait and see just how many groups affiliate to his group, but at the moment it's 
obscure and unknown." (King 2006)  
Many groups and individuals did support the need to reform community institutions as part of 
the development of their role in policy-making and public life. This included the advisors 
engaged by the Home Office and DCLG and many of those involved in the working groups, 
albeit with different emphases. Beyond the core set of advisors and number of Muslim groups 
and organisations were also supportive of efforts to explore the more nuanced perspectives of 
British Islam (Birt 2009). This reflected discussion about contextualised and cosmopolitan 
perspectives of Islam in the UK that were already taking place in many social circles, in 
particular amongst younger generations and professional groups. For example, groups such as 
the City Circle in London brought British Muslim professionals together into an active dialogue 
about the place of their faith in their social and political lives and identities. Some of these 
groups and networks were directly or indirectly engaged with government via members in 
advisory roles or forums. 
The motivation of many who engaged in the process was illustrated by the preamble of the 
Preventing Extremism Together Workshops. Participants did not view themselves as experts 
in terrorism and extremism but as interlocutors who wanted to help address problems on behalf 
of the Muslim community by improving engagement and dialogue with public authorities. A 
chief concern of participants was the impact of terrorism on the status of the Muslims 
community and the demonization of Islam in the UK: 
“The individuals involved in this process were acutely aware of the relevance and 





and 21st July, in the form of attacks on the Islamic Faith, the incessant demands for 
Muslims to repeatedly demonstrate their allegiance to the country, the demonisation 
of a whole community together with the unprovoked and marked attacks on Islam and 
Muslims by the media and in other more direct forms of physical attacks on mosques 
and individuals.” Forward to the report of the Preventing Violent Extremism Together 
Workshops (Home Office 2005a) 
Many of the groups and individuals involved in the process recognised the need for reform in 
order to help combat extremism. The summer consultation exercise supported the Home 
Office’s earlier assessment that a generational gap in religious teaching and identity 
development that had created opportunities for extremist recruiters. There was receptiveness 
to some of the issues identified by government, including the issue of recruiting Imams from 
overseas with little experience of the concerns of British youth, alongside the exclusion of 
women from the governance of community organisations. Similarly there were also balanced 
views of the problems of engagement between national and local government and the 
community, as illustrated by this comment: 
“I think in a way we were honest about representation from our own communities. 
Those with the loudest voices had often received grants but this did not mean it 
necessarily went to the right groups. We found that in some areas like Tower Hamlets 
many Bengali women's groups lost out on major funding for essential programmes 
around language, education and employment. Many had responsibility for raising 
children whilst often their husbands spent time travelling to and from Bangladesh on 
business or family reasons. Language was often a barrier to new incoming Bengali 
women and cultural difference and other factors meant they often faced challenges in 
raising children and understanding educational differences. But this has changed with 
strong representation of many women's Bengali groups. A key recommendation was 
for evidenced based funding of groups, including data about their needs and regular 





but also what was wrong in terms of the way central and local government funding 
was being allocated." Advisor 5 
The qualified support for reform of religious institutions ultimately led to the Mosques and 
Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) that established a framework of good governance 
for Muslim religious institutions. MINAB was launched in 2006 with the support of key 
Muslim representative organisations, including the MCB, Muslim Association of Britain, 
British Muslim Forum and the leading Shia Muslim representative group Al-Khoei Foundation 
(see Box 6.5 for the agreed standards). It was presented as an opportunity to work to develop 
the organisation and governance of Mosques in order to support their engagement with national 
and local government and their role in British society. However, the support of many 
participants was also heavily qualified by suspicion of government interference that linked 
Islamic teachings to extremism. The initiative was strongly criticised by radical groups such as 
Hizb ut-Tarir whilst the MCB spokesperson Inyat Bunglawal writing in Guardian article 
highlighted how the challenge for MINAB was to:  
“walk [a fine line] between a government that will not accept that it has done anything 
that may have even inadvertently fuelled the terror threat we are facing and Muslim 
communities who will be understandably sceptical as to what its real intentions are.” 
(Inyat Bunglawala 2007) 
The working groups also set out a large number of recommendations focused on addressing 
issues of settled disadvantage and integration of Muslim communities locally and nationally. 
This included a campaign to reframe a positive place for Islam in British society and break 
negative associations with Islam and terrorism. Building on this were recommendations to 
develop a place for Islam in citizenship education and national debates, including leadership 
training and service improvement for youth and support for student groups to counter extremist 





engagement with local authorities, subsequently developed through MINAB, and for actively 
including women’s perspective in policy through dedicated local and national forums. 
Box 6.5: Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board - five standards 
1. Members apply principles of good corporate governance 
2. Members ensure that services are provided by suitably qualified and or experienced 
personnel 
3. There are systems and processes in place to ensure that there are no impediments to 
the participation in the activities, including governance, for young people 
4. There are systems and processes in place to ensure that there are no impediments to 
the participation in the activities, including governance, for women 
5. Members ensure there are programmes that promote civic responsibility of Muslims 
in the wider society 
Not all of the recommendations put forward by the community were directly incorporated into 
Prevent, which was criticised by some who participated in the process and by politicians. Many 
of these decisions were justified on the basis of the need for a demonstrable direct or indirect 
link to preventing radicalisation, even if evidence was scarce. In practice this largely excluded 
recommendations that were not specific to the Muslim community. Religious discrimination 
was addressed through the inclusion of religion alongside other protected characteristics in 
2006. The proposals for promoting a positive place for Islam in Britain, diverting youth from 
potential engagement with extremists and development for community groups and 
organisations were all included in the pathfinder programme and subsequent 2007 strategy. 
Broader issues, such as economic marginalisation, remained out of the scope either due to 
contested relevance or the existence of the such as Sure Start and New Deal education and 






The exclusion of foreign policy and the nature of the relationship between Islam, extremism 
and terrorism, were the most significant points of conflict between government and community 
interlocutors. The working group focused on tacking extremism and radicalisation argued that 
British foreign policy was the key factor that motivated recruitment to radical and violent 
extremism. This included the Iraq war and the US-led war on terror but for many also included 
the UK’s support alongside the US of Israel’s occupation and control of the Palestinian 
territories. This working group called for space for dissent about foreign policy without being 
conflated with terrorists or “being deemed inimical to British values”. In a related point the 
young people working group prefaced its recommendations by highlighting political grievance 
due to a lack of Muslim youth influence in community and civic institutions and society. 
Foreign policy allied to political and social alienation was seen as a key factor underpinning 
the appeal of extremist ideas. 
The desire to include foreign policy, particularly the invasion of Iraq, in the discussion about 
the causes of extremism and terrorism put many in the Muslim community into conflict with 
the Labour leadership. The Iraq war continued to be a highly sensitive political issue for the 
Labour party during this period. Although Labour won the May 2005 general election its 
majority was significantly reduced and Blair’s personal association with the decision to invade 
was increasingly undermining his personal authority. Blair and his supporters opposed 
substantive consideration of the war as a cause and argued that this strand of thinking was 
reflective of extremist ideas that sought to undermine the legitimacy of democratic government. 
Blair argued that terrorist groups were using any action by western government to justify their 
beliefs and actions and should not be seen as a legitimate argument for changing foreign policy 
(Blair 2006a). In addition he also argued that opposition to foreign policy should be mobilised 






This position was supported by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), who resisted 
more substantive consideration of foreign policy in Prevent. There was an initiative that 
emerged out of the working groups recommendations to establish ‘safe spaces’ for Muslim 
youth to debate grievances and differences, away from settings that were dominated by 
ideologues and radicals. In addition there were efforts to improve communications about 
foreign policy domestically, including overseas development aid, that was subsequently 
supported by the set up of the Research Information and Communications Unit in 2007. The 
FCO also developed an engagement programme to improve communication of UK policy 
overseas, which included working with Muslim leaders and representatives form the UK in 
overseas engagement work. Overseas engagement was administered by the FCO separately 
from the programme of community engagement led by the DCLG and tended to work with 
traditional Muslim community leaders rather than the broadening range of individuals and 
groups. 
Violent-extremism 
“Do we care about terrorism or violent-extremism, or extremism, or cohesion and 
integration, or social conservatism. It cut right across it, to some extent it was trying 
to do all things to all men and women and not very well. So it was always slightly 
fudged.” Civil servant 2 
“There were different layers of people having influence. There were advisors in 
government of Muslim background and I think they had varying levels of influence. 
Then you had people outside government who I think were disproportionately 
influential in the media. I remember civil servants were petrified about what might be 
said and some of the caution came from wanting to protect ministers from attacks, 
which creates a high degree of caution." Advisor 1 
The focus on violent-extremism and promoting shared values represented a tactical 





of radical Islamism. There were competing principled and empirical views about the legitimacy 
and practicality of working with or challenging ideas and groups associated with strands of 
radical Islamist activism and conservative Islamic thought. This included an empirical debate 
about the extent to which radical or conservative ideas actively or tacitly encouraged 
segregation, legitimised violence or facilitated terrorist recruitment. At one end it was argued 
that radical groups should be challenged as a point of principle and as a necessary first step in 
any long-term process of integration. This was set against principled and tactical concerns 
about the consequences of being seen to curtail freedom of expression and the risks of limiting 
engagement and alienating the wider community. The balance between these two positions 
produced a tactical approach to engagement that focused on challenging violent extremists and 
promoting shared values. 
At the heart of the conflict was the debate over the definition of violent-extremism, British 
values and moderate Muslims. All three notions were highly sensitive amongst Muslim 
community due to concern about the implications for the status and views of Muslims and 
government engagement. The 2005 preventing violent extremism together working groups, 
and representatives such as the MCB, raised significant concerns that conflating terrorism and 
Islamic ideas, particularly in relation to conservative or normative interpretations, would 
exacerbate wider suspicion of Muslims. This also included concern that the notion of moderate 
Muslims and British values implied that Muslims were potentially a threat to the values of 
wider society. In practical terms this debate often focused on teachings of conservative 
Deobhandi and Salafist strands of Islam as well as criticism of UK foreign policy and the 
legitimacy of the state of Israel. More fundamentally it was founded on a general sensitivity 
about the way Prevent and government viewed and treated Muslims and Islam. 
Given these concerns there was strong opposition in the community to broadening definitions 
of extremism in Prevent beyond direct support for the use of violence. This position was 
supported by research querying the empirical link between ideology and radicalisation 





definition that could be implemented in Prevent whilst the potential for alienating potentially 
useful allies was also highlighted by advisors (Advisors 1 and 3). As a result Prevent included 
a public commitment to work with groups who supported taking ‘long-term’ steps to counter 
violent-extremism, as illustrated in this statement by Hazel Blears in 2007  
“So let me be blunt. If you're serious about taking practical, long-term steps to counter 
violent-extremism, Government will support you and will work with you. Simple as 
that.” (Blears 2007) 
At the time there were few practical definitions of violent-extremism beyond explicit support 
for violence. In practice the idea of violent-extremism was interpreted through a direct and 
indirect legal framework. The main legal definition of violent-extremism was the offence of 
glorification of terrorism that was included in the 2006 Counter Terrorism Act. In addition the 
2006 religious discrimination act also served as an important reference point. Although human 
rights standards, including the 1998 Human Rights Act, protected the right to freedom of 
conscience and expression the 2006 religious discrimination also introduced offences of 
inciting religious hatred. The act was introduced in late 2005 to help reassure the Muslim 
community that they were protected against forms of hatred specific to religion  and parallel 
concerns about new terrorism offences, particularly glorification of terrorism (Maer 2009).26 
Whilst glorification of terrorism was a new and controversial offence, incitement to hatred was 
more familiar to local authorities through race equality and cohesion work. In any respect, for 
the purposes of Prevent these frameworks were primarily guidelines, with prosecution of 
offences a separate matter. 
	
26 The act was introduced shortly after the acquittal of the leader of the British National Party, Nick Griffin, on 
charges of incitement of racial hatred on the grounds. The link between terrorism and incitement offences can also 
be traced in previous terrorism legislation and associated debates, including the 2000 and 2001 Terrorism Acts. 
The 2006 Act reintroduced offences of incitement of religious hatred by amending the Public Order Act 1986. 
Offences of inciting religious hatred had originally been proposed in the 2001 Terrorism Act but were removed 
following objection in the lords about definitions of religion and hatred. The eventual 2006 Act was also amended 
by the Lords to remove reference to abusive and insulting behaviour and required an active intention to stir up 






Hazel Blears’ reference to long-term steps did illustrate the aim of developing shared-values 
as a counter point to extremism and, by extension, a preference for working with moderates 
who actively supported this objective. The 2007 DCLG Prevent strategy and subsequent 
guidance set out a high level framework of British values to guide activity associated with 
Prevent, including the aims of funded projects and initiatives and the groups involved in joint 
working (DCLG 2007) (See Box 6.6). The framework was based on recommendations from 
the Commission on Community Cohesion but had no legal status or conditions attached, other 
than being indirectly incorporated into local government performance frameworks.  However, 
this framework did not resolve media scrutiny of extremist ideas and on-going pressure on 
government to actively challenge extremist views and groups. Equally, the approach was 
criticised for framing the values as exceptionally British, rather than universal, and whether 
they applied to Muslims in the same way as the wider population. 
Ultimately the Home Office and the DCLG supported a focus on violent-extremism, rather 
than on more general definitions of extremism, for tactical reasons. The Home Office believed 
that some extremist and radical groups could serve as useful safety valves for individuals and 
groups who might potentially have violent tendencies (Civil servant 1). There were examples 
of intelligence relationships with conservative groups who also had methods of diverting 
individuals away from violence, the most notable being the Muslim Contact Unit of the 
Metropolitan Police and the Brixton Street Project (Lambert 2008). For the DCLG the broader 
challenge related to maintaining engagement and support for the Prevent programme amongst 
the Muslim community. Local authorities in particular highlighted concerns about the 
practicality and desirability of using controversial definitions of extremism to selectively 
engage with community groups (Regional government officer; Local government chief 
executive; Local government officer). As a result established legal frameworks for violence 
and incitement to racial hatred were allied to a more general definition of shared values were 





Box 6.6: Principles of British values: 
• Respect for the rule of law 
• Freedom of speech 
• Equality of opportunity 
• Respect for others and 
• Responsibility towards others. 
(DCLG 2007) 
Some advisors encouraged a tactical approach to engagement in order to empower moderate 
reformers of conservative Muslim institutions (Advisors 1, 3 and 6). In some respects this 
reflected the basis of their access and influence with decision-makers but it also reflected the 
authority of the institutions and genuine debates that were taking place in them. They argued 
that reformist voices in key institutions, such as the East London Mosque or Islamic Society of 
Britain should be empowered to help develop more moderate contextualised approaches to the 
religion. They also argued that there was a risk that if this engagement was poorly handled 
these voices would be undermined to the detriment of Prevent. Similarly they also stressed that 
whilst liberal groups, such as British Muslims for Secular Democracy, had a role they did not 
yet have influence within the wider community. This position ultimately encouraged short-
term engagement as part of a longer-term organisational reform. 
The rationale for the tactical approach was also set out in a report by the think tank Demos that 
was commissioned by the DCLG. The report highlighted the complexity of defining extremism 
and recommended a practical approach to engagement that focused on engaging with the 
Muslim community to build partnerships. It highlighted the complex and contested causal link 





communities if government was perceived as being overly selective and shutting down dissent 
about the wider causes of alienation. The principle recommendation was that the community 
had to be central to any preventative efforts and that this meant prioritising active engagement, 
including with those who may hold challenging political and cultural values. As outlined in the 
report: 
“That is not to say that there is a clear line to be drawn between violent extremists and 
radicals. The former are always radicals, but radicals are very rarely violent, and 
because the government has a fairly poor understanding of the complexities within the 
community, it often finds it difficult tell them apart. Certain kinds of behaviour, dress 
and attitudes – for instance among the Salafi community – are problematic for a 
secular, liberal state such as the UK, and raise wider questions about the status of 
faith in British politics, the legitimacy or otherwise of certain forms of sharia law, and 
an individual’s right to behave in the private realm in ways that might be at odds with 
social norms or even laws. These are important questions that we need to debate as a 
society, but we must not let them get in the way of the priority of tackling terrorism. 
The energy of these non-violent forms of mobilisation must be harnessed towards this 
shared goal.“ (Briggs, Fieschi & Lownsbrough, 2006) 
The tactical approach to extremism and engagement was criticised by those who believed that 
there needed to be a more explicit challenge to politicised and conservative Islam. As with 
Blair, they argued that fundamentalist Islam represented a significant threat to the values and 
safety of western democracies and the democratic development of Muslim countries around 
the world. They highlighted conservative social and anti-democratic views that encouraged 
social segregation and grievances against western governments and anti-Semitic opposition to 
the state of Israel. Critics of Prevent also argued that political Islamists were inserting 
themselves as community interlocutors and were preventing government from taking robust 
positions against extremist views. Finally, some argued that Islamists had an active strategy of 





they argued that government should only work with those that opposed to Islamism, supported 
UK foreign policy and held liberal religious views.  
Although many of the more critical advocates were outside of government they placed 
significant pressure on decision-making (Advisor 1 and 4; Civil servant 1). The most prominent 
exponent of this position was the think tank Policy Exchange, including its founder Michael 
Gove who became an MP in 2005 and Dean Godson who joined Policy Exchange in 2005 to 
head its security programme of work. Both had been at the Times in 2005 where they regularly 
covered Islamist radicalisation as columnist and reporter respectively. Policy Exchange went 
on to publish two reports during this period. The first was ‘When progressives treat with 
reactionaries’ in 2006 followed by ‘Living apart together’ in 2007 that highlighted the 
existence of Islamist views in the Muslim community and increasing social segregation (Bright 
2006; Mirza et al 2007). In 2006 Michael Gove MP, a Times columnist, and Melanie Phillips, 
a Daily Mail columnist, published ‘Celsius 7/7’ and ‘Londonistan’ respectively. Both books 
also highlighted the threat of entryist political Islam and the failures of UK’s domestic and 
international response (Gove 2006; Phillips, M. 2006). 
The 2006 Policy Exchange report ‘When progressives treat with reactionaries’ by Martin 
Bright criticised the government’s approach to political Islam. It highlighted the challenge of 
engaging with the diverse range of ethnic, social, theological and political viewpoints under a 
single label of Islam. The report focused on the Foreign Office’s accommodation of Islamist 
groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and highlighted the influence of advisor 
Mockbul Ali and his role in facilitating entry into the country for radical political Islamists. 
Although primarily focused on foreign policy it raised parallel concerns about the 
government’s relationship with the MCB. Domestically, Bright was supportive of the findings 
of the preventing violent extremism together working groups and criticised the government’s 
failure to fully respond to their recommendations, including the call for an inquiry into the 
impacts of the Iraq war. However, he argued that Islamists, including the MCB, were hindering 





“Instead of tackling the ideology that helps to breed terrorism, Whitehall has 
embraced a narrow, austere version of the religion. I believe that when taken together, 
the documents provide a unique insight into the workings of the Foreign Office and 
show it is pursuing a policy of appeasement towards radical Islam that could have 
grave consequences for Britain.” He went on to say later in the report “Although the 
MCB describes itself as an umbrella organisation for British Muslims, the clear 
Islamist sympathies of its leaders make this a difficult proposition to sustain.” (Bright 
2006) 
Gove and Phillips argued that appeasement of Islamists was continuing the failed strategy of 
tolerating the presence of radicals such as Abu Hamza, Omar Bakri Mohammed and Abu 
Qatada during the 1990s under a ‘covenant of security’.27 Both made trenchant criticisms of 
multiculturalism for allowing space for separatist Islamist politics and identities and failing to 
recognise the scale and significance of the challenge that Political Islam presented to British 
values. They argued that government needed to scrutinise, monitor and check the actions, 
funding and operation of those who sought to spread Islamist ideas in Britain. They also argued 
that the appeasement of radicals was part of a wider failing of multi-cultural integration that 
had encouraged moral relativism and segregation. For Gove, the solution was stronger laws 
and a proclamation of common values that represented an ideological effort to develop an 
inclusive model of British citizenship that was based on moral clarity and free from divisive 
separatist identities. 
Gove and Phillips advocated a highly selective approach to community engagement. They 
argued that many groups and individuals involved in Prevent were motivated by Islamist ideas 
and were using entryist tactics to promote their influence. Phillips specifically criticised the 
Muslim Contact Unit’s approach, including its work around Finsbury Park mosque and the role 
of the Muslim Association of Britain, and with the Salafi Brixton mosque’s Street project. Iqbal 
	





Sacranie, Secretary General of the MCB, and Inyat Bunglawal, also of the MCB, were 
criticised for links to Wahhabi doctrines. The Islamic Foundation at Markfield was also 
criticised for its adherence to the teachings of Jamaat-i-Islami. Individuals who questioned the 
legitimacy of Israel, including tacit or active justification of the use of violence against Israel 
were identified, including the reformist Islamist academic Dr Tariq Ramadan. 28  Islamist 
influence on the Federation of Islamic Societies and Hizb ut-Tarir presence on university and 
college campuses was also criticised (Gleese 2005). They identified preferred Muslim 
interlocutors, including individuals such as Haras Rafiq of the Sufi Muslim Council and 
Khurshid Ahmed, former chair of the British Muslim Forum.  
Conclusion 
During this chapter decision-making responded to political pressure following the 7/7 attacks 
by expanding the scope of security policy to address the wider social causes of terrorism. 
Political priority was given to demonstrating a comprehensive response to home grown 
terrorism allied to an operational need to improve intelligence relationships with the Muslim 
community. These decisions also responded to growing political conflict around the place of 
Islam in the UK and the status of the Muslim community.  As a result policy focused on 
broadening and deepening strategic and tactical engagement with Muslim community groups 
to address patterns of social alienation, segregation and political grievances. At the same time 
the decision to restructure the Home Office and to decision to give the DCLG an enhanced role 
in the policy further embedded a consensual model of engagement through delegated local 
decision-making and activity. As a result decision-making was heavily influenced by a 
developmental model that sought to address terrorism and violence through the wider 
integration of the Muslim community. 
	
28 As the grandson of Hassan Al Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Dr Ramadan was often singled 





At the same time these decisions created space for conflict over the scope and objectives of 
Prevent. At the heart of this was a conflict over the decision to adopt a tactical approach to non-
violent extremism that set shorter-term priorities of expanding community engagement against 
competing models of longer term social change. This was linked to competing interpretations 
of radicalisation that focused on internal Muslim community responsibility versus 
responsibility for wider factors that shaped the experience of Muslims. The priority given to 
broadening engagement with Muslim groups and local authorities resulted in a tactical 
approach that minimised values conflicts over non-violent extremism and a preference for 
collective action around local community issues. This was criticised by those who believed that 
ideology and extremism was the key factor in recruitment and that shared values should be an 
issue of principle and a longer-term foundation for a cohesive society. These debates became 











Chapter 7: Reviewing Prevent 2008 – 2011 
“First, we will respond to the ideological challenge of terrorism and the threat from 
those who promote it… Second, we will prevent people from being drawn into 
terrorism and ensure that they are given appropriate advice and support… Third, we 
will work with sectors and institutions where there are risks of radicalisation.” 
Theresa May, Forward to the 2011 Prevent Strategy (HM Government 2011a) 
Introduction 
This chapter covers the period between the publication of the first full cross government 
Prevent strategy in 2008 and the revised strategy in 2011. It charts how implementing Prevent 
influenced decision-making through the transition from the Labour to the Conservative led 
coalition government in 2010 and changed government spending priorities. The key decision 
in this chapter was the decision to separate Prevent from integration policy in the 2011 strategy 
due to growing concern about community disengagement from Prevent. The new approach 
represented a compromise that retained elements on the social dimensions of radicalisation in 
the policy approach but emphasised personal characteristics to target interventions. At the same 
time the narrowing of the scope of the policy also represented a trade-off between a more 
assertive approach to non-violent extremism that was set against liberal concern about civil 
liberties. A key element of the compromise was the decision to give the Home Office control 
over Prevent in order to administer a revised tactical settlement around extremism. 
The decision to give the Home Office control of Prevent followed an independent review of its 
implementation prior to the 2011 strategy. This chapter illustrates how the Home Office 
renewed its authority by proposing to improve the impact of Prevent through centralised 
administration and better targeting of interventions. The approach responded to growing 
concern about the relevance of indirect local integration work in the context of reduced public 
spending under the Coalition government after 2010. Prior to 2010 the Home Office also re-





the development of the OSCT. It also supported the development of a new referral methodology 
for targeting interventions allied to a clearer definition of radical Islamist extremism. As a 
result, by the time the Coalition took office the Home Office was well positioned to deliver the 
twin objective of improving the effectiveness of Prevent whilst managing a more assertive 
approach to non-violent extremism.  
This chapter also illustrates how the reassertion of Home Office leadership responded to 
concerns in the wider policy community that Prevent had become a cause of, rather than a 
solution to, Muslim community grievances. The DCLG supported returning the policy to the 
Home Office in order to protect its own reputation and policy priorities. This followed a high 
profile conflict between the DLCG and the MCB that was linked to the government’s shift 
toward a more assertive approach toward extremism in 2009. This tension was also replicated 
at local levels where local authorities had sought to manage similar conflicts with local Muslim 
community groups over the aims and implementation of Prevent. Furthermore, after 2010 the 
DCLG also had to manage the largest budget reduction of all government departments whilst 
its wider role in coordinating local policy was also reduced. As a result the DCLG and local 
authorities supported the idea of dispensing much of their responsibility in relation to Prevent.  
The chapter also starts to show how the separation of Prevent from integration policy under 
Home Office represented a tactical compromise by supporters of a broader socially orientated 
approach. The success of the Home Office’s own arguments were in part based on widely held 
concerns that an unreformed approach to Prevent would undermine efforts to improve 
integration. Inherent to this argument was a shared view across the Prevent policy community, 
including the Conservative leadership, that root causes of terrorism were fundamentally linked 
to wider questions of integration. Those arguing for a more assertive values based approach to 
non-violent extremism supported taking decisions out of the hands of local authorities in order 
to improve the selection of partners. Those who emphasised a neutral approach to engagement 
supported separation and centralisation in order to limit the influence of an assertive values 





respect the Home Office was positioned as the best option for managing these competing 
priorities.  
Context  
Although Prevent had been part of the Contest strategy since 2003 this was the main period of 
implementation. A series of guidance documents were published in 2008, which were then 
followed by an updated Contest strategy in 2009. There were also a series of reviews of the 
Prevent and an increasing volume of often critical media, academic and independent scrutiny 
of Prevent. A review by the Communities and Local Government Committee recommended in 
2010 that Prevent and integration policy should be separated, a position that was also supported 
by an independent  review in 2010. The 2010 reports also highlighted allegations that Prevent 
was a vehicle for spying on the Muslim community by the security services and police 
following the publication of Arun Kundnani’s Spooked in 2009.29 As a result there was a 
growing volume of local and national feedback and debate about the impact of Prevent 
throughout this period. 
The perception of the threat during this period also changed. Although there was a continued 
belief among the security services that the threat was likely to be persistent over a period of 
time there was also a view that the acute threat that followed 9/11 and the invasion of Iraq was 
passing. There were fewer high profile arrests or attempted attacks and the UK largely 
withdrew forces from Iraq and Afghanistan by the end of the decade. The significance of al-
Qaeda itself was also reduced following the death of Ayman Al Zawahiri and ultimately Osama 
Bin Laden who was killed by US Special Forces in 2011. Furthermore, by early 2011 the Arab 
Spring dominated Middle East politics and represented a democratic alternative to radical 
	
29 This allegation was given particular credence in 2010 by the discovery of ‘Project Champion’ a covert system of 
CCTV cameras in predominantly Muslim areas of Birmingham, Washwood Heath and Sparkbrook. Although not 
directly connected to Prevent specifically the initiative was funded by Terrorism and Allied Matters (Tam) fund, 





jihadi opposition to regional governments, with widely varying degrees of success in Tunisia, 
Egypt, Libya and Syria. In June 2011 the government’s own assessment of the terrorism threat 
was reduced from severe to substantial. 
Crucially the Coalition government’s agenda was dominated by the financial crisis and its 
consequences, allied to a shared liberal civil liberties platform. The crisis started in 2007 but 
reached a critical point in 2008 and subsequently resulted in the deepest economic recession 
since the 1920s. Fiscal consolidation was a core element of the Conservative and Liberal 
Democrat coalition following the 2010 elections (HM Government 2010b). The Coalition 
agreement set out its most urgent task in relation to managing the financial crisis, with a 
particular emphasis on fiscal stability. Although the agreement did not make specific reference 
to extremism or Prevent, or integration, civil liberties was also a prominent theme. 
Commitments included the replacement of control orders with Terrorism Prevention and 
Investigation Measures (TPIMs) in December 2011 and the Protection of Freedoms Act (2012) 
which placed time limits on Section 44 stop and search powers. As a result by the end of the 
period the political agenda had largely moved away from security toward economic growth, 
public spending and, increasingly, immigration.	
Box 7.1: Timeline of events 2008 - 2011 
• June 2008: Prevent Strategy was published by the Home Office, the Department for 
Communities and Local Government, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the 
Department for Education and the Department for Culture Media and Sport. 
• 24th March 2009: The Contest 2 strategy was jointly launched by the Prime Minister, 
Gordon Brown and Home Secretary, Jacqui Smith. 
• 25th March: Hazel Blears announced a formal disengagement by the government 





• 5th June: John Denham was made secretary of state for communities and Local 
Government following resignation of Hazel Blears. 
• 17th October: ‘Spooked’ by Arun Kundnani was published with claims that Prevent 
was being used for spying. 
• 14th January 2010: John Denham announced a lifting of the suspension of formal 
relations with the MCB. 
• 16th March 2010: an inquiry into Prevent by the Communities and Local 
Government select committee recommended the separation of Prevent and 
integration policy 
• 5th May 2010: the general election resulted in a Conservative and Liberal Democrat 
coalition government. Theresa May was appointed Home Secretary and Eric Pickles 
Minister for Communities and Local Government. 
• June 2010: There was controversy over funding of CCTV in Muslim 
neighbourhoods in Birmingham by the Association of Chief Police Officers 
Terrorism and Allied Matters Fund. 
• September 2010: The Home Office announced a review of the Prevent strategy by 
the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Lord Carlile of Berriew. 
• December 2010: Arab Spring protests took place in many middle eastern countries 
resulting in new governments in Egypt and Tunisia, the failure of the state in Libya 
and an on-going civil war in Syria. 
• 5th February 2011: David Cameron gave a speech emphasising the need for 





• June: A revised Prevent strategy was published under the leadership of the Home 
Office explicitly separating Prevent from integration policy.  
• June: The terrorism threat was reduced to ‘substantial’ 
 
Centralisation of control 
The most significant decision taken prior to the 2011 Prevent strategy was the centralisation of 
Prevent under the control of the Home Office. The Home Office had rebuilt its capacity and 
status following the 2006/7 restructuring and had benefited from more stable ministerial 
leadership prior to the 2010 election. This had enabled it to renew its leadership of counter-
terrorism policy, as illustrated by its role coordinating the development of the Contest strategy 
in 2009. In contrast the Department for Communities and Local Government experienced 
significant disruption during the period, including damaging political conflict over Prevent 
itself and the controversial resignation of Hazel Blears in 2009. As a result by 2011 the Home 
Office, through the OSCT, had set much of the agenda around the development of the 2009 
Contest strategy and ultimately was well positioned to make the case for being the department 
to implement Prevent after 2010.  
The revised 2011 Prevent strategy gave the Home Office sole ownership for coordinating and 
delivering Prevent. Theresa May’s appointment as Home Secretary after 2010 gave the Home 
Office an independent political authority in the Conservative government, in part linked to the 
prominence of a Conservative party campaign promise to reduce net immigration. The 2011 
strategy centralised funding under the control of the OSCT and the Home Office. This included 
control of funding for a specified list of 25 local authorities focused on London boroughs, 
Luton, Yorkshire and Lancashire and supported by an OSCT network of regional Prevent 
coordinators. The Home Office also continued to support the neighbourhood approach to 
 
	
Prevent policing through funding for local police forces. In addition it also set out the intention 
to set up regional Prevent coordinators to liaise with different agencies but under Home Office 
leadership. 
Although this approach maintained a local dimension for implementing Prevent it was a 
departure from the distributed general grant model and local coordination by local authorities 
between 2008 and 2011. The emphasis on improving the coordination of local implementation 
of Prevent had been a consistent theme throughout this period. The 2008 guidance document 
(HM Government 2008b) had emphasised the need for local flexibility as a core part of the 
strategy of bringing local partners on board and in recognition of the complexity of the agenda: 
“This is a new and rapidly developing area of work. The Government is committed to 
ensuring that examples of good practice at a local level are shared and that local 
solutions help to shape the implementation of the national development programme… 
We recognise that this is a far-reaching and challenging policy agenda, and that local 
partners will continue to require support to deliver it.” (HM Government 2008b) 
However, this flexibility also led to on-going concern about the clarity and focus of Prevent 
that was highlighted in the forward to the 2011 strategy (HM Government 2011a). This concern 
was also illustrated by the variety of guidance documents that were produced during the period. 
This included the 2009 Contest strategy and two guidance documents for local partners that 
sought to clarify the aims and objectives of the policy (HM Government 2008b & 2009b). In 
addition the DCLG’s own next steps document included a detailed set of aims for its work and 
was supported by local guidance provided by networks of local authorities and regional 
government offices (Department for Communities and Local Government 2008a). This 
included examples of partnership working, such as setting up local prevent boards as part of 
Local Strategic Partnerships, that coordinated the work of various local agencies, as well as 
methods for responding to the framework set out by the NI35 performance framework. 
 
	
The reassertion of the Home Office role in the run up to the 2010 election brought it into 
conflict with the DCLG over control of Prevent (Communities and Local Government 
Committee 2010). The revised 2009 Contest strategy was presented to parliament jointly by 
the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, and the Home Secretary Jacqui Smith. In addition the 
Home Office increased its capacity through the OSCT and facilitated a series of workshops 
during 2007/08 as part of the revision of CONTEST. This engaged relevant departments and 
agencies, including DCLG and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Police, National 
Offender Management Service, Border and Immigration Agency, Crown Prosecution Service 
and the security and intelligence agencies. Furthermore, the OSCT also took on responsibility 
for strategic planning, the delivery of aspects of Contest, including oversight of the domestic 
security operations, crisis management, and Olympic security and strategy.  
The Home Office also developed a more detailed analysis of the challenge, as illustrated by the 
2009 Contest strategy. The new strategy set out a detailed view of the nature of the international 
terrorist threat, including its organisational and historical origins, ideological framework and 
its presence in the United Kingdom. It included discussion of the roots of radicalisation and 
highlighted issues of personal vulnerability and political grievances and the need to increase 
the resilience and ability of communities to challenge extremists. The more detailed description 
was included to support local partners with a narrative to that would help clarify the aims of 
the strategy. The need to improve communication around Prevent was also illustrated by the 
formation of the Research, Information and Communications Unit (RICU) within OSCT to 
produce strategic communications in support of counter-terrorism. Charles Farr described their 
role to the Home Affairs Committee as: 
“…advising the rest of government but actually, not just government, officialdom, from 
a brigade commander in Helmand province through to a chief constable in Yorkshire, 
about how they may wish to characterise the threat we face” Charles Farr evidence to 




The Home Office through the OSCT and Charles Farr actively sought greater control over 
Prevent as a necessary step to improve the strategic direction and implementation of the overall 
Contest strategy. The Home Office highlighted concerns about the effectiveness of activity 
delivered by local authorities. In contrast the Home Office highlighted the effective 
implementation of Prevent by local police forces and their de-facto ownership and coordination 
of the agenda locally. Notably this view acknowledged but downplayed the problems 
associated with the Muslim community’s suspicion of Prevent as a specifically police led 
agenda or the extent of the broader community engagement activity by local authorities and 
through Local Strategic Partnerships. For example: 
“In many cases I have no doubt at all that the police, who are experts on rapid delivery, 
have gripped this problem and have made a lot of progress, but the price of that has 
sometimes been that they have become, as it were, the shop front of Prevent to a greater 
extent than they would like, or than we would like or, I suspect, our colleagues in 
DCLG would like.” Charles Farr, evidence to communities and local government 
select committee, 19 January 2010 (Communities and Local Government Committee 
2010) 
Notably the 2011 strategy retained a commitment to continue active engagement with local 
institutions that were potential sites of radicalisation. This included a strong local element 
through the proposal for a network of regional coordinators working with local partners, 
including local police forces, local authorities, schools, colleges and universities and youth 
services. However this was a departure from the previous approach to Prevent that had been 
gave more discretion and local leadership to local authorities. This regional structure was also 
a response to the ending of local area based grants after the 2010 election and the associated 
Local Strategic Partnership structures. The  revised structure centralised control whilst 
retaining structures for local engagement with institutions outside of the Home Office’s direct 
remit. As a result the approach sought to refresh the balance between engaging with the 
 
	
problem of radicalisation at local levels whilst improving government capability to control and 
coordinate activity. 
Separating Prevent and integration 
“The Prevent programme we inherited from the last Government was flawed. It 
confused the delivery of Government policy to promote integration with Government 
policy to prevent terrorism… [W]e will do more than any other Government before us 
to promote integration, but we will do so separately and differently from Prevent.” 
Theresa May, Home Secretary, forward to 2011 Prevent strategy (HM Government 
2011a) 
Home Office control was linked to the decision to separate Prevent from integration policy. 
This was set out in the 2011 Prevent strategy and was founded on a growing consensus that 
there was confusion about the relationship between the different pillars of Contest, Prevent and 
integration policy. This included criticism of the value of local integration and engagement 
work to preventing terrorism allied to concern that the focus on Prevent and Muslim 
communities had undermined necessary reform of community engagement policy. There was 
also growing concern that the conflict over Prevent was starting to damage the relationship 
between the Muslim community and public authorities with wider consequences for integration 
policy and local service delivery. This set of concerns resulted in support for separation of 
Prevent and integration policy as a necessary and practical step to improve the delivery of both 
strands. 
The competing strands of Prevent were incorporated in the interdepartmental Public Service 
Agreements (PSA) that underpinned funding and implementation of Prevent across 
government between 2008 and 2010. PSA 26 focused on reducing the risk to the UK and its 
interests overseas from international terrorism, informed the development of CONTEST and 
 
	
associated departmental Prevent action plans.30 The PSA had three target outcomes that framed 
the work of the three main departments involved in delivery of the strategy (HM Government 
2009a). The extent to which domestic Muslim communities reject and condemn violent-
extremism was prioritised by the DCLG, as well as the Department for Schools Children and 
Families and the Department for Culture Media and Sport. Reducing the risk of individuals 
who come into contact with key sectors and services, becoming or remaining violent extremists 
was prioritised by the Home Office. Making a positive contribution to the resilience to violent-
extremism of priority countries was prioritised by the FCO. 
From the outset there had been a close conceptual and organisational relationship between 
Prevent and the community cohesion agenda that sought to reform community engagement 
policy. For example, PSA 21 – ‘build more cohesive empowered and active community’ - 
applied to both the DCLG and Home Office and was often cited in parallel to the delivery of 
PSA 26 objective of improving resilience (Home Office 2008; Department for Communities 
and Local Government 2008a; HM Government 2008a and 2008b). However, there were also 
continual efforts to clarify the difference with cohesion policy by stressing Prevent’s focus on 
specific issues of violence and extremism (HM Government 2008a and 2008b). Nevertheless, 
the relationship between Prevent and community cohesion at local levels was actively 
acknowledged in the original decision to task DCLG and local authorities with a coordinating 
role. This was further reinforced and highlighted in 2008 guidance published by the DCLG in 
support of the delivery of its Prevent work which stated that: 
“We recognise all policy areas of Communities and Local Government have a 
contribution to make to help build capacity across society to challenge any threat to 
our core values in the future” (DCLG 2008) 
The 2009 Contest strategy did attempt to clarify the role of different agencies in delivering 
Prevent but continued to qualify this by highlighting the close relationship with other policy 
	
30 The PSA also formed part of the Home Office’s national community safety strategy 2008 – 2011 
 
	
areas, in particular community cohesion. The 2008 guidance situated Prevent within a wider 
set of social policy agendas, including the contemporaneous social exclusion and civic renewal 
agendas. The various intersecting areas of policy that were identified in the 2008 guidance 
(DCLG 2008) including inequalities, housing, cohesion and local empowerment and 
accountability; regeneration and employment. Crucially, local authorities tended to integrate 
community cohesion and Prevent through joint officer posts (Communities and Local 
Government 2010). Much Prevent activity undertaken by local authorities also built on pilot 
phase activities that themselves were often built on activities that had already been developed 
as part of the cohesion agenda (DCLG 2008b). Projects included youth diversionary activities, 
community engagement projects particularly with women’s groups, mosque governance and 
engagement and initiatives aimed at celebrating shared community identity.  
In some respects the separation of Prevent and integration was simultaneously a presentational 
and a substantive change. Prevent and community cohesion had always been intended as 
related but distinct, a view that was frequently reiterated, for example by John Denham in 2009:  
“Prevent is what it says. About preventing violent-extremism. It is a crime prevention 
programme—aiming to ensure that our fellow citizens do not commit act of violence 
against Britain or British people overseas and that people abide by British law.” John 
Denham (Communities and Home Affairs 2010) 
However, there was clearly growing confusion within DCLG about how to deal with Prevent, 
the Muslim faith and integration (Advisor 4) In this respect, one of the main justifications for 
separating the Prevent and integration was disengagement by the Muslim community due to 
confusion and suspicion about the aims and motivations of the respective policies. Charles Farr 
highlighted this problem in 2010 as part of the case for greater Home Office control. The 
formation of RICU itself had been intended to help improve messaging around Prevent and 
counter-terrorism and although its work remained relatively limited during this period it was 
given more priority under the 2011 strategy. This emphasised a need to improve messaging 
 
	
and communication and improve trust in the Prevent ‘brand’, noted by a number of respondents 
to this study and by the independent review of the policy conducted by Lord Carlyle in 2011. 
The practical problems associated with perceptions of Prevent were highlighted by Charles 
Farr: 
“I spend as much time as I can talking to people who want nothing to do with the 
Prevent programme, which seems to me as important as talking to people who want to 
engage with it. I have to say that an awful lot of time I find the reasons for their not 
wanting to engage are rooted in the misrepresentations which Prevent suffered from 
notably in the articles that the Guardian ran, to some degree based on the IRR report 
by Kundnani, who I think you took evidence from yesterday.” Charles Farr Evidence 
to DCLG Select Committee 19 January 2010 (Communities and Local Government 
Committee 2010) 
Notably however, many of the more significant community concerns about the aims and 
objectives Prevent were in practice linked to the Home Office strands of Contest. In particular 
trust in Prevent had been undermined by a series of accusations that it was a cover for covert 
surveillance of the community. This included the controversy over Project Champion that 
placed covert CCTV cameras in largely Muslim areas of Birmingham and Arun Kundnani’s 
allegations that Prevent projects were being used as ‘honey pots’ for intelligence gathering 
(Kundnani 2009). Kundnani’s accusation in part reflected the original Prevent objectives of 
improving soft intelligence and identifying individuals at risk, but claimed this was being done 
covertly rather than consensually. These criticisms were also repeated in the Communities and 
Local Government Committee review which noted that the suspicion had critically undermined 
trust in Prevent despite a lack of evidence (Communities and Local Government Committee 
2010).  
There was also the on-going suspicion amongst the community about the definition of 
extremism being used by Prevent. This came to a head in a high profile conflict between the 
 
	
DCLG under Hazel Blears and the MCB following the introduction of a harder definition of 
extremism. On 25th February 2009 after just over a year as Secretary of State, Hazel Blears 
gave a speech at the LSE titled ‘Many Voices: understanding the debate about preventing 
violent-extremism’ where she set out a distinction between Islam, Islamism and violent-
extremism (Blears 2009a). Blears argued that whilst jihadi ideas were separate from legitimate 
Islamic teachings it did have wider social and political roots that should be addressed. She gave 
a qualified endorsement of engagement with groups with conservative social views who 
opposed to violent-extremism. However she also directly challenged those who justified 
terrorism overseas, questioned Israel’s right to exist and promoted religious and cultural 
practices such as “forced marriage, female genital mutilation, or homophobia” (Blears 
2009a).31 
The speech set out a framework for the more selective community engagement strategy that 
had been signalled in the 2009 Contest published earlier that month. This suggests that the 
Home Office was increasingly influencing the DCLG approach to Prevent at this point. The 
intention to emphasise a more selective strategy was also illustrated by advance briefings to 
the media. On the day of the speech the Guardian reported, “Extremist Islamist groups are to 
be confronted by the government as part of a new strategy to draw a sharper distinction 
between right and wrong, the communities secretary, Hazel Blears, will say today.” (Watt 
2009). Similarly the Daily Mail also reported that “In a speech to be delivered tonight, she  will 
also signal a tough new line on contacts with individuals and organisations which promote 
extremism in a call on the Government to challenge the practices of groups outside British 
'core values'.” (Daily Mail 2009). The common reporting from very different editorial 
positions suggests the prior press briefing was of a more assertive approach to promoting 
British values. 
	
31 This shift took place whilst Sadiq Khan, a former chair of the MCB legal affairs committee, was Minister of 
State for Communities under Blears. 
 
	
This new and more assertive position was swiftly followed by formal disengagement from the 
MCB. On the 13th of March Blears wrote to the MCB Chair (Blears 2009b) withdrawing the 
MCBs membership of the faith communities consultative forum until clarified its commitment 
to non-violence. It was linked to the signing of the ‘Istanbul declaration’ by the MCB deputy 
secretary-general, Dr Daud Abdullah Abdullah (Blears 2009c). The Istanbul declaration was 
produced over the weekend of 14th and 15th of February (Law 2009) following the 2008 – 09 
Gaza war and subsequent Israeli blockade. This was part of the on-going cycle of violence that 
in this instance followed Hamas’ seizure of power in Gaza after contested Palestinian National 
Authority elections in 2006 and subsequent rocket attacks on Israel. 
The Istanbul declaration claimed there was an international conspiracy against the defence of 
Gaza and criticised neighbouring Arab states – primarily Egypt - for not opening crossings to 
allow supplies, including weapons, to enter. The preamble to the statement set out a view that 
essentially called for support for Gaza as a first step toward ending Israel as a self-determining 
Jewish state: 
“This statement is addressed to the Islamic Nation, its religious scholars, its rulers 
and its peoples. In it we congratulate the whole family of Islam on the manifest victory 
which Allah has granted us in the land of Gaza, a land of pride and dignity, over the 
Zionist Jewish occupiers. Allah has appointed it as the first step in the complete victory 
for all of Palestine and the holy places of the Muslims.” (Istanbul Declaration 2009) 
The government argued that as the MCB’s apparent support for a statement that called for 
attacks on Jews and British forces disqualified it as legitimate partner for government. 
However, the MCB claimed that this was part of the long standing intention by the Labour 
administration to side-line it for its legitimate criticism of government foreign policy. The 
reasons given by government focused on the implied support for violence against British troops 
and interests due to the UK’s support for Israel, including the following sections of the of the 
declaration (BBC 2009): 
 
	
"The obligation of the Islamic Nation to regard everyone standing with the Zionist 
entity, whether countries, institutions or individuals, as providing a substantial 
contribution to the crimes and brutality of this entity; the position towards him is the 
same as towards this usurping entity." 
"The obligation of the Islamic Nation to regard the sending of foreign warships into 
Muslim waters, claiming to control the borders and prevent the smuggling of arms to 
Gaza, is in effect a declaration of war, a new occupation, sinful aggression, and a 
clear violation of the sovereignty of the Nation, that must be rejected and fought by all 
means and ways." 
The conflict between the government and the MCB exacerbated wider conflict about the 
consistency and transparency of Prevent. This included concern that Prevent was being 
exploited by some groups to secure access, money and status at local and national levels and 
to exclude groups and interlocutors that were critical of foreign policy. These concerns became 
part of an debate within the Muslim community about the legitimacy of Prevent due to the 
perceived stigmatisation of Muslim identity and conflation with coercive surveillance. 
Organisations such as the Quilliam Foundation, a think tank set up by ex-Hizb ut-Tarir 
members to actively campaign against Islamist views, argued that organisations such as the 
MCB were trying to undermine Prevent to defend their own status. Lord Carlile also criticised 
the MCB for making unjustified claims that Prevent cast suspicion on all Muslims.  
The conflict meant that local Muslim community organisations faced a complex set of local 
and national political pressures. This was set out in a report by the An-Nisa Society, a Muslim 
community organisation based in north London: 
“Funding grassroots Muslim groups to deliver Prevent is unhelpful as it causes them 
to lose credibility and trust with the very groups the government wants them to engage. 
Hardened extremists are not likely to attend projects funded by the government. Nor 
are parents going to send their children to ‘preventative’ projects that will stigmatise 
 
	
them. There is so much hostility to the strategy amongst Muslims once they become 
aware of it, that local councils and funded groups finding implementation difficult, are 
resorting to disguising the source and objectives of the funding by being ‘economical’ 
with information and using misleading labels.” (An-Nisa 2009) 
The An-Nisa submission illustrates the breakdown in trust around the motives of Prevent. This 
included the persistent concern that a focus on moderate Muslims was a form of cultural and 
ideological surveillance that stigmatised Muslims and Islam through the implied link with 
extremism and terrorism.32 Other religious communities also opposed making links between 
religious integration and terrorism, most notably the Jewish Board of Deputies. The Deputies 
were supportive of Prevent due to their concerns about Islamist radicalisation and strongly 
backed the government’s disengagement with the MCB over the Istanbul declaration. 
However, they also criticised conflation of orthodox religious views, including those that 
espoused religious and cultural segregation, with the risk from terrorism and advocated a 
clearer line between issues of integration and political extremism. Whilst this was based on 
general principles it was also a specific defence of groups such as the strictly orthodox, and 
highly segregated Charedi Jewish communities: 
“Many Muslims may not be integrated, and may promote ideas that are antithetical to 
community cohesion, but are non-violent and are repelled by Islamism and Salafi 
jihadism. It is well to remember that the lead members of the 7/7 and Operation 
Crevice conspiracies came from well-integrated backgrounds. Neither is speaking 
English or wearing the veil the real issue. The issue is confronting an extremist and 
alien political ideology which promotes the supremacy of Islam over other faiths and 
democratic political systems, a core belief in anti-Semitism and the use of violence to 
	
32 Importantly John Denham when Secretary of State also argued that there needed to be a commensurate focus on 
far right extremism following the growing prominence of the English Defence League and made a direct link to 
radical Islamist extremism. 
 
	
achieve its ends.” Jewish board of deputies, written evidence to Committee, September 
2009 (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010) 
The separation from Prevent was also supported by advocates for reform of integration and 
community engagement policy. This centred on concerns that the negative politics of Prevent 
was undermining attempts to address complex and sensitive issues associated with certain 
religious or ethnic group. Individuals such as Ted Cantle criticised Prevent on the basis that it 
was focused on a single ethnic community that served to stigmatise and displace wider 
discussions about community integration. Groups and organisations were resistant or fearful 
of addressing concerns in partnership with authorities due to the risk of feeding into perceptions 
and potentially undermining confidence in the community about their own motives. In turn this 
had confused and ultimately delayed dealing with complex and sensitive issues around certain 
cultural practices, such as forced and cousin marriages and female genital mutilation. As a 
result, rather than empowering the community to address challenging issues community groups 
had found themselves in the position of defending the status of Muslims in broader society. 
Risk based rationalisation 
“The Home Office and CLG had not taken responsibility for what was going on at 
local level… There was no useful practical guidance, so it was not surprising that you 
had a mixture of the genuinely good, the benign but worthless and stuff that made 
community cohesion worse. There was probably only a small amount of genuine 
counter radicalisation work.” Government minister 
The Home Office’s model of targeting interventions on individuals or groups was positioned 
as a viable alternative to an emphasis on the indirect benefits of integration and engagement. 
The Home Office argued that local administration of funding had resulted in support for 
projects and activities that had limited impact on preventing terrorism. In contrast the Home 
Office, through its support for the Channel programme, was able to present quantitative 
measures of engagement as evidence of impact. There were still persistent concerns about the 
 
	
capability of organisations and agencies such as schools and local authorities and their level of 
commitment to deliver such an approach. Nevertheless, it was argued that a targeted approach 
would be a more effective use of resources. This approach gained further authority in the 
context of significant government spending cuts that was also a key factor in the DCLG support 
for Home Office leadership of Prevent and the separation from integration policy. 
Figure 7.1: Hansard mentions of 'Muslim community', 'Islam' and 'Radicalisation' 
 
 (parli-n-grams.puntofisso.net retrieved 22 February 2017) 
Parliamentary interest in radicalisation grew as a way of describing the complex set of issues 
associated with recruitment and extremism (Figure 7.1). The idea of radicalisation was central 
to the development of the Channel Programme that had been set up by the Association of Chief 
Police Officers in 2007 with funding from the Home Office. The objective was “to provide 
support to people at risk of being drawn into violent-extremism.” and was based on Multi 
Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPA) introduced in the 2003 Criminal Justice 
Act. Schemes included a coordinator and a Channel board, ostensibly led by the local authority, 
that brought together statutory agencies and services such as housing, health services and youth 
offending teams. Channel identified individuals ‘at risk’ and referred them to appropriate 
interventions such as counselling, faith guidance or more general civic engagement activities 
 
	
and work with mainstream services (HM Government 2010a). By 2011 it had dealt with 1,120 
cases (HM Government 2011b). 
The OSCT advocated a targeted risk based approach to Prevent activities that could 
demonstrate a more direct impact on the risk of terrorism. The OSCT argued that Prevent 
should focus on disrupting the individual process of radicalisation rather than dealing with the 
wider root causes of radicalisation. This in part represented a failure to demonstrate evidence 
that a longer-term model of community mobilisation in support of social change was working, 
particularly given the growing conflict over Prevent itself. The difficulty of demonstrating the 
impact of Prevent was highlighted by Communities and Local Government and Home Affairs 
select committees in 2009 and 2010 respectively and by the subsequent review of Prevent in 
2011. There were persistent criticisms of the quality of monitoring and evaluation, the lack of 
focus on outcomes and absence of clarity at a national level of how Prevent money was being 
spent.  
Home Office evidence tended to focus on outcomes, in contrast to the process-oriented metrics 
being used by local authorities for NI35. In support of its position the OSCT argued that it was 
working to inform local agencies about local risks whilst highlighting the role of the Channel 
programme and other local mentoring and referral initiatives to provide targeted interventions. 
Channel provided figures on the number of individuals who had been diverted from harm 
following a risk assessment. Even though significant questions remained about the quality of 
models and referral systems the OSCT also draw on the growing body of evidence about the 
nature of the problem of radicalisation in support of the approach. This included the original 
work that framed the problem as a targeted issue of recruitment rather than a broader problem 
with the whole Muslim community. Furthermore, the OSCT, under the leadership of Charles 
Farr, could also draw on professional expertise and status to justify its approach. 




 (Institute for Fiscal Studies 2015) 
A targeted approach aligned with the Coalition government’s spending priorities post-2010. 
The 2010 comprehensive spending review resulted in an overall cut in spending of 9.1% across 
departments for the 2010-15 parliament. The DCLG agreed the largest departmental budget 
cut that resulted in a 50% cut to communities funding for coordination of local services and a 
cut of 27% to direct grants to local government for delivery of services (Figure 7.2). The Home 
Office itself saw a reduction of 24.9% and Department for Education 6.4%. In addition central 
government also withdrew from local decision-making in order to push accountability for 
spending decisions, and cuts, onto local authorities. In this context whilst Prevent funding was 
relatively minor in overall budgets it was an area of discretionary spending over which 
departments and local authorities and schools had control. For example, for the Department of 
Education spending on schools was protected meaning that its cuts came from discretionary 
activities, such as Prevent. 
In the new fiscal environment the incoming Secretary of State for Communities and Local 
Government, Eric Pickles, supported the proposals as an opportunity to reduce the workload 
of the department. In this context Pickles took the view that the controversy around Prevent 
 
	
outweighed the merits of local authority and DCLG involvement. The revised strategy did 
commit the DCLG to on-going engagement with the Muslim community beyond Prevent. In 
addition to general commitments on integration the 2011 strategy proposed that ‘Policy and 
programmes to deal with extremism and with extremist organisations more widely are not part 
of Prevent and will be coordinated from DCLG.’ (HM Government 2011a). However, there 
was a rapid restructuring of activities to focus on new priorities, including the citizen services 
and big society agenda, whilst downgrading or closing units that had primarily been working 
on Prevent. One observer describes this process: 
“Eric Pickles thought Prevent was a disaster that did more harm than good. He 
thought you could do mosque open days, which he did in Bradford, but that the whole 
securitisation of communities was a flop. The Prevent unit was slimmed right down 
and the bulk of the cash went off to national citizen services.” Advisor 4 
The rationalisation was also supported by a number of the advisors who had been involved 
throughout the development of Prevent, the Communities and Local Government Committee 
and the independent review of Prevent (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010; 
HM Government 2011c). The common theme in these reports highlighted the problems that 
agencies and authorities were facing when dealing with a complex and sensitive agenda that 
was outside of their normal capabilities. This had led to wasting of money and the potential to 
be actively damaging to the agenda’s core objectives. One advisor who had been involved and 
broadly supportive of an effective Prevent programme from the outset articulated a view of the 
decision as a tactical step to limit potential wider damage: 
“For me this is about compartmentalising the agenda and not about saying there are 
simply no connections; but when it comes to policy how do you deal with the issue so 
that teachers and police officers don’t feel that they are being asked to do something 
beyond their skill set and are using the skills they do have effectively.” Advisor 1 
 
	
There was still a dispute over the notional model of radicalisation that was being used by the 
Home Office due to its association with a conveyor belt model. The model incorporated a range 
of ideological, identity and behavioural precursors that described a vulnerability to recruitment. 
The Home Office largely bypassed the debate about causality by framing it as a risk assessment 
tool to be used by professionals to guide interventions. However, there was on-going concern 
about the robustness of referral mechanisms, the extent of community involvement and the 
potential to stigmatise individuals if interventions were mishandled, particularly in schools. 
However, many of the broader criticisms about causality also applied to longer-term root causal 
approaches. For example, the allocation of funding to local authorities based on the size of the 
Muslim community population was criticised for lacking an empirical base and for stigmatising 
the whole community. Some funding opportunities for community engagement and 
development work were retained, including community safety work and community cohesion 
work and engagement with religious institutions and groups. 
Engaging education 
The new model was founded on a centralising administration to improve coordination of policy 
alongside actively engaging reticent sectors, particularly education. The revised 2011 strategy 
signalled an intention to improve the engagement of institutions that were potentially 
radicalising ‘settings’ or key points of contact with young people, such as schools, colleges, 
universities and prisons, in Prevent. This in part followed research into situational approaches 
to radicalisation that was commissioned by the Home Office and published in 2011 (Bouhana 
& Wikstrom 2011). This work emphasised the importance of the dynamics of placed as neutral 
and active radicalising settings and vectors for interventions (Bouhana & Wikstrom 2011). 
However, there had been resistance that was linked to principled, cultural and practical 
concerns about the implications of being involved in a security agenda, particularly in 
education. This included managing controversy about definitions of extremism and accusations 
of spying and concern about practical capacity and capability and implications of referring 
individuals to programmes such as channel.  
 
	
The Department for Education had emphasised the role of citizenship education in preventing 
extremism. However, there were persistent concerns about the ability of teachers to address 
complex subjects such as the Iraq war and the relationship between Islam and the west. Schools 
also reported significant challenges in terms of managing concerns of parents and pupils about 
surveillance and stigmatisation associated with Prevent, even when framed as a duty of care. 
In practice Prevent was rarely, if ever considered alongside the Department for Education’s 
priorities of academic attainment or schools reform. Similarly, the involvement of local 
authorities had also continued to be sensitive, despite the availability of money and extensive 
work to encourage engagement. For example a number of local authorities deliberately chose 
to either avoid the agenda entirely or focus on the cohesion parts with little or no mention of 
Prevent (Regional government official). 
The 2011 strategy’s focus on higher education was based on concern about radical Islamist 
speakers on campus and the risk of recruitment via student groups or networks. In particular 
the issue of campus radicalisation was highlighted following the prosecution of a former UCL 
student, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, who confessed to having a bomb on board an aircraft. 
The representative group, Universities UK (UUK), had engaged with previous Prevent 
initiatives, such as the DIUS toolkit on managing good relations on campus in 2007. However, 
the 2011 Prevent strategy signalled an intent to actively engage universities in local Prevent 
structures. There was qualified support where Prevent was framed as an issue of a duty of care 
or law enforcement against terrorist recruiters. However, issues of non-violent extremism at 
universities presented challenges around the need for universities to balance responsibilities in 
relation to incitement to hatred and glorification of terrorism against a legal duty to promote 
freedom of speech within the law.33 
	
33 The legal duty to promote freedom of speech on campus had been introduced by the Thatcher government in the 
Education (No 2) Act (Section 43) in 1986 in response to student union opposition to conservative politicians and 
ministers on university campuses. 
 
	
For example, following Abdulmutallab’s arrest in December 2009, UUK produced guidance 
which focused on clarifying the law as it related to universities: 
“Following the events of December 2009 it became clear that there was little guidance 
available to universities in this area, and that it would be helpful to provide greater 
clarity in relation to the legal framework within which universities must operate, and 
more information about how other universities had been addressing these challenges.” 
Forward by Professor Malcolm Grant, Provost UCL (UUK 2011) 
The approach emphasised the high value the sector placed on protecting a culture of academic 
freedom and their legal autonomy from government. The student movement, including 
individual student unions, the National Union of Students and the Federation of Societies for 
Islamic Students were vocally opposed to Prevent. For many universities the main challenge 
centred on managing campus tensions between Muslim and Jewish students over Israel and its 
relationship with the Palestinian territories (UUK 2011). However, Islamists did have presence 
on some UK campuses through organisations such as Hizb ut-Tarir as well as various and 
formal and informal Islamic student societies, with examples of radical Islamist speakers being 
invited to events. As a result the sector’s reticence was highlighted by the OSCT and the 
incoming Conservative led government. Similarly organisations such as Quilliam, the Henry 
Jackson society and ‘Student Rights’ and the academic Anthony Glees  highlighted the 
presence of radical speakers on campuses and instances of UK graduates being recruited into 
terrorism (Glees 2005). 
Managing community engagement 
“[Our definition of extremism is} vocal or active opposition to fundamental British 
values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and 
tolerance of different faiths and beliefs. We also include in our definition of extremism 
calls for the death of members of our armed forces, whether in this country or 
 
	
overseas.” Definition of extremism used in 2011 Prevent strategy (HM Government 
2011a) 
The Home Office’s authority over Prevent was also founded on the need to manage the political 
risks associated with a more selective approach to engagement. Local authorities had done 
community-mapping exercises and established forums and partnerships to engage with local 
community organisations and representatives. The revised strategy, driven by the Conservative 
leadership of the Home Office, emphasised combating non-violent extremism by disengaging 
from groups who didn’t actively support shared British values. However, this was set against 
the Coalition government’s shared focus on civil liberties, an issues that was of particular 
importance to the Liberal Democrats. This tension served to strengthen the Home Office’s 
position in order to balance the views of both sides. On the one hand the Home Office aimed 
to stop Prevent funding going to politically risky groups by centralising administration, away 
from local decision-making. At the same the civil liberties dimension was reassured through 
an emphasis on the legal rights around extremism and freedom of conscience, alongside a 
narrower scope for Prevent that was separate from integration policy.  
The compromise between these two positions can be seen in the decision to not work with 
groups who ‘actively’ opposed key British values (HM Government 2011a). This  responded 
to the Conservative party’s support for a robust approach to a wider set of extremist views as 
part of a longer-term solution to radicalisation and an issue of principle to defend British values. 
Supporters of the approach included senior Conservatives, including David Cameron and 
Michael Gove as well as the incoming Home Secretary, Theresa May. For example, the 
Conservative manifesto had proposed banning organisations ‘which advocate hate or the 
violent overthrow of our society, such as Hizb-ut-Tarir’.34 However, the coalition agreement 
with the Liberal Democrats was founded on a shared commitment to liberal principles, a 
common theme in the Conservative manifesto. For example the Liberal Democrat manifesto 
	
34 As with Tony Blair’s stated intention to proscribe Hizb-ut-Tarir in 2005 the Conservative proposal was never 
implemented. In the absence of a connection to terrorism it was neither politically viable given the coalition with 
the Liberal Democrats or legally possible due to the Human Rights Act. 
 
	
was committed to freedom of speech and constructive community engagement and the party 
adopted a more liberal position in relation non-violent extremism. 
The Conservative manifesto emphasised a number of liberal themes outside of the main focus 
on fiscal consolidation (The Conservative Party 2010). This was particularly prominent in 
relation to foreign affairs which included a strong defence of open societies and liberal values. 
David Cameron set out the idea of muscular liberalism as part of a values based defence against 
terrorism and radicalisation in his ‘Munich speech’, February 2011. The speech was his first 
on security and terrorism as Prime Minister and reiterated an agenda of assertively promoting 
liberal values: 
“But I believe a genuinely liberal country does much more; it believes in certain values 
and actively promotes them. Freedom of speech, freedom of worship, democracy, the 
rule of law, equal rights regardless of race, sex or sexuality.  It says to its citizens, this 
is what defines us as a society: to belong here is to believe in these things.  Now, each 
of us in our own countries, I believe, must be unambiguous and hard-nosed about this 
defence of our liberty.” (Cameron 2011) 
A more robust approach was also promoted by those who advocated challenging Islamist ideas 
as the central cause of terrorism. Prominent advocates during the period were the Quilliam 
Foundation, and its founders Ed Hussain and Majid Nawaz. Hussain came to prominence in 
2007 with the publication of his book the Islamist, a memoir of his participation in Hizb ut-
Tarir when at college in the 1990s, and his subsequent exit and conversion to Sufi Islam. Nawaz 
was also a former member of Hizb ut-Tarir who had spent time in jail in Egypt. They founded 
the Quilliam Foundation in 2008 to undertake counter extremism work and drew on their 
authenticity as ex-radicals and Muslims to secure financial support from a range of sources, 
including the Home Office. They framed radicalisation explicitly in terms of Islamism, which 
they defined as a fundamentalist anti democratic political ideology that was being promoted in 
the UK and Europe. 
 
	
Both Quilliam and Policy Exchange argued that working with Islamist groups was short-
sighted and encouraged a more selective values based approach to engagement. Notably 
Quilliam wrote a letter to the incoming Home Office minister criticising various Islamic 
institutions, including the MCB and the Islamic Foundation, for politicising the spiritual 
concept of the ‘Ummah’ and tacitly or actively supporting extremist ideas. Similarly the 2009 
Policy Exchange report ‘Choosing our friends wisely’ (Maher & Frampton 2009), authored by 
Shiraz Maher, criticised local authorities and police forces for working with Islamist groups. 
This included the Salafist STREET project in Lambeth, the Muslim Contact Unit and funding 
of the Islamist Cordoba foundation by Tower Hamlets council. Examples of links to the MCB 
were also criticised. For example, £38,500 of Prevent funding from Bradford City council to 
the Islamic Society of Britain (ISB) to ‘actively engage with young people to discuss their 
identity and to become active role models in local and national democratic institutions’ was 
criticised on the basis that the acting and outgoing Presidents of the ISB were affiliated to the 
MCB.  
There had been persistent criticism that the general focus on Islam had stigmatised the Muslim 
community. The emphasis on Islam was also criticised for focusing funding on religious groups 
to the detriment of other groups. In this context some argued for more targeting of interventions 
based on assessments of beliefs, behaviours or other indicators. See for example Ed Hussein 
of Quilliam’s calls for better risk based targeting:  
“[Prevent] should target those communities in which there is a serious terrorism 
problem. My hunch is at times it is not targeting those communities in particular and 
hence this broad brush approach. That comes about as a result of not understanding 
where the problem lies.” Ed Hussein (quoted in Communities and Local Government 
Committee 2010 p47) 
Equally many critics of the focus on the Muslim community criticised more targeting and 
advocated an approach that focused on a wider set of community experiences and long-term 
 
	
indirect solutions. See for example evidence given to Communities and Local Government 
Committee that advocated for a focus on a wide set of indirect factors: 
“The causal link between recruitment and underlying socio-economic conditions 
leading to vulnerability seem to have been included but not emphasised adequately by 
government in its approach, preferring to focus on security and religion. Problems of 
discrimination, hate crime, deprivation, identity and the impact of an unpopular 
foreign policy need greater emphasis. All these factors make the vulnerable more 
susceptible to ideologies of violence and add to feelings of disconnection from the state 
and a government failing to meet needs.” Evidence from International School for 
Communities, Rights and Inclusion (Communities and Local Government Committee 
2010 p25) 
Conservative criticism of ‘multi-culturalism’ was also a factor in the centralisation of Prevent 
under Home Office control. The Conservative manifesto did briefly note community cohesion, 
alongside other dimensions of the public realm, as a dimension of effective national security 
(The Conservative Party 2010). The Conservative critique of multi-culturalism focused on the 
accommodation of separate ethic identities, primarily by local authorities that were often, 
though not exclusively, Labour led and formed the majority of areas receiving Prevent funding. 
These criticisms were supported by evidence given to the Community and Local Government 
Committee’s review that highlighted how Prevent funding based on religious identity had been 
channelled via existing relationships. This had reinforced the role of faith leaders as community 
representatives and gatekeepers with money, prestige and access. The report argued that this 
hindered reform of community engagement to the detriment of addressing the inclusion of 
disaffected young people (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010).  
In some respects funding went to organisations that were important and influential partners 
which also meant that allocations were often the result of local political competition and rivalry. 
 
	
As noted by one civil servant, when reflecting on the extent to which local authorities engaged 
with the longer-term objectives of social change: 
“In most of the places where it most mattered, there was strong Muslim political 
representation on the local authority representing the status quo, not change.” Civil 
servant 2 
Many in the Muslim community criticised Prevent for reinforcing existing patterns of 
community authority and representation. This included an over emphasis on religious 
institutions and a reliance on conservative leadership that had failed to engage younger 
generations of British Muslim and contributed to the vacuum of authority that had opened the 
door to extremists and radicals. This lent further credence to the need for reform around the 
types of groups and organisations that were engaged in Prevent nationally and locally. 
Although this line of criticism from within the Muslim community was not necessarily 
supportive of an ideologically selective approach it did serve to justify reform of partnerships 
and engagement in Prevent. This perspective is illustrated by this contribution to the DCLG 
select committee review: 
“The re-emergence of faith leaders as community representatives will have far-
reaching, long-term consequences on disaffected young people who have never nor 
will ever consider these faith leaders to represent their experiences or interests.” Peace 
Maker, written evidence (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010) 
The Home Office, through the 2009 Contest strategy, had sought to develop a clearer 
frameworks for selective engagement. This included a more detailed articulation of the nature 
of the radical Islamist ideologies associated with terrorist groups that drew on a growing 
volume of research into the nature of radical Islamism and jihadism.  Whilst the exact nature 
of the link between extremist ideas and violence was still contested, the OSCT under Charles 
Farr had supported the need to challenge a wider set of non-violent but extremist views. OSCT 
argued that engaging with ideas before they were violent and working with groups that actively 
 
	
promoted shared values was the best model for long-term prevention. This was a counter-point 
to an approach that relied on a neutral approach to extremism and engagement to address the 
root causes of grievances, as illustrated by this comment from 2009: 
“There are ideologies of extremism which lend themselves to violence and by limiting 
yourself to challenging violent-extremism you are operating too far down the conveyor 
belt of radicalisation.” Charles Farr, 26 February 2009 (Home Affairs Committee 
2009) 
In practice the Home Office did not propose moving beyond the legal frameworks associated 
with incitement to hatred and glorification of terrorism. The 2011 strategy reiterated a general 
definition of extremism that continued to be framed by general concepts of British values, 
including democracy, human rights and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs plus calls for 
the death of members of British armed forces. However, the definition was qualified by 
reference to active and vocal opposition to these values that allowed for more scope for a 
nuanced and tactical assessment of different groups. For example this was used as justification 
to exclude proselytising Islamist groups, such as Brixton mosque and the Street project, from 
involvement in Prevent funded work. One influential analogy at the time was that it was akin 
to working with far-right organisations to divert people from violent far-right groups. The shift 
away from Islamist groups was also positioned as an evolution of the programme that had 
developed new partners that shared the long-term objectives and political values of Prevent. 
As noted in the independent review by Lord Carlile: 
“Government, local authorities and the police do not need (if ever they have needed) 
to facilitate or work in partnership with extremists: a steady stream of new and non-
extremist groups, with the knowledge and integrity to assist the authorities in the aims 
of Prevent and associated work, is stepping up to the plate.” (HM Government 2011c) 
However, the managed approach to engagement adopted by the Home Office stopped short of 
a more proactive campaign against Islamist groups. This received notable criticism from 
 
	
Quilliam that was set out in a private briefing note to the incoming ministers in 2010. However, 
the Liberal Democrats, as well as some Conservative MPs opposed broader definitions of 
extremism as part of a liberal civil liberties agenda, particularly where this was seen to be 
targeting conservative interpretations of faith. In addition there were also advocates for a 
tactical approach that avoided alienating the broader community. Advocates for this approach 
included Sayeeda Warsi who joined Cabinet in 2010 as minister without portfolio and went on 
to become Minister of State for Faith and Communities and sat in Cabinet. The Home Office 
itself also retained a commitment to means based community engagement by local police 
forces, including with those who might otherwise be considered extremist, to support counter-
terrorism work. 
The funding climate was also a helpful opportunity to manage political disputes over extremism 
by framing decisions in terms of value for money rather than ideologies and beliefs. 
Centralisation helped to address criticisms that funding was being used as a form of community 
patronage at local levels, or by the government, to reward compliant and supportive groups. 
For example: 
“First of all, let me be clear: the groups have had funding withdrawn for all sorts of 
reasons, of which being extremist is not actually the principal one. Some groups have 
had funding withdrawn because Ministers felt, based on the information we provided 
them, that they didn't offer value for money, that they simply weren't addressing the 
issue in a way that was justified or that justified the amount of taxpayers' money that 
was going on them.” Charles Farr (Home Affairs Committee 2011) 
Box 7.2: Home Office Funding to the Quilliam 
Foundation 2009 to 2012 (Home Office 2014) 
Financial year Funding amount (£) 
 
	
2008 to 2009 674,608.00 
2009 to 2010 396,882.80 
2010 to 2011 158,896.66 
2011 to 2012 26,993.34 
The decision to end core funding to the Quilliam foundation is one high profile case that lends 
some credence to the issue of value for money in funding decisions, as well as the need for 
political balance. The decision to end core funding was taken in 2010, prior to their critical 
briefing to the incoming minister (See Box 7.2 for a breakdown of core grant funding to 
Quilliam from the Home Office). The decision was subsequently justified by Home Office 
Minister Damian Green on the basis that it was part of the normal funding development cycle 
and that the organisation had not been entirely successful in delivering its original core aims 
and had pivoted into new terrain (HC deb, 15 Mar 2011, c23WH). This highlighted Quilliam’s 
work on a broader range of activities beyond the original objectives of community engagement 
to challenge the ideology of terrorism and extremism. Quilliam had subsequently developed 
itself as a think tank and had failed to establish credibility amongst the broader Muslim 
community. This credibility gap was due to their perceived proximity to government, their 
previous history as extremists and a polarising style that alienated many even where there was 
sympathy for their objectives.  
The qualified approach adopted by the Home Office also reflected the continued debate about 
the empirical link between extremism, the causes of terrorism and effective solutions. Selective 
engagement was criticised for lacking an empirically justified link between terrorism and 
radical political or religious views. This included criticism of inclusion of theological and 
ideological factors in a simplistic conveyor belt of radicalisation that underplayed the root 
causes of grievance and wider processes of identity formation. The criticism of the model was 
 
	
prominent in evidence given to the DCLG select committee inquiry into Prevent. Arun 
Kundnani argued that Prevent had failed to empower communities to oppose to extremism and 
had instead chosen to engage in superficial behaviour modification: 
“There does seem to be a strong view amongst a lot of people I have spoken to that a 
key part of it is a sense of political disempowerment and a sense that the British 
political system is pointless and does not listen to them... Unfortunately, too much of 
the way Prevent is thought about now is not about empowerment but about behaviour 
modification.” Arun Kundnani (Communities and Local Government Committee 
2010) 
At the same time many who were sympathetic to this view also acknowledged the changed the 
political context for Prevent and were ultimately supportive of the Home Office approach to 
managing definitions of extremism. This tacit acceptance in part represented a tactical retreat 
that had traded separation of integration policy for a more robust approach to non-violent 
extremism in Prevent itself. Many of the advisors, who were increasingly side-lined in 
decision-making, continued to recommend a tactical approach that prioritised nuanced 
engagement with the Muslim community. At the same time they argued that a centralised focus 
on non-violent extremism that didn’t actively develop a broader base of support amongst the 
Muslim community was unlikely to resolve suspicions of Prevent and of initiatives such as 
Channel. One respondent to this study described what they saw as the negative consequences 
of the more selective approach to engagement: 
“I think that the people who lost out were the Deobandi, which I think was tragic for 
the government to lose because they run the madrasah and they will be producing the 
next generation of imams in this country, not the Barelvi as they don’t have many 
institutions, only one or two. And I think they are people we could have won over but 
we alienated. I think others who lost out are the moderates in the Ikhwan Jamaat 
camp.” Advisor 3 
 
	
The more limited approach to engagement was also supported by the DCLG in order to manage 
political risks associated with Prevent. Following the resignation of Hazel Blears, John 
Denham had sought to diffuse some of the tensions around Prevent. This included efforts to 
highlight the issue of far right extremism in Prevent to balance community concerns about the 
narrow focus on Islam, and renewing engagement with the MCB. The MCB were 
reincorporated into the faiths consultative forum in 2010, following mediation by the Church 
of England with the Jewish Board of Deputies. This followed work by the DCLG to clarify the 
MCB’s governance structure and a public rejection of Istanbul Declaration. Denham also 
actively highlighted the issue of far right extremism following street protests by the English 
Defence League targeted at Muslims and Islamic places of worship and he drew parallels 
between the different poles of extremism. However, although far right was included in the 2011 
strategy and Channel referrals, the OSCT advocated retaining the focus on Islamist terrorism.  
The 2011 Prevent strategy also committed the DCLG to undertake separate work to deal with 
extremism. DCLG prioritised managing its own political risks, with Conservative ministers 
adopting a position of selective engagement whilst Liberal Democrat ministers maintained 
wider community links. This also entailed a shift away from mechanisms such as the faiths 
consultative forum with a preference for more ad hoc engagement. Although this was justified 
on the basis of value for money it also allowed a more tactical approach to engagement. The 
decision to close the forum was justified by Liberal Democrat Minister Andrew Stunell in the 
following statement: 
“It did not add value to the effective arrangements that Departments already have in 
place for consulting faith communities on policy. Our preference is to work with faith 
communities in a manner that is strategic and appropriate for particular situations. 
My Department will continue to liaise individually with national faith communities 
that provided members of the Council, and to convene ad hoc groupings to discuss 
policy as necessary. Officials from various Departments will continue to attend 
meetings of the Faith Communities Forum of the Inter Faith Network for the United 
 
	
Kingdom, in order to engage with faith communities collectively.” Andrew Stunell, 
Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Communities and Local Government (HC Deb, 23 
June 2011, c440W) 
Conclusion 
Decisions during this period responded to the growing conflict over the policy by moving away 
from a distributed approach and strengthening central control. The Home Office gained 
leadership of the policy with a mandate to improve the coherence of national and local 
implementation. At the same time the scope of agenda retreated from broader questions about 
the root causes of grievances and alienation in preference for a focus on diverting individuals 
at risk of bring drawn into terrorism. The 2011 strategy retained the view that integration was 
fundamental to its longer term aims, but the decision to adopt a narrower approach was an 
explicit attempt to avoid the conflict impacting on Prevent and other areas of social policy. 
Notably however, the decision to adopt a more assertive approach to non-violent extremism 
was actually limited in its impact by the decision to separate Prevent and integration policy and 
the Coalition partnership’s own liberal foundations.  
These decisions represented a tactical compromise that sought to manage conflict over the 
policy by narrowing its scope in the context of reduced public funding. However, the 
compromise also moved the policy away from the challenges that had originally its motivated 
development. The failure to achieve a consensus over the development of shared social and 
political values was a problem that Prevent sought to address. Furthermore the failure to resolve 
mistrust of government policy, including amongst the Muslim community and critics of 
multiculturalism, was also a failure against one of its original motivations. Neither did the new 
approach fully resolve the problem of how to secure effective consensual engagement in the 
policy from a wider range of government departments and agencies beyond the Home Office. 
Therefore whilst the shift represented a tactical compromise that enabled a targeted it failed to 










Chapter 8: Institutional change 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the institutional features of the development of Prevent. In particular it 
shows how the size and structure of an evolving policy community, including evolving patterns 
of institutional support for the competing models, shaped Prevent (Heclo & Wildavsky; Rhodes 
1997; Sabatier & Weible 2007; Hall & Taylor 1986). The distributed model John attracted 
support as a way of rapidly broadening the scope of security policy that contrasted with the 
institutional limits of the centralised model Thomas. In particular, the focus on broadening 
institutional engagement, particularly at local levels, meant that a consensual model was a 
tactical necessity. However, the focus on the tactical motivations for engagement, captured by 
the focus on violent extremism, also limited the depth of institutional trust in the new policy 
community. This failure meant that there were persistent questions about the motivations of 
members of the policy community and, by extension, the shared aims and objectives of Prevent. 
The resultant conflict led to support for a tactical compromise between supporters of the two 
models that narrowed the scope of Prevent in 2011. 
Prevent was heavily influenced by the structure of engagement between government and the 
Muslim community. Political conflict over the narrow enforcement-led model Thomas in 
Chapter 5 motivated the development of a broader policy community founded on distributed 
and consensual institutional relationships. This structure was promoted by the Labour 
government in Chapter 6 as a tactical measure for dealing with the immediacy and complexity 
of the terrorist threat and its wider politics. The rapid expansion of the policy community 
engaged a wider range of agencies and community groups and addressed the need for 
demonstrable short-term action. It also provided a rationale for engaging government 
departments and local agencies, including local authorities, as well as Muslim community 
groups in a programme of collective action to isolate extremists. The expanded institutional 
 
	
reach enabled government to engage with wider and highly complex questions of social 
inclusion, identity and institutional reform.  
At the same time it was the distributed structure of the policy community that led to the 
compromise approach described in Chapter 7. The values based conflict within the policy 
community led to a tactical split in support for model John toward strengthening the authority 
of central government in decision-making. At the same time the compromise approach was 
also rooted in the institutional politics of the Coalition government. The Conservative party 
supported a centralised approach that removed local discretion over community engagement 
and funding and was more assertive toward non-violent extremism. At the same time the 
Liberal Democrats supported a narrower scope for Prevent that helped to protect a private rights 
based model of extremism. The broader policy community, including supporters of both 
models, supported clarifying the scope of Prevent, including the principles for engagement 
whilst limiting the wider political risks to integration policy. As a result separating Prevent 
from integration policy allowed for more assertive central government leadership but at the 
cost of the breadth and depth of institutional support and engagement. 
This chapter shows how the institutional foundations of Prevent centred on tactical and 
principled differences about the appropriate constraints and authority of government decision-
making. This came to the fore in relation to conflicting liberal values related to the tolerance 
of non-violent extremism, including socially conservative religious views. In this respect most 
decision-making in Prevent was constrained by the need to balance street level expansion of  
the policy community against wider political scrutiny of its membership. In particular the 
Muslim community held a dual status, as both targets for change and partners in the process 
that increased the sensitivity about their status in the policy community. This included scrutiny 
of the motivations and values of the organisations involved in Prevent nationally and locally, 
both amongst the wider the Muslim community, the media and parliament. This scrutiny 
exerted pressure on the Muslim community and government to disengage from Prevent that 
 
	
limited the scope for government to lead institutional change across a broader agenda without 
increasing conflict.  
Institutional limits of model Thomas 
“We were starting to pick [Prevent] up early but the reality was it wasn't solely ours… 
Some of my colleagues in the enforcement side were reactive and weren't necessarily 
going as far as thinking downstream about a long-term systemic problem.” Chief 
Police Officer 
Chapter 5 showed that Prevent originated out of the institutional limits of a narrow institutional 
model. At first security policy-making was led by a relatively narrow enforcement community 
centred on the Home Office. The enforcement community had received significant political 
support, including the extension of enforcement powers and the decision to coordinate a whole 
government approach through the Contest strategy. However, this support, combined with the 
political conflict over the invasion of Iraq exposed the political and legal limits of the approach. 
These limits, combined with the complexity of home grown recruitment, lent authority to 
street-level feedback that emphasised the need for more active engagement with the Muslim 
community. This included feedback from police forces about the operational problem of 
gathering intelligence on terrorist networks and from Labour MPs who were concerned about 
the electoral impact of political alienation. As a result the decision to prioritise Prevent in 2004 
originated out of the limits of the enforcement community. 
As demonstrated in Chapters 5 and 6, the government continued to emphasise strong 
enforcement powers, such as Labour’s strong political defence of the 2000 and 2001 Terrorism 
Acts. However, the decision to move leadership of security policy from the Home Office to the 
Cabinet Office in 2002 was the first recognition of the limits of a narrow enforcement approach. 
The decision to give the Cabinet Office a role under the leadership of Tony Blair was intended 
to help coordinate government resources due to significance of the terrorist threat and its 
political profile. At first this focused on working with departments that were relevant to the 
 
	
protect and prepare strands of Contest, in particular the emergency services and transport 
infrastructure. In practice, the enforcement community, through the Home Office and the 
intelligences agencies and the Association of Chief Police Officers, continued to coordinate 
security policy. In this respect Cabinet Office leadership helped to extended the authority of 
the enforcement community by drawing other departments into their decisions. 
Chapter 5 shows that members of the enforcement community actively pushed for increased 
capacity in order to manage the complexity of home-grown recruitment. At the same time these 
concerns established the operational and political boundaries of the enforcement community’s 
ability to deal with the threat. The complexity of the threat was noted in the intelligence 
assessment of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and was reinforced by the series of arrests (see 
Chapter 5). Importantly however Manningham-Buller’s own 2003 speech explicitly 
highlighted the problem of recruitment by extremist and terrorist groups and the challenge this 
presented to the security services’ capacity to identify threats. By linking the impact and 
effectiveness of enforcement with political dynamics of alienation she set out the limits of a 
narrow enforcement approach. This theme was also prominent in the 2004 Home Office 
briefing to the Cabinet that supported the decision to prioritise Prevent (UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office and Home Office 2004; Manningham-Buller 2003).  
The enforcement community was also divided over whether it should take the attitudes of the 
Muslim community into account in its approach. At one end the operational assessment of the 
threat undertaken by the security services and the Home Office acknowledged the role that 
Muslim social, religious and ethnic identities played in recruitment. Similarly, street level 
feedback also raised concern that mistrust in the legitimacy of enforcement was undermining 
flows of intelligence from the Muslim community. Both dimensions were supported by the 
recommendations of the MacPherson report that emphasised the need for forces to actively 
consider how patterns of institutional racism shaped minority experiences of policing 
(MacPherson 1999). However, there was clearly on-going local and national support for 
extensive use of strong enforcement powers that placed the problem of community concerns a 
 
	
distant second. This sentiment was illustrated by Hazel Blears’ evidence to the Home Affairs 
committee in 2005 where she said increased policing of the Muslim community was inevitable 
given the security environment. 
In practice Chapter 5 showed that the enforcement community reached the limits of its 
institutional authority due to growing operational, political and legal scrutiny. They were 
restricted by internal concern about the legitimacy of enforcement amongst the Muslim 
community, nor did they have the capacity to address growing political concerns about the 
causes and politics of community alienation. This included the growing media and political 
interest in radical Islamists in the UK, including the street protests in late 2004 and early 2005, 
allied to attacks in Turkey in 2003 and Madrid in 2004. At the same time there was no appetite 
in parliament for further extensions to powers of detention, despite the Labour government’s 
large majority. The 2004 Law Lords’ judgement established the legal limits of detention and 
the scope of derogations from human rights standards. Similarly the External Reviewer also 
highlighted the need to limit the use of stop and search powers. These factors exposed the limits 
of the model Thomas’s institutional capacity to deal with growing political scrutiny of the 
response. 
Support for model John 
“I think in some ways the initial integration approach was inevitable because it would 
have been difficult to do it another way.” Advisor 2 
Chapter 6 showed how the Labour government gave support to a distributed model in order to 
improve the legitimacy of its response to terrorism. In this respect the integration of a new 
broader policy community was a key element of the short term response to terrorism. The 
model emphasised distributed collective action by government and the Muslim community to 
address the causes of terrorism. The approach originated out of the government’s home affairs 
and social inclusion strategies, which combined enforcement with a wider consideration of how 
government and civil society could address complex social problems. It provided a solution to 
 
	
the operational and political limits of the Hobbesian model by actively seeking the support of 
the Muslim community as part of a comprehensive response. The approach was also supported 
by a loose coalition drawn from community policing, community cohesion and social inclusion 
agendas, as well as many Muslim community representatives and advisors.  
The support for a broader approach described in Chapter 5 was required to secure parliamentary 
support for enforcement powers and to mitigate the impacts of enforcement. At the same time 
such support was also embedded in the wider social inclusion agenda and associated 
approaches to public service reform. Labour’s home affairs strategy, captured in Blair’s famous 
axiom ‘tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime’ can be seen in in the positioning of 
development alongside military intervention in the post 9/11 response (The Labour Party 2001; 
Cabinet Office 2002). In addition David Blunkett made the link between security and the role 
of an active and cohesive civil society as part of the case for strengthened enforcement powers 
(Home Office 2004; Blunkett 2002). For the Cabinet Office, considering a wider range of social 
factors was a way of broadening engagement across government. For the Home Office a 
broader consideration of political and social alienation was a necessary tactical step for 
improving engagement with the Muslim community (Civil servants 1 and 2). 
Chapter 6 showed how a consensual model of social integration helped to secure the support 
of a broader policy community. A focus on social integration addressed both Blair and Brown’s 
interest in national leadership and identity. The 2005 workshops also show that this broader 
interest in integration was shared by many Muslim community interlocutors as long as it was 
a consensual developmental process, a position that was anticipated by the Home Office in 
2004. Chapter five also shows that this model was supported by representatives groups such as 
the MCB who had raised concerns over discrimination, policing and foreign policy (Home 
Affairs Committee 2005). Civil liberties advocates and opponents of the Iraq war in the Labour 
party also welcomed the acknowledgement of the social consequences of security policy and 
the acknowledgement of the limits of government. Furthermore, an integration led approach 
received qualified support from race equality and integration advocates who argued that 
 
	
patterns of segregation risked fostering inter-communal grievances and extremism (Home 
Office 2001a; Philips, T 2006).  
The emphasis on distributed engagement between government and the Muslim community was 
repeatedly signalled in a series of government statements from 2005 onwards. The most 
prominent of these was Blair’s 2006 statement that it was the Muslim community themselves 
that would solve extremism. Crucially, the model gained political impetus as a viable way of 
implementing a rapid comprehensive response in the aftermath of the 7/7 attack (Chief 
Constable; Advisor 2; Local government chief executive). The active engagement of the 
Muslim community and local partners was embedded as a key objective in all of the Prevent 
strategies and was a key reference point for success (Department for Communities and Local 
Government 2007; HM Government 2008a; HM Government 2008b). This approach 
acknowledged the limits of government’s capacity to combat extremism and terrorism alone 
and positioned the Muslim community in a leading role. Similarly the capacity of the policy 
community was further expanded by delegating responsibility for implementing Prevent to 
local authorities, as well as local police forces.  
The expansion of the policy community was founded on a reciprocal and consensual 
relationship between central government, local authorities and Muslim community 
organisations. Integration policy, including community engagement by public agencies, was 
an essential element of the support that was necessary to get Prevent off the ground (Advisors 
1, 2, 3 4 and 6; Civil servant 2). Chapter 6 also showed that this rested on the idea that 
radicalisation was an inadvertent consequence of the socio-economic and political context in 
which Muslim youth were formulating their identity (Choudhury 2006; Home Office 2005a; 
Home Office 2001a). The neutral framing also helped to minimise, though not eliminate, 
conflict over responsibility for radicalisation and segregation and positioned Prevent as a 
consensual partnership in opposition to violent extremists. Polarised Muslim identity was 
largely framed as the inadvertent product of the minority experience and evidence of a need to 
 
	
help support a British Muslim identity. Equally, this also focused Prevent on engagement and 
identity whilst minimising more structural questions such as employment and education. 
The expansion of the policy community was enabled by the focus on violence as the reference 
point for defining extremism. The Home Office highlighted the benefits of engagement as part 
of a longer term process of change and the risk that selective engagement could alienate 
potential allies and even encouraging support for radical Islamist ideas (Saggar 2006). Notably, 
the tactical approach drew on the experiences of policing in Northern Ireland and with Black 
Caribbean communities in England (UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Home Office 
2004). This elevated the influence of representative organisations and advisors as authentic 
interlocutors to the diversity of the Muslim community in order to guide effective engagement. 
The tactical approach was also supported by evidence from think tanks and academic 
researchers that emphasised the importance of nuanced engagement with civil society in order 
to support both the short and long-term objectives of Prevent. Examples included the reports 
by Demos and Choudhury, which were funded by the DCLG and largely reinforced the 2004 
Home Office recommendations (Briggs et al 2007; Choudhury 2007).  
Chapters 6 and 7 also showed how the new policy community further embedded a consensual 
model through local decision-making. In particular the broader policy community was founded 
on delegated authority to local government and police forces that emphasised street level 
sensitivity to the relationships with community groups (Local Government Respondents 1 and 
2). This resulted in an emphasis on partnership development and collective action that 
replicated the prominent role for community interlocutors at local levels. The influence of local 
decision-making in Prevent was illustrated by the extensive guidance issued to local councils 
and the different approaches that were adopted by different local authorities (HM Government 
2008b; Regional government officer). Furthermore local Prevent funding was often 
administered alongside community and cohesion work, often through combined posts which 
further embedded local community preferences. This further aligned Prevent with integration 
 
	
policy and the priorities of local community groups and framed prevention as a secondary 
indirect benefit.  
The formation of the DCLG helped to underpin a distributed and consensual approach to 
Prevent. The decision to adopt a local approach led to the DCLG’s responsibility for 
coordinating Prevent as part of the broader localism agenda. Equally the DCLG played an 
influential role in further developing the distributed approach in the main 2008 Prevent 
strategy. The capacity of the DCLG was initially developed at the expense of the Home Office 
following the transfer of civil servants in 2006. This led to the Pathfinder programme in 2006 
and the DCLG’s own strategy in 2007 that focused on local community engagement and 
development. 35 This was aided by the alignment with the existing cohesion agenda that enabled 
the rapid development of new activities. Therefore by virtue of its involvement in various social 
inclusion agendas, DCLG also able to play a significant role in shaping the 2008 strategy. 
The Locke model broadened the capacity of policy-making to address a wider range of 
problems by expanding the policy community at national and local levels. The distributed 
process was supported by the Cabinet Office’s model of institutional reform as well as the input 
from community advisors and advocates. The approach directly addressed the limits of the 
Hobbesian model by emphasising a consensual partnership focused on collectively addressing 
violence. This created space for the Muslim community itself and local agencies, in particular 
local authorities, to address community concerns as contributing factors to radicalisation. 
Furthermore although the agenda was controversial, local government and many Muslim 
organisations did welcome the funding and the opportunity to influence an important national 
policy (Local government chief executive, local government officer and regional government 
officer). As a result the consensual and distributed model John addressed the immediate 
demands for demonstrable action as part of a longer-term process of institutional reform. 
	
35 Although the DIUS also produced it own guidance document for colleges and universities in early 2006 this was 
a much shorter document focused on explaining the issues and highlighting questions and did not set out a plan of 
action (Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills 2006).  
 
	
Split in model John 
“I recognise fully that in many ways the link between integration and Prevent was 
feeding into a line of thinking that I didn’t agree with… that all of this is a result of 
bad theology, rather than foreign policy, discrimination and deprivation. I quite 
strongly disagreed with that.” Advisor 3 
“We took Prevent seriously and we put a lot of effort and investment into community 
cohesion. The main challenge was to protect the rest of the organisation from 
distracting controversies.” Local authority chief executive 
John’s limitations were exposed by growing institutional conflict within the new policy 
community over membership and control over decision-making. Where the expansion of the 
policy community had been intended to improve the legitimacy of decision-making, the size 
of the community itself became the focus for conflict. Over the course of chapters 6 and 7 it is 
demonstrated that decision-making became dominated by conflict between tactical and 
principled approaches to engagement and the associated tension between national and local 
decision-making. This latent tension in the new community came to a head when the Labour 
government tried to move toward a more assertive model of engagement in 2009. This 
undermined the sensitive trade-offs that had underpinned the involvement of the Muslim 
community and local authorities and exacerbated conflict over responsibility for the causes of 
terrorism. The resultant conflict and increasing disengagement of Muslim community groups 
and local agencies undermined support for model John. 
The conflict was directly linked to the compromises that were necessary to expand the policy 
community. As shown in Chapter 6 a tactical and consensual approach to engagement helped 
to minimise conflict over the policy. However, the sensitivity of the approach was illustrated 
by the conflicts over authenticity from two competing views of Prevent. On one side were those 
pushed for an authentic focus on the marginalisation and discrimination experienced by the 
Muslim community (Briggs et all 2006; Choudhury 2007; Communities and Local 
 
	
Government Committee 2010; Advisors 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6; Home Office 2005a). On the other 
side were those who wanted to focus on substantial reform of cultural and religious attitudes 
and institutions within the Muslim community (Blears 2009a; Civil Servant 2; Gove 2006; 
Maher & Frampton 2009; Mirza et all 2007; Phillips, M 2006; Quilliam Foundation 2010a; 
Tony Blair HC Liaison Committee 4th July 2006 Q 355; Theresa May in HM Government 
2011a). Although these perspectives were not mutually exclusive the divergent emphases 
underpinned different views on who was an authentic member of the policy community and 
who, by extension, was part of the problem. 
Labour’s attempt to shift toward a more assertive principled position in 2009 can be seen as a 
late attempt by Blears and the DCLG to assert control over the policy community. The position 
followed Blair’s original view that it was necessary to challenge segregated Muslim 
organisations in order to achieve long-term success (Blair 2006a; Government minister; Maher 
and Frampton 2009; Mirza et al 2007). The Home Office also advocated a clearer framework 
for Prevent to guide local decision-making and engagement. The position was in part a response 
to growing concerns within some parts of the policy community about the merits of working 
with groups that didn’t subscribe to liberal values of non-discrimination (Civil servant 1). 
Finally, the more assertive position can also be seen in the context of growing electoral 
pressure. This included the Conservatives in the run up to 2010 election who espoused a more 
assertive, though still liberal, national identity, and the success of the BNP who advocated a 
racially exclusive identity. 
The shift exposed the tension between control of national and local decision-making that had 
been embedded into Prevent by the expanded policy community. The on-going efforts to clarify 
the implementation of Prevent set out in Chapter 6 clearly points to nervousness in Whitehall 
about the extent of control it had over the local use of Prevent funding. In this context a 
principled approach was in part an attempt to establish a more transparent framework around 
engagement at national and local levels. At the same time reaching down into local engagement 
decisions perpetuated national debates about the scope of Prevent. This included grievances 
 
	
about policing and surveillance that came to a head in 2009 around Project Champion and the 
allegations in Spooked (Kundnani 2009). There was also increased pressure to address other 
types of extremism, in particular far right extremism, that was illustrated by John Denham’s 
commitment to address it as part of an effort to shore up support for Prevent. Finally the 
unresolved tension around foreign policy continued to dominate debate about Prevent. 
Labour’s attempt to move toward a more selective approach further exacerbated intra-
community competition. This included whether groups or individuals were authentic 
representatives or whether they were legitimising the stigmatisation of the wider Muslim 
community. This tension was originally identified in Chapter 5 but subsequently evolved into 
active pressure to disengage from Prevent, see Chapter 6. Selective engagement exposed the 
problem of community representation across diverse theological, geographic, economic, 
generational, ethnic and cultural dimensions. This is illustrated by the MCB’s argument that 
government attempts to broaden engagement were an attempt to marginalise their role due to 
their criticism of foreign policy. This view was also supported by the political coalition that 
had criticised the Iraq war in Chapter 5, and it was in part true.36 Equally this was also a 
question of balancing engagement with established conservative religious institutions with 
more reach into more marginal groups that were led by women and youth or held overtly liberal 
religious and social outlooks.  
This tension contributed to suspicion over the extent to which the model John was a collective 
response to terrorism or was a vehicle for scrutiny and exclusion of Muslim values and identity. 
For example, the 2009 shift and subsequent 2011 strategy marginalised pious Salafists who 
had been involved in diverting ‘angry young men’ and conservative Deobhandi institutions 
who had reach into the community (Lambert 2008; Advisor 3). This was also framed by a more 
‘technical’ debate over whether radical Islamism was a symptom giving expression to wider 
	
36 One respondent suggested that Blair’s 2005 statement that the ‘rules of the game’ had changed was in part a 
coded challenge to the MCB’s leadership of community engagement with the government. At the same time the 
on-going engagement with  the MCB until 2009 illustrates the limits that were put on any attempt by government 
to move away from the MCB at the time. 
 
	
concerns of alienation or a root cause of terrorism. Those who argued it was a symptom were 
often defending the legitimacy of Muslim identity activism and challenged the relevance of 
focusing on social conservatism (Choudhury 2007; Githens-Mazer & Lambert 2009). Those 
emphasising the role of ideas, such as Quilliam, argued that radical Islamist ideas and 
conservative beliefs that were antithetical to western values and legitimate grievances and 
segregation were self evidently part of the problem (Gove 2006; Phillips M 2006; Quilliam 
Foundation 2010a).  
The strength of these tactical and technical debates had their roots in a values conflict within 
the new policy community. The policy community was founded on a practical commitment to 
improving engagement between authorities and with the Muslim community in order to address 
causes of alienation and grievance. However, anti-racism advocates challenged the 
implementation of Prevent as an explicit and implicit threat to minority religious and cultural 
expression (Kundnani 2009). This was supported by Islamist and radical left groups who also 
sought to defend the legitimacy of anti-imperialist political activism in relation to Iraq and 
Israel. At the same time many integration advocates had principled and practical concerns 
about working with groups that tacitly supported violence overseas or did not personally share 
principles of non-discrimination in relation to gender, sexuality and religious tolerance (Civil 
servant 1; Communities and Local Government Committee 2010; HM Government 2011c). 
The position was bolstered by political support, and advocacy by Policy Exchange and 
Quilliam, for an assertively liberal British identity as a necessary condition to be trusted as a 
partner for Prevent. 
 
Compromise 
“The territory became so muddy and controversial that it relied on people with a 
credible voice. Mixing the two terrains, slipping from one to another, didn’t help. In 
fact it undermined the credibility of some individuals and organisations.” Advisor 1 
 
	
Chapter 6 described the emergence of a compromise that was based on separating Prevent from 
integration policy. This approach effectively traded improved control over decision-making by 
reducing the breadth and depth of the policy community. In this respect the reassertion of Home 
Office leadership was emblematic of a renewal of a central Hobbesian control and clarified the 
relationship between national policy and local decision-making. Equally, elements of the 
distributed model were retained, including the on-going focus on working with Muslim 
community groups to deliver targeted interventions. The compromise was rooted in the politics 
of the Coalition government and policy community itself. The compromise was supported as a 
way of improving the effectiveness of Prevent through a narrower set of institutional 
relationships. This included improving the management of political risks in the context of a 
more assertive and selective approach to engagement. In effect the compromise traded an 
improved central control at the cost of a narrower and shallower institutional reach. 
The compromise described in Chapter 7 was a response to the conflict around Prevent. Key to 
the compromise was the positioning of the Home Office as a strong and neutral arbiter for 
managing the growing conflict over Prevent during that was identified in Chapter 6 and that 
continued in Chapter 7. Charles Farr’s evidence to the Home Affairs and Communities 
Committees during 2009 can in part be seen as an attempt to gather support for this role. 
Notably this was at the same time as the conflict between the DCLG and the MCB that was in 
part motivated by the Home Office push for a more assertive approach as part of the 2009 
Contest strategy. The Home Office’s position was aided by the prospect of the Conservative 
party’s expected commitment to a more assertive approach to non-violent extremism. The 
Home Office both demonstrated their commitment to a more assertive approach whilst also 
highlighting the political risks to the broader policy community.  
The Home Office’s position was further strengthened by the politics of the Coalition 
government that restricted the push for a more assertive approach to non-violent extremism. 
The Coalition agreement explicitly committed to protecting civil liberties whilst national 
government also withdrew from local decision-making as part of strategy for delivering the 
 
	
austerity agenda.37 The compromise produced an active definition of non-violent extremism 
that focused attention on campaigning groups rather than challenging conservative religious 
institutions, a point that was criticised by the Quilliam foundation in 2010. The nuances of this 
settlement strengthened the role of the Home Office in order to manage the political risks 
around engagement. This included not funding potentially risky or entryist Islamist groups. It 
also gave them the opportunity to select partners on the basis of their effectiveness and 
alignment with the strategy, as illustrated by the withdrawal of core funding from the Quilliam 
foundation. 
The Home Office’s leadership was also founded on its renewed authority following its 
restructure (Chapter 6). The establishment of the OSCT gave it increased capacity to set the 
policy agenda in relation to terrorism and security. This included gaining control of the 
development of the 2009 Contest strategy when the role of the Cabinet Office was downgraded 
under Gordon Brown in 2007. Through this process the Home Office had set the agenda around 
how the relationship between Prevent and the wider Contest strategy should be structured. The 
authority of the Home Office was also supported by the appointment of Jacqui Smith, a key 
Brown ally, as Home Secretary, allied to the political difficulty and subsequent resignation of 
Hazel Blears, a Blair ally, at DCLG in 2009. This shifting ministerial commitment to Prevent 
continued under the Coalition government when Eric Pickles prioritised protecting his 
department from controversy and managing major cuts, whilst Theresa May, then Home 
Secretary, defended sole ownership of agendas such as Prevent. 
The Home Office’s leadership of a centralised approach also anticipated the fiscal constraints 
after the 2010 election. It built on the repeated criticisms of the impact on terrorism that had 
been raised in Chapters 6 and 7 (Home Affairs 2009; HM government 2011c; Communities 
and Local Government Committee 2010). This was reinforced by Conservative criticism of 
local decision-making and the reform in community engagement (Civil servant 2). Charles Farr 
	
37 In effect the Coalition increased local authority discretion over local spending that helped to limit national 
political risks around the resulting cuts to local services 
 
	
successfully argued that ‘upstream’ risk based interventions, such as the Channel programme, 
could demonstrate better short-term outcomes (Home Affairs 2009). This drew on the social, 
personal and ideational aspects of radicalisation that had largely been developed through the 
integration approach. However, instead of focusing on rectifying the root causes themselves it 
emphasised it as guide for targeting resources at individuals. This also helped to reframe 
Prevent and the model of radicalisation as questions of professional judgement that could be 
addressed through better coordination. As a result the approach was framed as improving value 
for money through better management. 
The arguments put forward by Charles Farr in Chapter 7 framed community disengagement as 
evidence that the distributed approach had failed on its own terms (Communities and Local 
Government Committee 2010; Home Affairs Committee 2009; HM Government 2011a; HM 
Government 2011c). This argument received support from many in the broader policy 
community, including DCLG and local authorities, who were concerned about the risk to 
community relationships in other areas of social policy. Notably however, disengagement was 
often linked to on-going grievances around enforcement activity, such as the 2006 Forest Gate 
shootings, 2010 Birmingham CCTV cameras and the ‘Spooked’ allegations (Kundnani 2009). 
These events, alongside the conflict over selective engagement and non-violent extremism, 
were the main drivers of community suspicion about the aims of Prevent. Nevertheless, the 
Home Office attracted support in order to improve communication about the aims and methods 
of Prevent and to avoid potential confusion and conflict due to local decisions.  
The broader policy community also looked to the Home Office to manage competing pressures 
around a more assertive approach to non-violent extremism. The trajectory of Prevent under 
Blears and the arrival of a Conservative government demonstrated the political risks associated 
with a more assertive approach to extremism (Advisors 1, 2 and 3; Communities and Local 
Government Committee 2010). As a result the policy community and the Coalition government 
looked to the Home Office to protect rights to freedom of expression and conscious whilst 
delivering the decision to work with groups with more overt liberal identity and values, 
 
	
particularly around principles of non-discrimination. Furthermore many supporters of a 
distributed approach supported withdrawing Prevent from local decision-making to guard 
against the Conservatives push to work with groups with a more overt British liberal identity 
(HM Government 2011a). In this context Home Office control was seen as best way of 
managing the new political settlement (Advisor 4). 
The decision to separate Prevent and integration policy was at the heart of this compromise 
(Advisors 1, 2, 3; Communities and Local Government Committee 2010; HM Government 
2011c). The separation described in Chapter 7 represented a tactical retreat from the broader 
policy community that was established in Chapter 6 to deliver a comprehensive approach to 
terrorism. For many supporters of a focus on integration, the separation was necessary to 
protect local control of community engagement. In particular, for many Muslim community 
organisations and representatives the broader focus on Islam, activism and attitudes presented 
risks in relation to other social policy agendas, such as education. Similarly, advocates for 
reform of integration policy believed the politics of Prevent and the pressure to expand the 
policy community had undermined attempts to reform the relationships between local 
authorities and community gatekeepers. Similarly those who were still concerned about wider 
issues of extremism and integration were partially reassured by the proposal for the DCLG to 
develop extremism and integration strategies.38  
Structure of the policy community 
The structure of the policy community both underpinned the development of the broader 
response whilst undermining its sustainability. This was linked to the relationship between a 
core reciprocal policy group and a wider network that exerted considerable influence on 
decision-making. The development of a core set of reciprocal relationships was key to 
expanding the size of the policy community, particularly at local levels. At the same time the 
wider issues network pushed for more accountability about the aims and values of the core 
	
38 These strategies were not subsequently developed by the Coalition government 
 
	
policy community. The distributed structure of the community created opportunities for the 
wider issues network to exert significant influence by influencing decisions around 
engagement in the core policy community at national and local levels. This in part led to 
growing pressure to centralise decision-making under the Home Office to improve control and 
reinforce government leadership and authority. In this respect the structure of the policy 
community made the trade-off between establishing and maintaining a consensus and 
promoting change extremely sensitive. 
The influence of this dual structure is illustrated by the shift toward a distributed policy 
community in Chapter 6 and then the return to centralisation in Chapter 7. In Chapter 5 the 
institutional limits of the narrow enforcement community were exposed by growing political 
concern about the alienation of the wider Muslim community. During Chapter 6 the focus was 
on bringing new local and non-government organisations into decision-making in order to 
broaden the scope of the response. This resulted in a distributed and consensual model of 
engagement that created opportunities for the core policy community to shape decision-
making, such as the 2008 decision to give local authorities discretion over grant funding. At 
the same time this put constraints on national government decision-making, including on the 
assertive approach originally signalled by Blair in the aftermath of 7/7. The conflict over 
pushing toward a more assertive approach in Chapter 7 ultimately resulted in the centralisation 
of Prevent and administration of funding by the Home Office.  
The core policy community was founded on the consensus that Prevent should improve the 
relationship between government and the Muslim community. This approach was based on 
advice from the Home Office and was clearly supported throughout by the Labour leadership. 
It was positioned as necessary step to underpin the governments capacity to deliver short and 
long-term solutions to terrorism. The first expansion of the policy community was in described 
in Chapter 5 when the Cabinet Office was brought in to work with the Home Office to develop 
the Channel strategy, including the empirical and conceptual foundations of the Prevent strand. 
In Chapter 6, Muslim community representatives and local authorities and local police forces 
 
	
joined in order to develop and implement the Prevent strand. This step connected the policy 
community to local relationships between Muslim community organisations and agencies that 
significantly broadened and deepened engagement. This in turn reinforced the Lockian 
emphasis on collectively addressing community grievances and concerns through consensus. 
In chapter five this expansion was facilitated by the adoption of an inadvertent model of 
radicalisation allied to the focus on community development and integration activities. 
Decision-making was influenced by two broad networks that challenged the core policy 
consensus from the margins of actual decision-making. One network was centred around wider 
Muslim community and political supporters who believed that the security response was 
stigmatising and inherently racist. In Chapter Four this network challenged the legitimacy of 
the enforcement approach that led to the decision to prioritise Prevent and the adoption of the 
consensual model in chapter five. Similarly in chapter six this wider network also influenced 
disengagement from Prevent that resulted in the separation of Prevent and integration policy. 
The other network challenged the extent of the government’s commitment to promoting shared 
values and identity. This network included critics of multiculturalism such as right wing media 
commentators and think tanks, notably Policy Exchange, as well as Conservative MPs and 
leadership. This constituency exerted significant influence on ministerial decisions in Chapters 
5 and 6. It also directly shaped the 2011 strategy’s focus on non-violent extremism when key 
members such as Michael Gove joined the Coalition government.  
Both extended networks exerted influence via members of the core policy community. In the 
case of the wider Muslim community this influence came via Muslim advisors and local 
authorities who were sensitive to patterns of community engagement. This is illustrated by the 
sensitivity of the debates about personal credibility and authenticity. At the same time these 
members could also influence advice and decisions by highlighting the prospect of community 
disengagement. Critics of multi-culturalism largely exerted influence through national 
decision-makers, including a sympathetic Labour leadership in chapter five and then via the 
Home Office in chapter six and the Coalition government after 2010. The influence of both 
 
	
networks was aided by Labour’s political triangulation around home affairs that attempted to 
balance a strong stance whilst broadening engagement. The incompatibility of the two 
networks led to the compromise between an assertive approach to extremism but a narrower 
agenda to minimise the wider risks of disengagement. 
Members of the core policy community clearly kept their participation in Prevent under 
constant review on the basis of formal and informal accountability to these wider networks. 
The first and most sensitive was the trade-off for Muslim members of the policy community 
between influencing policy-making whilst potentially legitimising suspicion of Islam and 
Muslims. This was clearly articulated by the 2005 community working groups. The second 
tension from the perspective of public authorities was between the merits of working with 
certain groups, either to gain intelligence, gain support or to work or drive reform, and the 
potential political risks around political and cultural views. This was prominent in the debate 
about broadening engagement in chapter five. Local government also balanced the risks of a 
highly sensitive agenda that might disrupt local relationships versus gaining resource to 
undertake work on a high profile and important agenda. This shifting calculation was behind 
Muslim advisor and local authority support for a narrower approach to Prevent in response to 
the push for more selective engagement in Chapter 6. 
The dual structure also constrained decision-making due to the need to maintain participation 
in decision-making as part of an implicit and explicit process of institutional reform. In the 
short-term consensus with Muslim community groups was prioritised to give legitimacy to the 
government’s response. However, decision-makers were also under pressure to demonstrate 
leadership on the issue of extremism that challenged parts of the Muslim community. The 
sensitivity of this relationship was illustrated by Blear’s positioning around the 2009 LSE 
speech where she sought to ally with the Muslim community against pressure from 
Islamophobic ‘outsiders’ like Melanie Phillips. At the same time the speech was also positioned 
with the media to demonstrate government leadership by challenging Islamist extremism, 
followed by the very public disengagement from the MCB. The sensitivity of this balance is 
 
	
illustrated by the subsequent split in the policy community that centred on tactical and 
principled concerns about the approach to engagement.  
The influence of this dual structure can be seen in the evolving settlements described in 
Chapters 6 and 7. The decisions taken in Chapter 5 emphasised the longer-term benefits of 
prioritising short-term engagement by focusing on causes of grievances rather than extremism. 
This was justified with reference to the short-term risks of exacerbating the alienation of the 
wider Muslim community and the tactical imperative of broadening the core policy community 
(Advisors 2, 3 and 6; Civil servant 2). However, this was challenged throughout Chapters 6 
and 7 by a wider network who argued for a principled approach to engagement as a prerequisite 
for achieving longer-term objectives of social change (Maher & Frampton 2009; Quilliam 
2010a). This then led to support for establishing a framework for engagement that emphasised 
the need for funding to be linked to a long-term and outward commitment to a shared set of 
values (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010; HM Government 2011a; HM 
Government 2011c; Advisor 7). 
Status of the Muslim community 
“The impact can be immediate. Having representation, having the right partners at 
the table. That’s a quick win. I think the political will was definitely there at that time. 
I think it just wasn’t executed well which is sad. It was about a disadvantaged 
community but that was never a priority area for Prevent.” Advisor 5. 
The dual status of the Muslim community in the policy community was also a factor in 
Prevent’s institutional reach and instability. The engagement of the Muslim community was 
the key reference point for the core policy community throughout the development of Prevent. 
This gave the Muslim community a direct stake and influence in Prevent. Equally, the 
expansion of the policy community was motivated by concerns about recruitment and the need 
for a demonstrable and comprehensive response. More fundamentally, Prevent also made the 
Muslim community the principal target for reform that further emphasised the sensitive 
 
	
position of Muslim members of the policy community. Participants in the core policy 
community were partners in trying to improve trust and flows of intelligence by improving 
confidence within the Muslim community about the benefits of engaging with Prevent. 
However this was also set against scrutiny of Muslim organisations and an agenda that 
encouraged reform of community values and identities. 
Because of this dual role there was persistent sensitivity about the extent to which Prevent was 
a consensual partnership between the government and the Muslim community. Muslim 
representative groups and advisors did exert influence on Prevent through the core policy 
community described in Chapter 6, particularly at street level. Similarly the community 
disengagement described in Chapter 5 and 7 also exerted significant influence on the initial 
development of Prevent and its subsequent rationalisation. However, both positions risked 
legitimising a link between the Muslim community and terrorism, either by accepting the 
premise of Prevent or by not supporting government efforts. The community’s influence on 
decision-making was also limited by its minority status. Prevent did increase involvement in 
decision-making but Muslims remained a small minority across the civil service, local 
authorities, policing, politics and the wider media. Concern about influence was exacerbated 
by the exclusion of foreign policy or media representation from the agenda. In addition many 
ministerial statements, such as Blair’s statement in the aftermath of 7/7, persistently maintained 
a tacit link between the community and terrorism. 
The political, generational, ethnic and theological diversity of the community also exacerbated 
sensitivities around influence. The controversy around the Sufi Muslim council in Chapter 6, 
Quilliam in Chapter 7 and the on-going tension over the MCB’s leadership of the community 
response throughout were all illustrative of the structural challenge of community 
representation. For many advisors it was possible to exert influence through the core policy 
community by highlighting where there was a risk that government policy would result in 
community disengagement. In this context attempts by government to cultivate a broader range 
of groups was often seen as an attempt to undermine this leverage. However, the diversity of 
 
	
the community also precluded a coherent collective Muslim community view on how best to 
implement Prevent, an issue that was highlighted throughout Chapter 6. Diversity was an 
important part of the argument for a locally distributed approach that enabled street level 
influence. At the same time it undermined arguments that it was possible for advisors or 
representative groups to represent a collective Muslim community view or position. 
The limits of the Muslim community’s position can be traced through the breakdown in the 
support for a distributed model and the push for renewed central control over decision-making. 
In this respect the Muslim community could mobilise influence on Prevent by undermining the 
government’s reputation by disengaging from the security response but at the risk of being 
framed as part of the problem. In addition the diversity of the community and its minority status 
limited the ability of Muslim representative groups and advisors to influence decision-making. 
The dual accusations of entryism or racism served further challenged the legitimacy of 
participants in the policy community and their motivations, and by extension the policy as a 
whole. Ultimately this position led to questioning of the legitimacy and authenticity of Prevent 
as a consensual partnership amongst the Muslim community that undermined the distributed 
policy community and ultimately led to the narrower compromise approach.  
Shared purpose 
The conflict in the policy community centred on tensions between the merits of a tactical 
approach to expanding engagement and the development of values-based relationships that 
could sustain trust in decision-making. This underpinned a question about who was part of the 
problem and who should be part of the solution, including where there was reasonable overlap 
between targets and partners in a process of change. In this respect the debate over non-violent 
extremism was a reference point for explicit and implicit suspicion about the motivations of 
members of the policy community and whether Prevent was Islamophobic and racist or a threat 
to liberal enlightenment values. Many in the core policy community actively sought to navigate 
these tensions by focusing on a process of establishing trust around a shared agenda of 
 
	
preventing violence. However, this still left the new policy community vulnerable to conflict 
over the values that underpinned decisions and their short and long term motivations.  
Nevertheless, the thread of high modernism – that there was an objectively and empirically 
testable problem that needed to be addressed - did help to mediate the structural tensions within 
Prevent. In practice the institutional consensus, certainly between government and Muslim 
representative groups, centred on action to prevent terrorism and improving the relationship 
between government and the Muslim community. In particular it encouraged the core policy 
community to make justifiable arguments about how to prevent terrorism, and the potential 
roles of different organisations in any solution. It can be traced from the Home Office’s 2004 
empirical analysis of Muslim community attitudes that emphasised a tactical approach to 
engagement to generate support for government policy making (Foreign and Commonwealth 
Office and Home Office 2004). This was crucial to the decision to expand the policy 
community in Chapter 5. It encouraged policy makers and advocates to focus on the steps that 
were necessary to establish the new policy community whilst avoiding divisive values conflicts 
over extremism. Debates about implementation did act as proxies for principled and tactical 
positions but were also referenced against the core policy aims and the practical management 
of the new set of reciprocal relationships. 
The shared agenda helped to mask differences in the values of the core community and whilst 
acting as a counter point to more fundamental criticisms by the wider networks. This modernist 
framing for policy development can be traced through the leadership of Blair and the input 
from the Cabinet Office in 2004. For example, the focus on a developmental process of change, 
with less emphasis on hard delivery targets, was linked to evidence and experience of wider 
policy reform agendas. This approach also built on the Barber model of ‘deliverology’ that was 
being used elsewhere in the government (Barber 2008). This further emphasised a focus on 
objectives, delivery chains and monitoring and the limits and potential of government capacity. 
The focus on the delivery chain helped to frame the management of the sensitive relationship 
 
	
between central government and local agencies. At the same time this approach also 
contributed to the Muslim community’s dual status as core partners in their own change. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined how the institutional dimensions of decision-making played a 
pivotal dual role in shaping Prevent. Prevent emerged out of the concern that the institutional 
limits of a narrow enforcement model failed to address the operational and political need to 
address the alienation of the Muslim community. This led to support for a distributed 
consensual approach as a way of broadening the breadth of the response and demonstrating 
immediate action to address a complex problem. At the same time the distributed model placed 
constraints on government decision-making by emphasising the need for a consensual and 
tactical approach to expanding engagement. However, the underlying values conflict around 
the definition of shared principles for participation in the policy ultimately undermined support 
for the distributed model and led to a compromise approach. As a result the institutional 
structure of the policy community was both a direct focus for decision-making and highly 
influential in shaping and constraining the development of Prevent. 
Much of the institutional conflict was linked to differing views of the balance between a tactical 
means based approach to engagement versus defining up front shared values for participation 
(Birt 2009). This undermined the stability of the new policy community by increasing suspicion 
about the motivations of the policy. The issues of non-violent extremism and foreign policy 
were emblematic of the concern amongst the Muslim community that they should be 
consensual partners in a collective effort to deal with the causes of terrorism. Furthermore, 
resistance amongst community organisations and local authorities to exploring the ideological 
roots of violent extremism and reforming of patterns of engagement placed further constraints 
on government’s ability to lead a process of change through a distributed institutional model. 
In both cases this produced competition over the authenticity and motivations of members of 
 
	
the new policy community that ultimately led to support for separating integration and security 
and clarifying national and local control over decision-making. 
Nevertheless, Prevent was explicitly and implicitly negotiated by the new policy community. 
It developed as a direct response to the institutional limits of support for the enforcement 
community’s institutional capacity and legitimacy. The distributed structure enabled a 
consensus around collective action by explicitly creating space for the priorities and interests 
of a wider policy community. At the same time the subsequent renewal of Home Office 
leadership under the new Coalition government represented a compromise established across 
the broader policy community. The new settlement recognised the institutional limits of 
national and local decision-making that had emerged around the trade-offs between tactical 
and principled approaches to engagement. Nevertheless, the tactical decision to narrow the 
institutional breadth of Prevent still acknowledged the persistent consensus that a broader 
agenda of social integration was ultimately part of any long-term sustainable solution. 
Therefore, rather than a zero sum competition between two competing models of policy 
Prevent was the product of institutionally negotiated change. 
The evolving structure of the policy community described in this chapter indicates that it was 
the relationship between the two models of security that shaped the development of Prevent. 
Crucially there are clear indications that the John model was an important part of the 
development of Prevent. The new community was brought together by a shared objective of 
improving security policy in partnership between government and society. The structure of the 
new community was founded on reciprocal relationships that emphasised the voluntary 
participation of a wider set of civic actors in decision-making. Furthermore the structure of the 
policy community, including distributed local decision-making, focused on a process of 
establishing social norms and consensus through collective action. The reversion toward a 
narrower model under the control of the Home Office was also founded on a national consensus 




In this respect, Prevent represented an new institutional decision-making framework that 
established and maintained a comprehensive policy response to a complex and novel problem. 
Much of the work of the policy community was founded on a consensus about the shared role 
of society and government in security policy. It brought two broad policy groups, that had 
different priorities, together around a shared agenda of preventing terrorism whilst managing 
a values based conflict over the response. This necessitated a series of principled and tactical 
trade-offs around the definitions of extremism and the accommodation of grievances in order 
to facilitate short-term engagement and long-term social change. Whilst much of the analysis 
of Prevent has focused on the conflict associated with these trade-offs this study suggests there 
was sufficient institutional consensus that these questions were important enough to try and 
address. This is not to say that these questions were resolved successfully and the tactical step 








Chapter 9: A new conceptual framework 
Introduction 
This chapter examines the ideas that shaped the development of Prevent (Blyth 2013; Hall 
1993; Lindblom 1959; Stone 1989; Stone 2012). It shows that the conceptual framework for 
decision-making was shaped by arguments that were rooted in the strengths and limitations of 
the two competing models of security. The parameters of the debate were established by the 
Thomas model’s focus on the rights of citizens and the John model’s focus on social consensus. 
Notably the dual framework was brought together by the Labour government’s wider model of 
policy reform that balanced strong enforcement and the social inclusion agenda. In the case of 
Prevent this led decision-making to focus on the respective roles of government and society. 
The resulting trade-offs centred decision-making on the process of developing shared social 
values and identities as a necessary condition for legitimate and effective government action. 
Ultimately this framework balanced establishing a consensus to enable action in the short term 
whilst working toward contentious objectives of longer-term social change. 
This chapter shows that the main debates in Prevent centred on the dual aim of improving trust 
in government’s authority as the guarantor of citizens’ rights and as a reference point for social 
integration. The dual framework placed explicit and implicit constraints on government’s 
ability to lead a long-term process of consensual social change whilst delivering short-term 
security objectives. The tension between these constraints is illustrated by the on-going debate 
the relationship between integration and enforcement and the need to develop a social 
consensus as a necessary condition for effective government action. Conflicting views of the 
role that government should play in defining and defending shared values in the interests of a 
cohesive society created a series of trade-offs. These included the debates about the relationship 
between integration and enforcement, engagement with Muslim identity and grievances and 
the balance between short and long-term process of social change and institutional reform.  
 
	
The structure of the agenda meant that successful arguments engaged with the fundaments of 
the two models and their inherent limitations. Supporters of the Thomas model promoted the 
need for trust in government with community groups as an instrument for improving the 
capacity of government. These arguments came to the fore when engagement was framed as a 
direct response to declining confidence in the capacity and competence of government. On the 
other hand supporters of John positioned the resolution of social grievances and their causes as 
a pre-requisite for an effective and comprehensive action. These arguments positioned an equal 
partnership between government and society as a tactical and strategic necessity to deliver 
benefits in the short and long-term. At the same time this dual framing underpinned persistent 
debate about the appropriate breadth and depth of engagement that came to the fore during the 
later period of Prevent. Ultimately decision-making struggled to fully resolve whether shared 
values should be an outcome of a consensual process or a pre-requisite for participation.  
The chapter also illustrates how these conflicts and debates were mediated by an empirical 
debate about the concept of radicalisation and the role of society. Radicalisation acted as a 
proxy for questions of responsibility for the threat from terrorism whilst at the same time 
providing a shared empirical framework for decisions. The concept made the connection 
between the benefits of an on-going process of social integration and the short-term security 
response as part of the debate about the relationship between the social and organisational 
dimensions of terrorism and recruitment. This included the extent to which wider community 
grievances were contributing to or were symptomatic of Islamist activism and identity politics 
agitation and whether they were relevant to terrorist recruitment. The chapter shows how the 
concept, a causal model that can be traced from the Labour government’s social inclusion 
agenda in Chapter 5, served to mediate this dialogue. It played an influential role throughout 
the evolution of Prevent, including framing emerging concern about home grown recruitment 
described in Chapter 5, the emphasis on community input in Chapter 6, and the tactical 
compromise in Chapter 7.  
 
	
The policy agenda 
The decision-making agenda was founded on a shared role for government and society in order 
to legitimise and broaden the scope of the security response. This dual approach represented a 
point of intersection between the two competing models of security. It addressed both the issue 
of government’s capacity to deal with threats and the social conflict around the response. The 
cornerstone of the new framework was the Thomas model’s focus on expanding government’s 
capacity to respond to terrorism where, as Blair put it, the ‘rules of the game had changed’ and 
all options were on the table. However, in practice the agenda was heavily influenced by the 
John model’s emphasis on establishing a social consensus to underpin the legitimacy of the 
response, as illustrated by Blair’s comments about the importance of the Muslim community 
in 2006. The two models were integrated by an empirical debate about radicalisation that 
captured debates about the role of government and society and focused decision-making on the 
benefits of active engagement with the Muslim community. 
Chapter 5 demonstrated how the government’s focus on its capacity to prevent terrorism was 
the foundation of the agenda (Civil servant 2; Advisor 3; HM Government 2006; HM 
Government 2009a; HM Government 2011a; HM Government 2011b; Turnbull 2004). This 
concern dominated decision-making in the immediate aftermath of 9/11, including the overseas 
military interventions and the extension of domestic counter terrorism powers. Furthermore, 
much of the initial development of Prevent in Chapter 5 focused on the capacity of government 
to deal with the complexity of the new threat. For example, the inclusion of a Prevent strand 
was part of a whole government approach that was supported by the enforcement community 
and led by Tony Blair. Similarly, the political prominence of Prevent in Chapter 6 was directly 
linked to Blair’s push for an immediate, demonstrable and comprehensive government 
response in the immediate aftermath of the 7/7 attacks. 
Equally, government also adopted the view that effective security was fundamentally reliant 
on a social consensus. As a result the development of Prevent was founded on a process of 
 
	
social integration as both a tool and an objective for security policy. The decision to introduce 
these ideas came in response to the political and legal limits and paradoxes of government-led 
enforcement that were exposed in Chapter 5. For example, these ideas can be traced through 
the link that Blunkett made between counter-terrorism powers and civic integration in 2002. In 
addition the 2004 Cabinet discussion was directly concerned with the political implications of 
grievances amongst the Muslim community about the government response to terrorism. In 
practice it was in Chapter 5 when ideas associated with the John model exerted the most 
influence over decision-making by positioning the need for a negotiated social settlement as a 
pre-requisite for effective action. The decision in 2006 to follow a distributed programme of 
engagement with community groups embedded this model into national and local decision-
making.  
The emergence of radicalisation as a concept for policy-making in 2004 helped to integrate the 
John model into decision-making. Radicalisation framed recruitment as a socio-political 
process that positioned the wider causes of grievances and social alienation alongside a 
narrower organisational model of recruitment by rational terrorist groups. The emergence and 
influence of the concept can be traced from Labour’s social inclusion strategy in Chapter 5 that 
explored complex social problems in order to guide both targeted interventions and a process 
of institutional reform (Blair 1993; Blunkett 2002; Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Home 
Office 2004; Home Office 2001a; Home Office 2001b; Home Office 2004b; Home Office 
2004c; The Labour Party 2001). Equally, the model included a more conventional focus on the 
organisational links, or ‘conveyor belt’, between Islamist activism, extremists and terrorist 
groups. This can be traced in the initial analysis of the role of radical Islamist groups and 
community attitudes in Chapter 5 and the continuing tensions over the relationship between 
extremism and terrorism described in Chapters 6 and 7.  
The debate over radicalisation, as a complex and novel concept, helped to integrate elements 
of the competing models into decision-making. In particular the complex interaction of 
multiple personal and situational factors created space for interventions associated with both 
 
	
models. Furthermore it was this complexity that motivated the development of the broader 
policy community described in Chapter 6. At the same time it opened up debate about the scope 
and focus of Prevent that can be traced through the increasingly detailed descriptions in the 
Prevent strategies and the subsequent reviews of the policy in Chapter 7 (Bouhana & Wikstrom 
2011; Communities and Local Government Committee 2010; Home Affairs Committee 2009; 
HM Government 2009a; HM Government 2011a; HM Government 2011c;). The debate can 
also be traced throughout the dual focus on community institutions, such as mosques, as vectors 
for recruitment and interventions and as locations for the development of segregated or shared 
values. Furthermore in Chapter 6 the concept framed the debate over extremism as a symptom 
or cause of alienation and the role of foreign policy and discrimination. 
Radicalisation embedded a role for both society and government into decision-making (UK 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office/Home Office 2004; Tony Blair HC Liaison Committee 4th 
July 2006 Q 355). This underpinned the developmental strand that focused on supporting the 
capacity of both government, its agencies and the Muslim community. In Chapter 5 Prevent 
was focused on improving intelligence flows and gaining support for enforcement amongst the 
Muslim community (Police respondent 2; Civil Servant 2). In Chapter 6 the interest in root 
causes was part of a process of improving the coordination of the response through non security 
agencies such as local authorities (The Labour Party 2001; The Labour Party 2005; Blair 
2006b). In addition there was also a persistent focus on developing the capacity of community 
groups and local agencies, such as the MINAB work in Chapter 6. Similarly the model was 
used to guide Channel programme and the development of the capacity of agencies and 
community groups to support referrals and credible interventions in Chapter 7 (Advisor 2; Civil 
servant 1).  
As a result the new framework represented a developmental process of collective action that 
sought to satisfy pressure for demonstrable action alongside by establishing social consent. 
This positioned community engagement, and by extension a role for local agencies and local 
policing at the heart of the Prevent to support a series of direct and indirect objectives. 
 
	
Community engagement was supported by the narrow Thomas model’s focus on maintaining 
the reputation of government whilst the John model positioned broader social consensus as a 
prerequisite for effective action. This dual emphasis helped to embed the question of dealing 
with upstream root causes as a long-term solution and as a short-term tactical measure for 
gaining community consent for policing. The importance of this dual model was at the heart of 
the development of Prevent in Chapter 5 and the development of distributed collective action. 
In addition, the focus on community partnerships was retained in Chapter 6 allied to a renewed 
focus on identifying and intervening with individual pathways of radicalisation. 
Constraints 
The dual approach to Prevent established crucial constraints on the policy agenda around the 
relationship between government and society. This centred on a dual model of rights and social 
consensus that constrained the role that government could play in leading a process of change. 
Crucially, Prevent was constrained by a need to focus on the Muslim community rather than 
wider structural questions. This feature was key to demonstrating direct and demonstrable 
action in response to patterns of recruitment and the need for relevant intelligence, in line with 
the Thomas model. However, the focus on rights also constrained the extent to which 
government could play an active role in shaping political and social values. At the same time 
the John model’s emphasis on consensus limited the extent to which government could lead 
change without the active and consensual support of the Muslim community. More sensitively 
however the majority social consensus also framed segregation and alienation as a problem 
associated with the Muslim community rather than wider society. 
The first and perhaps most crucial constraint on Prevent was its focus on the minority Muslim 
community rather than a wider focus on the rest of society. This was established from the outset 
and can be traced from the focus on reassuring the Muslim community in the aftermath of 9/11, 
the growing concern about alienation in 2004 and active community engagement in the 
aftermath of 7/7. A clear example of this approach was the decision to distribute funding to 
 
	
local authorities on the basis of the size of their local Muslim population in 2008. The decision 
was influenced by the Thomas focus on practical and targeted interventions to improve 
intelligence in response to terrorist recruitment that targeted the Muslim community. However, 
this also belied a wider perspective, in part framed by the John model, that the social origins of 
the problem were associated with the identity and values of the minority Muslim community. 
In this respect the reassurances to the Muslim community allied to questions about British 
Muslim identity, all illustrated the political foundations of the agenda. 
Government’s ability to lead change was also limited by the legal and political protections for 
civil society and minority identity. This is best illustrated by Blair’s 2006 comments about the 
Muslim community being in the best position to resolve the problem of extremism and 
radicalisation. Although this in part referred to his personal credibility in the community 
following the Iraq invasion it also spoke to the political constraints on government. The rights 
debate evolved from the focus on civil liberties and habeas corpus described in Chapter 5 
toward the debates about freedom of conscience and minority rights in Chapter 7. At the same 
the debate about social norms evolved around the merits of the assertion of shared values and 
identity, the accommodation of diversity, and the risks of imposing majoritarian views that 
marginalised minority identities. The frequent reassurances from the Labour leadership about 
the legitimacy of Muslim identity described in Chapters 6 illustrated the sensitivity of this 
constraint. Similarly the space for autonomous civil society was an inherent theme in the 
Coalition government’s liberal emphasis on civil liberties in Chapter 7. 
The need to demonstrate competency and leadership also represented a constraint on decision-
making. In effect, the prominence of the terrorist threat and the political sensitivity around the 
government’s response made no action intolerable. This framed the cabinet discussion 
described in Chapter 5 and Tony Blair’s leadership in the aftermath of 7/7 described in Chapter 
6, and ultimately led to the development of a broader policy community. The political 
importance of Prevent was also illustrated by its role in Brown and Cameron’s positioning as 
national leaders who could deal with security concerns and a broader historical narrative of 
 
	
national identity. From the Thomas perspective government needed to demonstrate its 
capability to deal with the threat. From the John perspective a process of social and institutional 
change was necessary for the legitimacy of government action. This forced decision-making to 
demonstrate short-term action that was embedded in a longer-term process of social change. 
Equally the shift in the government’s priority away from security in Chapter 7 also enabled the 
consensus behind a narrower compromise approach. 
The final constraint centred on dual emphasis on government reputation for competence and 
establishing social consensus. This can be seen in the dual strategy of reassuring the Muslim 
community at the same time as responding to political scrutiny of Islam and the views of the 
Muslims. These debates further illustrated how the new paradigm represented both a security 
strategy and a political strategy for managing conflict over integration and identity. For 
example, the origins of Prevent was rooted in the Labour leadership’s electoral concerns about 
the Muslim community described in Chapter 5 and subsequently to their political right in 
Chapter 7. The conflict was animated by Islamist protests about policing in 2004, the defeat 
for the Labour party in Bethnal Green in the 2005 general election and the Danish cartoons 
protests in 2006. Subsequently in Chapter 7 the electoral threats grew from the racist British 
National Party, who had success in the 2005 local elections and subsequently in the 2009 
European elections, and from the Conservatives in advance of the 2010 election.  
The different debates around the selection of partners were also illustrative of the constraints 
in the agenda. Ultimately the focus on the Muslim community placed a high degree of scrutiny 
on community representation and theological and political attitudes. This can be traced through 
the debates about the representation of religious, ethnic and generational diversity that was 
masked by a homogenous notion of the Muslim community. Equally these debates were framed 
by arguments about the reach of organisations to help drive wider social change or their 
proximity or insight in order to develop targeted interventions that could divert individuals 
away from extremism. This also intersected with questions about whether certain community 
organisations were inadvertently, or deliberately, part of the problem due to generational 
 
	
divides, theological perspectives or political entryism. Ultimately this motivated the dual 
attempt in Chapter 6 to broaden engagement to new groups whilst at the same helping to reform 
the governance of incumbent organisations through MINAB. 
Furthermore, the absence of a consensus about political and cultural diversity placed a political 
constraint on setting long-term objectives for social change. The Thomas model emphasised 
the rule of law and the protection of rights whilst the John model emphasised the development 
of shared identity and values as longer-term objectives for integration. This established 
pressure between the legal justification for excluding groups from Prevent versus establishing 
meaningful alliance based on shared values and identities. This tension was illustrated by the 
series of principled and tactical debate about non-violent extremism and the debate about the 
legitimacy of Islamist identity politics as a partner for the short and long-term objectives for 
Prevent. Examples of this tension include the conflict over Ruth Kelly’s support for the Sufi 
Muslim council in Chapter 6 and with Hazel Blear’s conflict with the MCB in Chapter 7. This 
was set against the persistent criticism of perceived government appeasement of Islamist 
groups, such as Policy Exchange’s report ‘Choosing our friends wisely’ (Maher and Frampton 
2009). 
Trade-offs 
This section examines how the combination of the John and Thomas models framed a series of 
principled and tactical trade-offs into decision-making. The first trade-off centred on the 
balance between a consensual process of social integration and the legitimacy of government 
authority and leadership. The second trade-off centred on the balance between addressing 
political grievances associated with Muslim identity politics whilst promoting integrated social 
and political values. The third trade-off centred on the balance between a focus on short-term 
security objectives and a longer-term and indirect process of reform and change. These trade-
offs framed the decisions that determined the size of the policy community, the definition of 
extremism and the scale and urgency of the ambition for Prevent. Ultimately the trade-offs all 
 
	
had practical implications for the level and patterns of support for Prevent and, by extension, 
its scope and focus. 
Integration and enforcement 
“It was always going to be a learning process but the lack of integration work prior to 
2005 was the big gap that Prevent identified and tried to fill, and did some good work. 
I think the disentangling of integration and Prevent was good but it couldn’t have 
happened before. Unless you had integration policy that was funded you weren’t going 
to get away from the need to do that in the early years of Prevent” Advisor 2 
Although Prevent was a security agenda, integration policy was positioned as an essential 
element of the strategy throughout. However, the tension between the two dimensions was 
crystallised by the decision to separate them in Chapter 7. The centrality of this relationship 
can be understood through the influence of both the Hobbes and Locke models. At the heart of 
this was a shared question about the role that shared identity and belonging within society 
played in underpinning government authority. The Locke dimension foregrounded questions 
of inter-group relationships and the accommodation of difference within a cohesive social 
identity. This emphasised resolving horizontal social tensions between religious diversity and 
freedom of conscience and discriminatory views of religious, gender and sexual equality. The 
Hobbesian perspective focused on the vertical authority of government, the rights of citizens 
and the extent to which government should enforce the authority of shared norms and 
institutions. This can be seen in the emphasis on support for the rule of law, human rights and 
the institutions of liberal democracy as a reference point for extremism. 
The fundamental importance of integration to Prevent can be traced through the high level 
political interest in questions of national identity and leadership. Integration of diverse British 
society was presented as counter point to the ontological divide promoted by radical Islamists. 
This created tension over whether integration was an open process with space for minority 
perspectives or was uncritically asserting ‘western’ and ‘Christian’ political institutions and 
 
	
values. This was prominent in concerns about moderate Muslims and British values in the 2005 
working groups. The debate was also given prominence by Blair at various points between 
2001 and 2006, Brown in 2006 and Cameron in 2011 who all positioned an integrated national 
identity as a strategic response to a civilisational challenge from jihadist terrorism, and their 
own leadership in a global and historical context. Similarly, in 2002 David Blunkett situated 
new counter-terrorism powers in the historic contract between government and society as the 
foundation of a civil society tolerant of diversity (Blunkett 2002). 
The importance of integration to Prevent can be traced throughout the main decisions. The 
decision to focus on the social roots of alienation in Chapter 5 and 6 framed the objectives of 
Prevent around a process of social integration. The process of community engagement and 
integration was also positioned as a tool for supporting the development of government 
capacity. Furthermore, the integration lens touched on the longer term questions about the 
causes of terrorism, including why people were attracted to these views and what government 
and society could and should do to address the problem. This dual role can be illustrated in 
Chapter 5 where integration policy was positioned as a tactical response to the need for 
improved intelligence and the wider challenge of political alienation. At the same time the 
importance of integration was also part of the rationale for narrowing and separating the two 
strands in Chapter 7. 
The sensitivity of the relationship with security was linked to integration’s role as a tool, 
process, objective and principle. The Hobbesian model emphasised defending the authority of 
government but recognised the importance of ensuring this authority was exercised in a fair 
and consistent manner within society. The Locke model prioritised establishing shared values 
within society with a role for government to support the process and to mediate conflicts. This 
meant that integration was both an upfront principle for guiding engagement and participation 
in policy making, as illustrated by Bears in 2009 and Cameron in 2011, and a developmental 
process.  This can be seen in the decisions in Chapters 6 and 7 that moved between the benefits 
of neutral or values based engagement as part of a longer-term process of integration. These 
 
	
decisions balanced the risks and realities of community disengagement, with consequences on 
the breadth and depth of the agenda. 
The sensitivity of the relationship was also linked to the extent to which the security agenda 
justified government assertion of values and identity through integration policy. For example, 
decisions in Chapter 6 focused on the role of integration as a short-term tool for growing the 
policy community. This approach left multi-cultural space for minority Muslim religious and 
political identity as the reference point for engagement and dialogue in security policy. 
However, the assimilationist perspective, largely pushed by Gove, Phillips and Policy 
Exchange, positioned shared liberal British identity and values as a necessary pre-condition for 
participation in Prevent. They argued that upfront commitment to shared values was necessary 
to underpin a sustainable long-term consensus about the objectives for integration and by 
extension security. These were not mutually exclusive positions and there were efforts to 
balance the approaches, such as the 2006 Choudhury literature review that emphasised the 
benefits of engaging with evolving Muslim identity as part of a shared British identity. 
The decision to separate Prevent from integration policy described in Chapter 7 was in part 
based on its importance to the long-term objectives of Prevent. For example, on-going mistrust 
of enforcement activity throughout, including the 2006 Forest Gate shootings, Project 
Champion and the 2009 Spooked claims, directly affected wider community confidence in 
Prevent (Kundnani 2009). At the same time there was concern with the core policy community 
that the link between integration and security agenda risked narrowing the range of acceptable 
values and identity with consequences for wider social policy agendas (Advisors 1, 2 and 3). 
The decision was supported by those who were concerned that the difficulty of building 
consensus behind Prevent had constrained a more assertive approach to British values and 
challenge community interests (Advisors 5 and 7; Civil servant 2). As a result the 2011 strategy 
formally separated the strands, citing the negative impact of Prevent on community attitudes 
but advocated a more assertive approach to shared values and emphasised the long-term 
importance of integration to Prevent.  
 
	
The on-going conflict over the selection of community partners can also be seen as an on-going 
proxy for the debate between enforcement and the different models of integration. There was 
a tension around working with incumbent groups that were seen as resistant to change, but with 
greater authority and reach in the community (Civil servant 2; Advisor 3). This was set against 
supporting new groups that were committed to leading change in the values and identity of the 
community but without the same reach or influence. In Chapter 6 this debate was framed in 
terms of authenticity of representation but was also linked to suspicion of preferential 
government treatment on the basis of cultural and political views, particularly on foreign 
policy. In Chapter 7 engagement became more explicitly framed by shared values and 
principles, but in the context of a narrower agenda. The evolving balance can be seen in debate 
about the authenticity of liberal Muslim organisations and the fortunes of the Sufi Muslim 
council in Chapter 6 and the Quilliam Foundation in Chapter 7. 
The balanced position of integration in Prevent placed constraints on government’s role as a 
neutral arbiter and guarantor of rights (Blair 2006a; Cameron 2011; HM Government 2008a; 
HM Government 2011a). Both the Hobbes and Locke models framed integration as virtuous 
counterpoints to extremist visions of society. The tension centred on whether government was 
a neutral or consistent arbiter that protected the rights of minority social groups, in particular 
Muslims, or was uncritically asserting discriminatory majority values. For example, in Chapter 
6 there was a broad consensus that violence was central to defining extremism but there were 
suspicions about how laws such as glorification of terrorism were being applied to Islamist 
groups in comparison to right wing groups. Equally, in Chapter 7 there was a consensus around 
the tolerance of diversity within a liberal democratic framework but a tension over whether this 
was being used to exclude conservative Muslim groups in a way that wasn’t being applied to 
other religious groups. 
The balance between security and integration meant that decision-making was closely 
scrutinised for how it dealt with conflicting rights and minority identity. This largely centred 
on whether Muslim beliefs and experiences were being subjected to exceptional scrutiny or 
 
	
leniency in comparison to other religious or minority groups. For example, non-discrimination 
laws played a dual role in reassuring the Muslim community in the aftermath of terrorist 
attacks, and were directly linked to counter terrorism laws in the aftermath of 9/11 and 7/7. 
Equally the protection of religion and sexuality alongside race and gender in the 2006 
Discrimination Act, plus the 2006 Terrorism Act offence of glorification of terrorism also 
became a soft framework for evaluating the attitudes of community partners in Chapter 7. There 
was a wider suspicion that glorification of terrorism was intended to challenge legitimate 
support for overseas resistance movements. This included support for Palestinian resistance to 
Israeli occupation and opponents of US and UK occupations, which was a key feature of the 
split between the government and the MCB in 2009. 
Identity and grievance 
Decision-making also navigated a sensitive balance between accommodating and challenging 
Muslim identity. The trade-off was rooted in the role of government leading a consensual 
process of social integration and was linked to the debates about the causes of radicalisation. 
This included the debate about whether Muslim community grievances justified substantive 
action by government or were the product of mobilisation by radical Islamists. This can be 
traced in Blair’s 2006 criticisms of Islamist grievance politics and into the assertion of a values 
based approach to engagement in Chapter 7 that was founded on wider criticisms of Muslim 
identity politics. Equally the development of Prevent in Chapter 6 was founded on the practical 
recognition of Muslim identity as a tangible and legitimate partner in developing effective 
short-term measures and a longer-term process of integration. In practice conflict over 
definitions of extremism were emblematic of the tension between challenging radical Islamist 
activism whilst protecting space for Muslim identity in British society. 
Prevent was founded on an implicit challenge to the legitimacy of Muslim identity politics. In 
some respects the challenge is self-evident due to the persistent community concern that 
Prevent framed Islam and Muslims as a threat both to the authority of government and social 
 
	
integration. Blair also dismissed grievances framed by an Islamic political identity, particularly 
the idea that western foreign policy was a war against Islam. Similarly Blears’ 2005 statement 
around policing impacts also suggested a perspective that, at the very least, didn’t fully engage 
with the political salience and sensitivity of a collective Muslim community identity. Salient 
topics that animated Muslim identity politics were either not treated as specific to the Muslim 
community, such as unemployment, or out of reach for government, such as media or political 
representation. The idea of moderate Muslims that emerged in Chapter 6 implicitly excluded 
Islamists, a tension that became more explicit in Chapter 7. Similarly British values and the 
debate about multi-culturalism carried implicit challenges to minority and migrant identities 
and values.  
Prevent was a political response to the wider scrutiny of Muslim identity and values. This can 
be traced from growing interest in radical Islamists in Chapter 5, growing scrutiny of the wider 
Muslim community itself in Chapter 6 and the subsequent political shifts in Chapter 7. For 
example, the public debate about extremism and British values focused on the attitudes of the 
Muslim community rather than wider society (See for example Gove 2006 and Phillips M 
2006). Prevent challenged the legitimacy of a Muslim identity that sought to exclude a British 
identity and limit participation in western society. Prevent also challenged public and private 
commitments to the rights and identities of other protected groups, particularly other faiths, 
gender equality and sexuality. These two strands were often used in parallel, such as in the 
assertion of liberal values as British, and in contradictory ways. For example, British Muslims 
were challenged on their private commitment to liberal values or their active commitment to 
promoting a shared national identity. 
Equally, Prevent was also a pragmatic means based engagement with community organisations 
based on a shared religious identity in order to combat terrorist recruitment. In this respect 
Prevent worked with Muslim community organisations to support practical short and long-term 
objectives by minimising more divisive values questions. The prioritisation of Prevent 
described in Chapter 5 was in part a response to the political mobilisation of the community in 
 
	
advance of the 2005 election (Turnbull 2004). In addition the whole Prevent programme was 
predicated on engaging with the Muslim community, even where alternative framings around 
Pakistani backgrounds could have been used (Local government respondent 2). Prevent also 
engaged with substantive grievances through the introduction of community policing and the 
recognition of faith discrimination in 2006. The 2006 report by Choudhury on behalf of the 
DCLG also illustrated tentative engagement with nuanced dynamics of Muslim identity that 
could engage the younger generation (Choudhury 2007). This translated into an engagement 
strategy that sought to work with Muslim community organisations at national and local levels.  
The trade-off between challenging and working with Muslim identity is illustrated by the 
criticism that Prevent negatively reinforced Muslim identity politics. Prevent was criticised for 
reinforcing the organisation of a diverse community around a singular Muslim identity 
(Kundnani in Communities and Local Government 2010; Choudhury 2007; Briggs et al 2006). 
This engagement was also criticised for framing Muslim identity as separate and for 
entrenching incumbent community structures that had alienated young generations and 
marginalised women (Advisor 6; Communities and Local Government Committee 2010). At 
the same time an instrumental approach to community engagement was also criticised for being 
detrimental to community advocacy and empowerment, such as by Kundnani in his evidence 
to the CLG select committee in Chapter 7 (Home Office 2005a; Kundnani 2009; Advisor 5). 
For example, the avoidance of foreign policy, despite its clear influence on community attitudes 
and recruitment, was seen indicative of a failure to engage with the substance political 
grievances. Finally the sensitivity of need to work with Muslim community groups limited 
more constructive dialogue and challenge over community practices and attitudes (Advisor 5). 
The attempt by government to adopt a more assertive approach toward Muslim identity politics 
in Chapter 7 represented a shift in this trade-off. The assertion of values based approaches to 
engagement moved away from practical elements of engagement with Muslim identity at the 
cost of narrowing the breadth and depth of engagement, and by extension the scope of the 
policy. The activist model of extremism that excluded Islamist groups implied a preference for 
 
	
private or liberal Muslim identity that can be traced from the idea of ‘moderate Muslims’ 
(DCLG 2007; Advisor 3). For example, those who held normative conservative religious views 
were progressively excluded from Prevent, as illustrated by experience of the Salafist Street 
project in Brixton. The stance adopted by Blears in Chapter 7 in part challenged the 
mobilisation of an Islamic political identity in opposition to the government foreign policy 
(Blair 2006; Blears 2009a). At the same time the narrower agenda did leave space for local 
discretion over community engagement and negative liberal space for conservative religious 
organisations. 
This trade-off underpinned the tactical approach to community engagement that persisted 
throughout Prevent. The initial focus on community engagement was framed as a practical tool 
to improve the legitimacy of government action. Similarly, the compromise in Chapter 7 was 
a tactical settlement that balanced concern about community alienation, maintaining protection 
for civil liberties and the assertive approach to non-violent extremism. Managing these 
competing demands underpinned the reassertion of Home Office authority through a fuzzy 
model of extremism (Bleich 2010). There is also evidence of tactical positioning by the Home 
Office to maintain community confidence in the context of the approach, including the 
withdrawal of funding from Quilliam identified in Chapter 7. The separation of Prevent from 
wider integration policy also allowed space to push more selective engagement with groups 
with outwardly liberal and British identity. At the same time the narrower agenda left space for 
local discretion over community engagement outside of Prevent. 
Process and outcomes 
“You are trying to isolate a group of [extremists] and move the community in another 
direction… It was an attempt to think about a long-term change of behaviour and there 
were some politicians who loved that. They might not have liked the political 
positioning but loved it conceptually. Others thought we were entirely in the wrong 
game” Civil Servant 2 
 
	
The final trade-off centred on the balance between demonstrable direct outcomes and an 
indirect process of change. The Locke model introduced consideration of the indirect benefits 
of improving the social legitimacy of government authority. In contrast the Hobbes model 
emphasised the need to demonstrate authority through a direct and demonstrable response to 
terrorism. As a result decisions tended to reference both the short and long-term dimensions. 
For example, the decision to include the Muslim community in an expanded policy community 
was a short-term intelligence measure that was situated in a longer-term process of social 
change. At the same time the sensitivity of this trade-off is illustrated by different ideas about 
the relative short and long-term merits of adopting means or values based approaches to 
community engagement. The compromise in chapter six re-orientated the trade-off to focus on 
directly targeted interventions whilst addressing questions of long-term change by working 
with groups who promoted an integrated liberal British identity. 
Prevent embedded these trade-offs into an explicit and implicit process of institutional reform 
that aimed to improve government capacity and promote social integration. The reformist lens 
can be traced from the whole government approach to Contest in Chapter 5 and the active steps 
to develop a larger policy community in Chapter 6. Equally the subsequent debate about the 
management of distributed relationships in the new policy community was indicative of a 
tension between broadening engagement and selecting partners to support longer-term 
objectives. The process of engaging new participants in the policy, principally the Muslim 
community and local authorities, was a key short-term objective that necessitated minimising 
conflicts with influential groups such as the MCB. At the same time success was also embedded 
in an explicit process of change that led to debates about the long-term implications of 
engagement, the definition of extremism and the practical impact of interventions.  
Chapter 5 illustrated how the focus on a process of institutional reform originated from the 
wider ideas associated with New Labour’s modernisation agenda (6 et al; Barber 2008). 
Institutional reform was a key recommendation of the MacPherson report that forced public 
agencies to review how racial prejudices influenced their relationship with minority groups 
 
	
(MacPherson 1999). Organisational reconfigurations were also a prominent feature of 
measures to deal with complex problems outside of direct government control (Barber 2008, 
Saggar 2010b). For example, Chapter 6 showed that Prevent was directly linked Labour’s 
localism agenda and was integrated into local coordinating structures. Prevent itself was 
simultaneously framed in terms of intervening with individuals considered ‘at risk’ and at a 
population level to address wider social or structural problems that propagated grievances. This 
was similar to the dual approach of reconfiguring tax and benefits whilst providing individual 
support through sure start centres to end child poverty (Kenway 2010).  
Chapter 6 also showed how the development of Prevent focused on the delivery chain, 
principally the relationship between government and the Muslim community, rather than direct 
impacts on terrorism. For example, although PSAs were established, they did not set hard 
targets to reduce low frequency high impact issues such as terrorism. Instead monitoring, such 
as NI35, focused on the process of engagement between public authorities and the Muslim 
community. Similarly, as Charles Farr noted in Chapter 7, the accuracy of counting the number 
of people diverted from terrorism lent heavily on the accuracy of an indirect and heavily 
contested model of radicalisation (Home Affairs 2009). However, the benefits of resolving 
wider community grievances also relied on similarly contested causal relationships. In practice 
Prevent was based on a consensus that focused on the benefits of establishing relationships 
between authorities and Muslim community groups as part of an indirect and distributed 
process of change. 
In Chapter 6 Muslim community organisations were simultaneously positioned as partners for 
short-term interventions and in a process of change that was focused on the community itself. 
This approach aligned the intrinsic and long-term value of a process of government engagement 
with community groups with the instrumental benefits of good relations on enforcement and 
intelligence priorities. The approach effectively brought the Muslim community into a 
framework of modernisation and reform to reshape social attitudes around an integrated British 
identity (Advisor 5). For example, the MINAB initiative sought to reform governance of 
 
	
religious institutions to facilitate engagement with public authorities looking for viable 
partners. However, the growing focus on reforming the values and the ideas of Muslim 
community organisations created the conflict over the longer-term aims of the process that 
undermined short-term objectives. This led to the compromise identified in Chapter 7 that 
aimed to clarify the Muslim community’s role in the delivery chain by focusing on the 
instrumental dimension of engagement. 
The compromise noted in Chapter 7 also aimed to improve government control of this process 
in order to manage the risk of unintended consequences (Saggar 2009 and 2010a). In contrast 
to efforts to stigmatise behaviours or actions, such as smoking, Prevent was an explicit attempt 
to shape political views about society and government through reform of complex issues of 
social identity and alienation. However, the unit of engagement, in this case the Muslim 
community also distorted the framing of the problem around the broader community rather 
than specific behaviours and attitudes. This problem was not unique and a contemporaneous 
agenda designed to engage and change behaviours of families or parents also highlighted 
similar difficulties (Bennet 2010). This created space for opponents of Prevent, including 
Islamist and nativist campaigners, to delegitimise collaboration and accommodation. The 
failure to resolve these tensions, particularly amongst the wider Muslim community, led to the 
compromise decision in Chapter 7. 
The dual status afforded to the Muslim community in the new paradigm highlighted the 
inherently political challenge of Prevent’s model of social reform. Saggar has shown how the 
process of defining problems around social identities for the purposes of policy-making risks 
unintended impacts on that identity (Saggar 2009). In the case of Prevent, reform of Muslim 
social institutions had to navigate competing ideas of success. In addition the Muslim 
community was a crude unit that resulted in poor targeting of resources and negative feedback 
about its consequences, including via local constituency MPs. It widened the range of 
individuals and groups with a stake in the process, in this case all British Muslims, without a 
settled technical or professional framework to give legitimacy to decisions around the trade-
 
	
offs between short and long-term dimensions. In this respect the new framework illustrated that 
complex population level change is outside the sole control of government without sufficient 
social consensus for laws and multi-generational education programmes. 
The role of evidence 
“It was very hard to establish an evidence base that people would agree on. We have 
hundreds of evidence-based papers but people could always find enough evidence to 
support their own personal views, whatever that might be. Therefore it was almost 
impossible, as a consequence of that, to have genuinely evidence-based policy-making 
in this area. It was always driven by senior people, ministers or civil servants.” Civil 
servant 2 
The integration of the Hobbes and Locke models into decision-making was facilitated by an 
empirical debate about the causes of terrorism and the relationship with the Muslim 
community. As illustrated in Chapters 6 and 7, the debate about radicalisation challenged 
decision-makers and advocates to empirically justify their positions, rather than purely make 
claims against values and interests. At the same time the empirical debates were directly tied 
to the evolving trade-offs. For example, evidence of tacit support amongst the Muslim 
community came to the fore in Chapter 5 to justify broadening engagement with the Muslim 
community (Saggar 2006 and 2010a). This was set against evidence that the wider attitudes 
and integration of Muslims were unexceptional and fed into support for separating integration 
policy in Chapter 7 (Sobolewska 2010). Both positions could be demonstrated to be true but 
were variously elevated or minimised to justify alternative approaches to the key trade-offs in 
Prevent. 
Influential research engaged with the core policy problem and its main trade-offs. For example, 
work by Burke, Sageman, Wiktorowicz and latterly Richardson highlighted some of the wider 
social and political questions inherent in terrorism (Burke 2004; Sageman 2004 & 2008; 
Wiktorowicz 2005a & 2005b; Richardson 2006). The 2004 Home Office briefing on 
 
	
radicalisation and extremism in Chapter 5, the literature review on Muslim identity by 
Choudhury in 2007 and the 2006 Demos report, both supported by DCLG, supported the case 
for broadening of community engagement in Chapter 6 (Briggs et al 2006; Choudhury 2007). 
At the same time the outputs from Policy Exchange highlighted the alternative selective 
approach to engagement (Bright 2006: Mirza et al 2007 and Maher and Frampton 2009). The 
DCLG select committee inquiry collated street-level feedback that set the agenda for the 
subsequent recommendation from the independent review to adopt toward a narrower model 
of Prevent (Communities and Local Government Committee 2010; HM Government 2011c). 
At the same time the situational research by Bouhana and Wikstrom underpinned the Home 
Office’s renewed emphasis on places of radicalisation in 2011 (Bouhana & Wikstrom 2011).  
The disconnect between the government’s and the Muslim community’s view of radicalisation 
and recruitment was emblematic of the gap in government legitimacy that led to Prevent in the 
first place. In Chapter 5 the authority of the enforcement response was undermined by the 
reliance on blanket stop and search powers and detention without trial. In Chapter 6 Muslim 
participants in the development of Prevent simultaneously recognised the problem of 
recruitment whilst resisting the connection with the wider community. Analyses of the 
ideational and organisational framework for radical Islamism were repeatedly criticised for 
failing to address the role of foreign policy and discrimination against Muslims and Islam, 
including in the 2005 community workshops. At the same time evidence in relation the threat, 
including information that justified the detention of individuals pending deportation, was often 
kept secret. At the same time the Labour leadership, including Blair in 2006, and many others 
in government and beyond argued that a failure to accept the problem was evidence of the 
problem with community attitudes. 
The decision to focus on expanding the policy community to include Muslim community 
organisations and representatives itself was supported by analyses of wider Muslim community 
attitudes. For example, Saggar’s 2006 article was based on research and advice to the Home 
Office that argued that some beliefs, whilst not actively participating or even supportive of 
 
	
terrorism, did need to be considered with care as part of a broader long-term preventative 
strategy. At this point in time the evidence supported the decision to actively engage with the 
wider Muslim community that framed the development of Prevent in Chapter 6. However, 
Sobolewska’s later analysis highlighted how the limitations of polling skewed perceptions of 
the problem and justified growing concern that Prevent’s focus on the Muslim community 
would exacerbate grievances. Both examples directly engaged with the debates of the day, from 
the need for a nuanced approach to community engagement in Chapter 5 to the need to manage 
growing conflict by separating integration in Chapter 7. 
The focus of both the Hobbes and Locke models on the relationship between government and 
society elevated the authority of authentic Muslim community interlocutors in decision-
making. This included playing an important role in navigating and embedding the approach to 
engagement in Chapter 6. The 2004 Home Office analysis provided sufficient evidence of 
reasonable concern about certain attitudes to legitimise the consultation process in Chapter 6. 
At the same time it also demonstrated sufficient evidence that mainstream Muslim community 
opinion identified as British and did not support extremist or terrorist views, which led to the 
neutral community engagement strategy. The third point of reference came from community 
advisors who provided feedback on community priorities and avenues for engagement with 
community groups. The combination of analysis and this feedback was a key factor in 
broadening the policy community but didn’t resolve the normative debates about radicalisation 
and extremism. 
The importance of this elevated role, and the contentious nature of Prevent, led to scrutiny of 
the personal values and motivations of interlocutors. This included an internal community 
debate about representation of diverse interests and religious values that challenged the MCB’s 
leadership role in Chapter 6. At the same time there was on-going interrogation of the political 
values and objectives of participants in the new policy community that were illustrated by the 
persistent accusations of entryism, such as the various Policy Exchange reports. The 
consultation exercises, such as the 2005 workshops, and the engagement of different advisors, 
 
	
were attempts to structure input in a way that could navigate these tensions. In contrast ‘The 
Islamist’ became an influential personal account of recruitment to Hizb ut-Tarir that helped to 
influence the shift toward a more selective approach to engagement in Chapter 7 (Hussain 
2007). It gained legitimacy due to the author’s overt conversation to liberal form of Sufist Islam 
but at the same time was challenged for universalising the experience of a former extremist to 
the wider Muslim community.  
Despite the conflicts around Prevent there were clearly moments where evidence played a 
crucial factor in integrating the new paradigm. At the same time the importance of advisors 
was illustrative of the lack of a clear and stable reference point within government for 
evaluating decisions. In this context the Choudhury literature review helped to support the 
broader engagement with the community described in Chapter 6 by emphasising positive 
mobilisation of Muslim identity activism. On the other hand ‘The Islamist’ provided a 
compelling and influential account that influenced the more explicit challenge to Islamist ideas 
during Chapter 7, but without addressing wider questions of social change (Hussain 2007). In 
contrast, the evidence that the Streets project diverted individuals away from harmful activism 
was ultimately discarded for being linked to a theological model that became politically 
unacceptable. These differing fortunes illustrate how although the new paradigm was shaped 
by evidence it was rarely free of institutional and normative debates and trade-offs (Civil 
servant 2). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown how the features and limitations of the two competing models of 
security provided the conceptual framework for decision-making. The influence of the two 
models focused decision-making on the parameters of the relationship between government 
and society in security policy and influenced which arguments gained traction in decision-
making. The approach was brought together by Labour’s political strategy and reform agendas 
that enabled coordinated action through a distributed policy community. At the heart of much 
 
	
of the debate was how to balance the a series of trade-offs linked to the need to address short-
term security concerns as part of a process longer-term social change. The debate between the 
two conceptual models shaped the emergence of practical policy options with different 
approaches to the core trade-offs. In this respect the combination of both models represented a 
new conceptual framework for negotiating decision-making.  
The agenda presented government with the paradoxical challenge of providing leadership on 
social integration whilst establishing its own legitimacy to do so effectively. Prevent was based 
on an acknowledgement that government action was constrained by the need to maintain its 
own legitimacy at the risk of exacerbating social alienation and grievances. At the same time 
government was also under pressure to act as a guarantor of rights and as a reference point for 
social integration. In this context ideas associated with social integration gained a leading role 
in policy making, as both a short-term tactical instrument, long-term objective and guiding 
rationale for institutional reform. Decision-making had to navigate principled and tactical 
debates about the extent to which cultural diversity and political grievances should be 
accommodated. Therefore as a policy Prevent embodied the political debate about integration 
and government authority that had motivated its original development.  
In practice, the dialogue between the two fundamental models of government and security 
framed the development of two policy options, which can be characterised as the integration 
and enforcement approaches. Both approaches accept the core principle that Prevent should be 
based on a consensual partnership between government and civil society in order to address 
short and long-term objectives. The integration approach that was initially adopted focused on 
broadening engagement with the Muslim community to disrupt radicalisation by addressing 
indirect political grievances. It emphasised the inherent benefits of engagement as a process of 
collective action that would help to support the development of integrated identities and shared 
values over the longer term. In contrast the enforcement approach frames radicalisation as a 
means for identifying and targeting interventions to divert individuals or groups from harm. 
Engagement in this model focused on supporting effective interventions in partnership with 
 
	
community organisations and institutional partners that shared an up-front and overt 
commitment to shared liberal values and British identity.  
Rather than being  mutually exclusive the two models represented different approaches to the 
agenda’s central constraints and trade-offs.  This chapter has illustrated how the shift toward 
the narrower enforcement approach was in part indicative of the consensus behind the 
importance of integration policy to the longer-term objectives of Prevent. However, the 
complexity of the framework for managing political conflict and social change meant that the 
integration led approach was always vulnerable to being framed as part of the problem. It 
introduced a wide range of problems onto the policy agenda that increased the breadth of the 
government response. However, it also introduced different views of the aims and objectives 
of Prevent across local and national decision-making. This was exacerbated by the dual status 
of Muslim identity in both models of Prevent, as both a problem and vehicle for reform. The 
resulting conflict over community engagement led to the emphasis on a narrower more focused 
enforcement approach to Prevent.  
Although highly contentious, in some respects the practical focus on community engagement 
helped to minimise sensitive questions about responsibility for the causes of terrorism within 
the core policy community. Viewed in this way the concept of radicalisation helped to frame a 
shared debate about the roles government and society could play in supporting collective or 
targeted action. The focus on community engagement pushed the debate about values based 
engagement into a second order agenda for the core policy community, albeit a very sensitive 
one that ultimately undermined trust in decision-making. Even in Chapter 7 the shift to a values 
based approach was justified in order to clarify the terms of engagement and resolve growing 
conflict over Prevent. Equally, many of the key decisions were explicitly concerned with 
perceptions and patterns of engagement, both within the core policy community and across 
wider issues networks. However, Prevent was always constrained by the same problems that 
motivated its development, namely limited trust that government could lead an equitable 
process of integration. 
 
	
Ultimately, the strengths and limitations of the Thomas and John models of government and 
security provided the conceptual foundation for decision-making. The political pressure to 
demonstrate a comprehensive response introduced a fundamental tension about the roles of 
society and government into policy-making. Prevent explicitly recognised the social roots of 
extremism and terrorism, the limits of government capacity and the role of society in delivering 
short and long-term solutions. However, the debate around integration demonstrated competing 
ideas about the importance of process and outcomes to Prevent and the necessary role of 
government leadership. This included competing views on who was responsible for 
segregation, alienation and extremism. Similarly the debate about extremism incorporated 
fundamental questions about the accommodation of difference and dissent and the nuances of 
the distinction between private and public views. At the heart of this challenge was the 
persistent tension over how society and government should mediate between majority and 
minority views. Ultimately these tensions precluded a settled consensus about the scope and 







Chapter 10: Contribution and conclusions 
Introduction 
This thesis has shown that Prevent represented a new framework for decision-making that 
focused security policy on the relationship between government and society. It developed as a 
solution to the political and operational complexity of responding to home grown terrorism 
following the 9/11 and 7/7 attacks. The framework extended the capacity of government to 
deliver short-term security priorities through a longer term process of social integration. In this 
respect the dialogue between both fundamental models of government and security established 
the conceptual and institutional framework for decision-making. Central to this framework was 
the development of a new policy community that balanced the interests of distributed 
institutional relationships with central government leadership. The policy agenda was 
integrated around a debate about the causes of radicalisation and the associated development 
of solutions to the threat of home grown terrorism. Therefore Prevent was a new framework 
for decision-making that balanced the strengths and limitations of the two competing models 
of security. 
This study started from a premise that a preventative approach to terrorism is a valuable 
undertaking because political violence is unhealthy for democracy and the wellbeing of society. 
The findings from this study further emphasise the difficulty facing democratic governments 
of exercising effective authority over individual citizens and society in order to prevent 
violence. This problem is most difficult and most urgent where the democratic foundations of 
legitimacy are being challenged by radical movements that capitalise on salient political 
grievances and identities. Prevent was an opportunity to reduce the use of coercive powers by 
dealing with social grievances and alienation and diverting individuals before they do harm to 
themselves or wider society. However, the approach opened up challenging questions about 
government’s priorities and assumptions in relation to minority social identities and the space 
available for alternative political views. As a result Prevent was fundamentally about how to 
 
	
managing conflict over values and identities whilst delivering short term interventions and 
longer-term change. 
The development of Prevent clearly illustrated the importance of leadership in order to navigate 
complex practical and political problems. The approach was predicated on creating a coalition 
of support to define and challenge extremist ideas whilst developing capacity and trust in 
targeted interventions. Creating this coalition entailed a series of complex and politically 
contested tactical and strategic trade-offs about who should participate and who should have 
been excluded. Draw the boundary too wide and trust and solidarity breaks down from within. 
Draw the boundary too narrow and efforts can be superficial, alienating and reinforce existing 
grievances. Prevent shows how government can use explicit and implicit compulsion and 
influence to evolve these boundaries. At the same time it has to balance the risk that it may 
disempower and alienate social groups with negative, or positive, consequences for social and 
political integration and the aims of the agenda. Ultimately the long term questions is how 
individuals and groups can be empowered to resolve differences and grievances through the 
democratic institutions of government and civil society. 
A question this study hasn’t set out to answer was whether Prevent actually prevented 
terrorism. What it can answer is whether Prevent was successful on its own terms. The evidence 
presented here is of a very mixed picture. The conflict around Prevent and the narrowing of the 
agenda shows that neither the Labour or the Conservative Liberal Democrat coalition 
governments covered by this study established a sustainable consensus across a broader policy 
community that could deliver long-term change. Instead, Prevent was a focal point for a range 
of grievances and suspicions about the hard and soft surveillance of Muslims and Muslim 
identity. Neither did it address structural questions of racism, discrimination and empowerment 
that influenced patterns of social alienation. However, in reality these objectives were beyond 
the ambition for Prevent. In practical terms it enabled demonstrable collective action in the 
politically sensitive period after 7/7, it supported tentative improvements in local partnerships 
 
	
with police and local authorities and also developed diversionary interventions such as 
Channel. 
The case presented here was particular to the United Kingdom and the political focus on 
security and the Muslim community in the period after 9/11 and 7/7. Nevertheless, the lessons 
from the process, in particular the challenges of establishing the legitimacy and authority of a 
response to political threats are relevant to different national contexts. For example, in the 
French model of strong rights-based liberal secularity there may be more acceptance of a strong 
government asserting a shared civic culture, in contrast with the UK’s norms based model of 
liberal multi-culturalism. However, the point still stands that overly assertive leadership may 
alienate social or political groups if government does not respond to cultural and political 
norms on the ground. At the same time other states rooted in different multi-cultural models, 
such as Australia or Canada, may need to consider how government can play an active role in 
fostering an inclusive social and political identity for certain minorities in response to a specific 
threat.  
In both cases the challenge is to strike a balance between the practicalities of engaging with 
dynamic social diversity in an on-going process of integration, both to prevent violent 
extremism and enable an effective response where necessary in the short and long term (Kaldor 
2003; Saggar 2010a; Sen 2006). At the same time Prevent was focused on a social and ethnic 
minority identity, in this case the Muslim community, that made up about 5% of the UK 
population. As a result policy making tended to focus on the Muslim community rather than 
wider structural questions, including the majority population. This contrasts with cases of 
social and political conflict that involve the mobilisation of a much larger minority identity 
grouping. In these cases the group may be large enough to mobilise effective representation of 
its interests via democratic institutions. However, the risk remains, such as was the case in the 
Northern Ireland conflict before the Good Friday agreement, that a large minority may be 
locked out of the institutions of government, creating space for radical and potentially violent 
 
	
political movements. In this context the challenge of legitimacy and authority remains the same 
but the pressure for more substantial institutional reform is likely to be far greater.  
Embedded in the question of how Prevent may be applied to other countries or conflicts is 
whether such a contentious policy is worth the trouble. One of the tensions at the heart of the 
agenda was whether it was a security policy at all or a vehicle for dealing with the politics of 
the Muslim community. In some respects this suspicion was valid. Nevertheless, this study 
argues that in practice Prevent took a political conflict that was already taking place and 
institutionalised it into a structured policy dialogue. The politics in the aftermath of 9/11 and 
7/7 both motivated the development of Prevent but at the same time exposed failures of 
legitimacy that were rooted in a previous deficit of engagement. The lesson here is surely that 
government should treat engagement with civil-society as an on-going exercise to actively 
address grievances and alienation, prevent space for radicals to operate and maintain the 
authority of shared institutions. Success will still requires a careful balance between the pre-
requisites and the process of integration, including the breadth and depth of engagement and 
the balance between an open socially led process and government leadership. 
Contribution 
This thesis differs from other accounts because it explores Prevent as a decision-making 
process that was shaped by negotiation between institutions and ideas (Thomas 2017). Crucial 
to this development was the Labour government’s dual response to the practical and political 
challenge from terrorism. The approach sought to underpin the legitimacy of government 
enforcement by adapting ideas of social inclusion to address the social origins of grievances 
and alienation. This decision expanded the scope of Prevent by establishing a new set of 
reciprocal and consensual relationships with the Muslim community and local agencies. At the 
same time these relationships placed constraints on government decision-making due to the 
trade-offs between the short and long-term aims of Prevent and conflicts over the values of the 
policy community. The resultant conflict within the new policy community, including between 
 
	
government and the Muslim community, and between national and local government, 
undermined support for Prevent. This ultimately led to a compromise approach under the 
Coalition government that narrowed and centralised control of the agenda. 
The development of Prevent was based on developing a comprehensive response to terrorism. 
The first challenge focused on how to expand the scope of the response in a context where the 
authority and legitimacy of government and its agencies was part of the problem. The second 
challenge focused on how large the policy community could grow in order to establish a viable 
coalition in support of the agenda without creating internal conflict about shared values and 
motivations. The third challenge centred on establishing empirical foundations to guide and 
legitimise decision-making around the trade-offs between the short and long-term objectives 
of Prevent. These trade-offs served to establish two preventative policy models, enforcement 
and integration, that represented alternatives approaches to the core policy trade-offs. 
Ultimately the compromise reached at the end of the period represented a choice in the context 
of new government priorities, reduced funding and a less immediate terrorist threat. 
Ultimately this study’s main contribution is the argument that Prevent was the product of a 
discursive negotiation between different views of the relationship between government and 
society. This contrasts with Hall’s zero sum model of paradigmatic policy change and leads 
the study to conclude that Prevent was not a simple incremental extension of Thomas nor a 
conclusive shift to John (Hall 1993). Rather, the dialogue between both models focused 
decision-making on the relationship between government and society and pushed the security 
agenda into new institutional and conceptual terrain. It brought the interests of the Muslim 
community into decision-making whilst creating new opportunities for government to assert 
wider influence over social values and beliefs through the governance of an expanded policy 
community (6 et al 2002; Newman 2001a). This process could be characterised as a 
securitisation of social policy, particularly the scrutiny of Muslim identity. However, this 
would also mask the limits placed on government, including the multi-polar process of debate 
 
	
about the causes of terrorism, social identity and legitimacy, that were key to the development 
of Prevent.  
Neither does this mean that Prevent represented a stable framework for decision-making. 
Instead, Prevent represented a negotiated but limited and flawed settlement. From the abstract 
ideational perspective Prevent embedded the importance of addressing the causes of terrorism 
and promoting integration into decision-making. The consideration of a wider set of beliefs 
and ideologies and the causes of grievances and alienation was a clear departure from security 
policy prior to 9/11 and was retained in the new phase of the agenda in 2011. From the practical 
institutional perspective the growing conflict over Prevent also demonstrated the limits of the 
new framework’s sustainability. Nevertheless, although heavily qualified, there was a degree 
of consensus that civil society organisations and local non-enforcement agencies had an 
important role to play in effective security policy. Even if involvement was subject to stronger 
central control, the question of how to secure their effective participation remained a central 
theme of the 2011 strategy and beyond, as it had throughout the development of Prevent. 
Hobbes and Locke 
This study was examined the development of Prevent against two conceptual models of 
government and security, Thomas and John, that were inspired by Hobbes and Locke 
respectively. These models were used as a way of understanding the institutional and 
conceptual development of Prevent and how patterns of authority evolved in decision-making. 
Ultimately this study argues that Prevent represented a new institutional and ideational 
framework that integrated and balanced features of both models. This framework expanded the 
capacity and reach of government at the cost of recasting the institutional and political 
constraints on its decision-making. The different organising principles and assumptions of the 
two models can be traced throughout the key decisions, from the initial policy crisis, the 
development of a distributed and consensual response and the subsequent consensus around 
reform. However, this does not mean that ministers and civil servants were regularly citing the 
 
	
Leviathan or the Treatise of Government to justify their decisions. It does serve to illustrate 
how these two major historical traditions can be traced forward into contemporary debates to 
provide a framework for understanding the evolution of Prevent and its trade-offs.  
The study has argued that ideas associated with the two models exerted implicit and explicit 
influence throughout the development of Prevent. The ideas of both models can be seen in the 
focus on the relationship between government and society to deliver a short-term response to 
terrorism that was embedded in a long-term process of social change. The example of David 
Blunkett citing Hobbes in his 2002 contributions on citizenship and security further illustrates 
how the ideas and concepts of the two models influenced the way policy was framed and 
communicated (Stone 2012; Blyth 2013). Both models are based on long standing theories of 
the state that are embedded in political theory modules at British universities and are typically 
taught together. Furthermore, both models represent cultural and political preferences that have 
exerted tangible influence on government with consequences for patterns of violence over time 
(Pinker 2011). In this respect the influence of these two models on Prevent should not be 
surprising. 
The influence of both models also framed the challenge of establishing a consensus behind the 
legitimacy of government authority within an integrated society. Prevent was a direct response 
to the dual political challenge to the legitimacy of government authority and the status of 
Muslims in British society. From the Hobbesian perspective of model Thomas, Prevent was a 
tool that supported the capacity of government to prevent terrorism. It was supported by those 
who emphasised the importance of asserting government’s role to protect citizens and enforce 
political norms around the rule of law. From the Lockian perspective of model John, Prevent 
was a process for addressing the reasons why individuals were attracted to the ideas of terrorism 
and was supported by those who believed in the importance of a social consensus to underpin 
the authority of government. Ultimately it was a practical response to the need to improve the 
legitimacy and effectiveness of enforcement and the need to manage social conflict over 
question of developing a shared national identity and values.  
 
	
Ultimately the new framework for decision-making centred on the shared importance of 
establishing trust and credibility between government and society. Prevent was founded on a 
process of distributed engagement to improve confidence in government and to support the 
integration of the Muslim community. At the same time it also led to conflict over the 
boundaries of participation and influence. The debate about non-violent extremism was a 
tangible question about the objectives of Prevent that intersected with questions about the 
parameters of shared social values and identity. This ultimately coalesced around support for 
the authority of government, respect for the rule of law and an outward commitment to a British 
identity and liberal principles of non-discrimination. At the same time conflict also centred on 
the consistency of this framework, including the space for diversity of identity, freedom of 
personal conscience and public dissent. In this area this study would support the argument that 
Prevent both inadvertently, and at times deliberately, subjected the minority Muslim 
community to unfair and racist scrutiny. 
The difficulty of establishing consistency and trust illustrates a cyclical and inextricably linked 
relationship between social consensus and government authority. This process is at the heart 
of the contrast between the investment in a collective sovereign in Hobbes’s Leviathan and the 
negotiated authority described in Locke’s treatise of government (Hobbes 1996; Locke 1996). 
This feedback loop was a factor in the predominantly tactical framing of decision-making 
throughout Prevent. There was a need to give sufficient space for the Muslim community to 
engage with Prevent on its own terms. At the same time there was also pressure on government 
to lead social change. Both positions were accepted by all who participated in the core policy 
community. The question was around the degree to which the Muslim community should set 
the policy agenda and establish the boundaries of acceptability versus a democratically elected 
government largely motivated by the perspective of the non-Muslim majority. This ultimately 
led to a dual focus on the minority Muslim community as both targets and partners for change 
that ensured this balance was under persistent scrutiny.  
 
	
Ultimately, navigating the trade-offs between both Thomas and John represented the primary 
axis that guided decision-making. Decisions attempted to navigate a path toward a social 
consensus that would support the authority of government. As a result Prevent explicitly and 
implicitly incorporated ideas from both models by embedding the short-term benefits of 
engagement into a long-term processes social change. Furthermore the combination of both 
models explicitly recognised the limits of both government’s and civil-society’s ability to deal 
with the complex problem of terrorism. The crisis of the Thomas model was rooted in the 
failure of a narrow enforcement approach to deal with the political dimensions of the problem. 
Equally there was a widespread acknowledgement, especially in the Muslim community, that 
only government had the capacity and authority to lead effective action in both the short and 
long term. By integrating both models Prevent represented a single framework for decision-
making focused on undertaking collective action to prevent terrorism through social integration 
and targeted interventions. 
Policy change 
The conclusion that Prevent was the product of negotiation between the two models contrasts 
with Hall’s zero sum model of change (Blyth 2013; Hall 1993; Pierson 2000a; Schmidt 2010). 
With the caveat of being a single case, this tends to support the more discursive model of 
change that is influenced by both institutions and ideas (Schmidt 2010). The initial framing of 
the crisis emerged from an internal acknowledgement of the contradictions and failure of the 
incumbent model. At the same time Labour’s home affairs and social inclusion strategy created 
conceptual and institutional space for a dual approach and from here the two models produced 
an iterative series of policy trade-offs. These questions were resolved through the wider policy 
and political context, the alignment of institutional support, the framing of arguments in 
relation to the alternative standpoint and the practical capacity to take decisions. This process 
was framed by an interactive dialogue that was centred on the institutional and conceptual axis 
between the two models.  
 
	
In order to assess whether this was an example of paradigmatic change the process can be 
compared against the tests outlined in Chapter 3. There is clearly a high volume of decision-
making, as illustrated by the three Contest strategies and two dedicated Prevent strategies 
during the period. There is evidence that new ideas on social inclusion that originated from 
outside the incumbent security community framed decision-making. There is evidence of 
institutional change given the evolution membership of the policy community and coalitions 
of support, even if the relationships were conditional, unstable and limited. This ultimately 
meant that decisions balanced the two models to maintain a viable policy community which 
produced the two second order policy options described in the previous chapter. This is 
indicative of paradigmatic change. However this study argues that Prevent did not develop as 
a zero-sum competition between two fully conceived models of policy. Rather the two models 
framed the options for decision-makers, which shaped the institutional settlement that in turn 
structured decision-making. 
Importantly, the debate about the causes of terrorism helped to integrate the two models into 
one conceptual framework for decision-making (Stone 2012). Throughout the development of 
Prevent, radicalisation provided a conceptual rationale for broadening the ideational and 
institutional frame of security policy. In addition, the framing of radicalisation as a neutral and 
diffuse social process facilitated the expansion of engagement with the Muslim community and 
beyond in opposition to an ‘out group’ of violent extremists. At the same time the potential 
breadth of this model also created conflict over the effectiveness of interventions and the 
legitimate scope of the agenda, particularly in relation to Islamic identity and foreign policy. 
For example, the debate about whether belief and ideology was a cause or symptom of 
radicalisation acted as a proxy for a debate about the relative importance of structural 
discrimination, social values and identity and responsibility. As a result the causal model was 
both central to the broadening of Prevent and the conflict that characterised it. 
The importance of the concept of radicalisation to integrating the new paradigmatic framework 
contrasts to a degree with Blyth’s slightly pessimistic account of evidence as a self-reinforcing 
 
	
factor for incumbent paradigmatic models (Blyth 2013). This study emphasises the political 
origins of Prevent and its development was characterised by political conflict about values and 
institutional interests. Equally, its development was influenced by an empirical debate about 
the causes of terrorism, policy options and evaluations of success. As Blyth notes in line with 
Hall, Pierson and Schmidt, this debate was closely tied to institutional preferences and the 
evolving political context (Hall 1993; Pierson 2000a; Schmidt 2010). However, evidence 
helped to bring together more abstract theorist approaches to decision-making with the 
institutional frame of practitioners muddling through toward a viable policy (Lindblom 1959). 
This supports the likes of Wildavsky who see evidence as part of an iterative process of 
persuasion that helps to navigate ideas about a problem alongside institutional interests and 
preferences (Wildavsky 1979). 
Prevent also illustrated how empirical arguments can help to integrate abstract ideas about the 
policy problem together with practical institutional considerations (Lindblom 1959). At the 
same time it is important to clarify the types of evidence that were influential in this process. 
Prevent was a conceptual response to the changed security environment but its prioritisation 
was largely driven by street level feedback about community alienation. This combination sets 
institutional feedback as a reference point for decisions alongside abstract empirical and 
ideational stories about the policy problem (Heclo and Wildavsky 1974; Lindblom 1959; Stone 
2012). This does not mean that Prevent was purely referenced against institutional interests or 
abstract beliefs, but that different forms of evidence engaged with different aspects of decision-
making. Polling and academic research contributed to describing a phenomena, policy research 
helped to define the policy options and institutional feedback set out the tactical factors that 
were necessary to deliver a viable policy. In this context Prevent was very much a product of 
the collective process, or art, of navigating an interlocking framework of ideas, institutions and 
empirical authority. 
The development of Prevent also demonstrates the challenge of implementing a contentious 
policy agenda through the explicit and implicit institutional checks and balances of liberal 
 
	
democratic government. Decision-makers had to navigate a series of tactical steps and strategic 
trade-offs that were necessary to develop a viable institutional response to the political and 
practical challenge of terrorism and extremism. In this case the boundaries were negotiated by 
different institutional objectives and conceptual visions of the policy to form a new framework 
for decision-making. Furthermore the study illustrates the latent tension between the need to 
challenge institutional and ideational boundaries as part of a process of change whilst being 
responsive to the need to avoid counter-productive conflict. Those trying to influence this 
process were faced by similar tactical and strategic calibrations around participating in 
decisions or challenging the principles and assumptions of the process. How policy-makers 
approach these trade-offs, for better or for worse, are ultimately strategic and tactical 
calculations. 
Endo and exogenous factors 
The process of change represented an interplay between endo and exogenous influences in the 
decision-making process (Heclo and Wildavsky 1974; John et al 2013; Lipsky 1997; Rhodes 
1997; Sabatier & Weible 2007). Exogenous influences were fundamental to the process of 
institutional and ideational change at the heart of Prevent. In short, Prevent was a direct and 
practical response to the external challenge of terrorism. The most obvious input was the 9/11 
attacks and the invasion of Iraq which shifted the overall risk assessment of the security 
services and the political agenda. Similarly Labour’s decision to prioritise Prevent was a direct 
response to the Madrid attacks in 2004 whilst the public focus on Prevent after 2005 was 
directly related to the 7/7 attacks. The significance of these events also encouraged the Muslim 
community and agencies to engage with Prevent despite their reservations about the agenda. 
At the same time the compromise approach that narrowed the scope of Prevent occurred in the 
context of an evolving security climate and the Coalition government’s focus on fiscal 
consolidation following the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
	
Prevent was also an explicitly political response to the political challenge facing the 
government (John et al 2013). At the heart of Prevent was an attempt to establish a consensus 
to challenge the views of radical Islamist activists who promoted a view of the world that 
divided Islam and Muslims from the Christian west. In addition Labour’s decision to prioritise 
Prevent also responded to feedback about the political alienation of the Muslim community, 
including potential electoral threats in local constituencies and wider sensitivity to political 
protests about the Iraq war. At the same time Prevent responded to political pressure to adopt 
a robust stance toward Islamist extremism. For example, the shift toward a more assertive 
definition of extremism in 2009 was in the context of increasing support for critics of multi-
culturalism in the Conservative party and the BNP. The 2011 compromise was also a product 
of the politics of Coalition that balanced values based engagement with negative liberalism and 
civil liberties. 
Equally the actual development of Prevent is best understood by looking at the endogenous 
institutional factors that structured and constrained decision-making (Bulpit 1998; Heclo and 
Wildavsky 1974; Rhodes 1997). In particular, many of the key decisions that shaped Prevent 
were expressly focused on establishing and maintaining a viable consensus across a broader 
policy community. The breakdown in the authority of the conventional approach to security 
was in part driven by street level feedback about the impact of policing on community relations 
and the legal constraints on policy makers (Lipsky 1997). The importance of street level 
feedback was further entrenched by the adoption of a tactical approach to community 
engagement through distributed decision-making that emphasised local discretion. As a result 
the feedback between members of the new policy community shaped the key decisions 
throughout Prevent. This included adopting a neutral approach to extremism to facilitate 
engagement and the subsequent consensus around a narrower model in order to manage the 
growing conflict over values. 
The grey area between endo and exogenous inputs also highlights the challenge of studying 
decision-making in what are ultimately open systems (Sabatier & Weible 2007). For example, 
 
	
Prevent itself was in part a reaction to the impact of the government’s own response to the 
terrorist attacks, which included the ramping up of enforcement powers and the invasion of 
Iraq. Putting aside whether these interventions were justified given the threat from al-Qaeda 
they are nevertheless examples of the feedback loop in government decision-making. Other 
examples include the structural legacy of government’s failure to address racism and 
segregation that had created the opportunity for Islamist groups. This line of thinking could 
even extend to the post-colonial roots of Islamist political ideas, a view that was dismissed as 
absurd by Blair in 2006. More conventionally key ideas that shaped Prevent, such as the 
influence of social inclusion on the model of radicalisation, were exogenous to the incumbent 
security policy community. Likewise, the opportunities for various local events, ideas and 
interests to influence decision-making through the distributed model became a key factor in 
the search for control in 2011. 
Incommensurability 
The conclusion that Prevent represented a new framework based on two competing models 
contradicts Hall’s conventional model of paradigmatic change (Hall 1993). However, the 
findings presented here, particularly the instability of the policy community, reinforces Hall’s 
proposition that combining competing models leads to dysfunctional policy. Prevent was 
structured around a sensitive balance between the models that created a series of trade-offs 
with consequences for the aims of Prevent. In practice the conflict centred on the extent to 
which government was a neutral arbiter that could enable social integration without resorting 
to coercion that would undermine its own authority and legitimacy (Almond 1988; Arendt 
1970; Skocpol & Amenta 1986). The John model emphasised a distributed process of 
negotiation and mediation of social interests and identities in order to develop social cohesion. 
In contrast the Thomas model emphasised the legitimacy of government as a central point of 
reference for social interests and identity.  
 
	
The link between these dimensions was embedded into the disputes over the values and status 
of the Muslim community and the process of integration. Decision-making was structured into 
a tactical balance between establishing trust and confidence in the agenda whilst also pushing 
a process of change. Push too far and support for the policy broke down within the policy 
community, leading to disengagement by the Muslim community. Fail to push far enough and 
government came under political pressure to demonstrate clearer leadership and action. This 
structured decision-making into an incremental process that sought a viable balance between 
the two models. The process of striking a practical balance between abstract models again takes 
us back to the theorist and pragmatist model of Lindblom (Lindblom 1959). Members of the 
core policy community had the opportunity to introduce their interests and ideas into decision-
making. At the same time their influence was contingent on them recognising the constraints 
associated with balancing the competing models. 
Equally, Prevent did not represent a stable framework for decision-making. For example there 
were on-going questions about its practical impact on preventing terrorism, an inherently tricky 
question to measure. Neither is it clear whether Prevent was the right framework or whether 
the decisions taken within it were effective or rational in Blyth’s Bayesian sense (Blyth 2013). 
Blyth’s model tends to frame the issue of success and failure as political questions rooted in 
institutional interests and abstract ideas. In the case of Prevent decision-making was often 
expressly focused on managing institutional conflict over values and interests but itself became 
a focal point for grievances and conflict. Many members of the policy community had the 
option of withdrawing support which both emphasised the need for institutional consensus 
whilst undermining the stability of the reciprocal relationships that were central to the 
distributed model. This raises questions about the success of Prevent on its own terms as a way 
of establishing support for the government’s response to terrorism. 
Fundamentally Prevent was a strategy for managing political conflict around the response to 
terrorism. On one level this is obvious, Prevent was expressly intended to address political 
violence and was founded on a deep consensus that political violence was corrosive to the 
 
	
collective and individual rights of citizens and society. The combination of the two competing 
models was the result of the need to maintain confidence in government’s ability to deal with 
the complexity of home grown terrorism. The focus on the relationship between government 
and society was also an explicit recognition of the need to manage political conflict over the 
response. It was also a part of a response to political conflict that was ultimately driven by the 
ideology of radical Islamists and linked to dynamics of national identity and integration. From 
this perspective Prevent sought to manage political conflict by creating space for the Muslim 
community to participate in the response to a complex problem. 
Integration and diversity 
This study has also shown how Prevent was a microcosm of the debate about integration and 
cohesion in Britain. In the development of Prevent, integration policy was both a conceptual 
tool, methodology and objective. Therefore Prevent is also illustrative of the tensions inherent 
in integration, the accommodation of diversity and the resolution of grievances (Cantle 2012; 
Modood 2007; Saggar 2010a; Sen 2006). One of the main lessons from this study was that 
integration, and by extension, confidence in government, cannot simply be asserted. At the 
same time neither can integration proceed in a meaningful way without a commitment to shared 
objectives. Expanding the policy community necessitated a process that gave participants 
confidence that they could shape decisions and their outcomes. However, this trust also 
required agreement on the objectives of the process and the shared values of participants. As a 
result Prevent, was persistently framed as a threat to or overly accommodating of minority 
differences. 
The study shows the dual importance of trust in the authority of government and the acceptance 
of different identities in integration policy. The limitations of the narrow Thomas model of 
security was rooted in the failure to maintain its legitimacy amongst the groups that 
experienced its effects the most. Equally, the failures of the John model was rooted in the 
failure to create a clear consensus about the parameters and objectives for the new policy 
 
	
community. This created the circular challenge of establishing trust in the process that was 
contingent on establishing shared principles through a process of dialogue. Tactical decision-
making was inevitable in order to balance engagement with change in a way that recognised 
the fluidity of identity whilst also responding to structural imbalances in the process. In this 
respect actively drawing Muslim perspectives into decision-making was an essential measure 
to address a structural deficit in most public institutions.  
During that time Prevent was also challenged by opponents of the inherent compromises that 
were involved in such a process. Although much of this debate focused on the Muslim 
community itself it was also emblematic of the contemporary political tension between national 
and liberal political identities. There was a basic consensus around the rule of law and non-
violent political change. At the same time there was conflict around the legitimacy of dissent, 
the experiences of the Muslim community and the role of government. Perhaps most 
importantly there was a dual, and often contradictory, framework of national and liberal 
identity that is the subject of a wider debate around Europe that extends far beyond the Muslim 
community. The two dimensions represented a shifting framework that exacerbated concern 
about how fairly and consistently Muslim identity was being treated in integration and security 
policy. At the same time Prevent was also exposed to criticisms from those who exclusively 
viewed integration through liberal or national lenses. 
Prevent also illustrates the dual dimensions of integration. The Hobbesian Thomas model 
emphasised the role of government in protecting individual rights and as a neutral reference 
point for integration. At the same time the Lockeian model John exerted a dual institutional 
pressure to conform to a liberal social identity and an expressed British identity as a condition 
of participation in decision-making (Hall 1993; Powell & DiMaggio 1983). The combination 
of Hobbes and Locke meant that legal frameworks such as the Human Rights Act and non-
discrimination laws became important reference points for testing the private views of minority 
groups and individuals. Furthermore, the pressure to affirm a British identity often put these 
principles to one side, or positioned them as inherently British. At the same time Muslims and 
 
	
the Muslim community was framed through one identity that masked the personal nuances of 
heritage, education, employment, age and values. 
This type of contradictory framework creates obvious problems for the relationship between 
government and minority groups such as the Muslim community. In some respects Prevent 
recognised the legacy of institutional racism that can be traced from the MacPherson report to 
the public sector duty in the Equality Act 2010 (MacPherson 1999).39 It emphasised the need 
to establish confidence in the consistency of government counter terrorism policy amongst the 
Muslim community. Equally, political scrutiny of Islamism challenged the neutral tactical 
approach to community engagement but there was limited substantive interrogation of the 
inconsistencies and contradictions of majority attitudes against the nascent framework of 
British values. This tension was ultimately resolved by making a distinction between public 
and private views and the delegation of community engagement to local levels, away from the 
centralised Prevent agenda. This allowed more space for a means based engagement with the 
Muslim community based on a outward commitment to the shared set of British values but 
without resolving mistrust about the motivations, values and beliefs of different groups. 
Ultimately, the separation of integration and security policy was a tactical retreat from the 
complexities of integration policy. Both the Labour and Conservative governments pushed for 
engagement based on a positive outward commitment adherence to liberal values and British 
identity, as captured in Cameron’s idea of muscular British liberalism. This was intended to 
move away from a ‘negative’ liberal model of multi-cultural integration that allowed space for 
different social identities and private attitudes, even where these may not be liberal in 
themselves (Cantle 2012; Modood 2007). However, the practicalities of community 
engagement meant that the push toward an assertive liberal approach in Prevent from 2009 
onwards paradoxically may have resulted in a retreat back to a negative liberal model of 
	
39 The Equality Act places an expectation on public authorities to have due regard to the aims of the act by 
removing or minimising disadvantages suffered by people due to their protected characteristics; taking steps to 
meet the needs of people from protected groups where these are different from the needs of other people and 
encouraging people from protected groups to participate in public life or in other activities where their 
participation is disproportionately low. 
 
	
community engagement. The assertive values based approach was only made possible by 
separating Prevent from wider questions of integration policy, protecting local discretion over 
community engagement outside of Prevent. Ultimately the growing conflict around Prevent 
and the changed financial climate resulted in a retreat from more active engagement with the 
issue of shared social and political identity. 
This further illustrates the importance of institutional capacity and leadership when addressing  
the dual challenge of process and principles inherent to integration (Saggar 2010a; Cantle 
2012). The tactical trade-offs associated with maintaining a viable consensus whilst 
demonstrating meaningful change required clear leadership that could give different groups 
confidence in the objectives and fairness of the process. Prevent was simultaneously motivated 
and undermined by the breakdown in trust between the Labour government and most of the 
Muslim community, and beyond, over the invasion of Iraq. Religious and racial identity 
politics, including the growing political assertiveness of nativist identity groups, also narrowed 
the focus onto the social and political integration of Muslims. Prevent did make some 
contribution to cohesive political and social values through collective action at local levels. 
Nevertheless ideas of national identity and liberalism were too often seen as instruments that 
were used to challenge Muslim identity rather than a means of empowerment and integration. 
New Labour and the Conservatives 
Prevent also seems to have occupied the odd status of being a highly political agenda that didn’t 
become an electoral issue. Some of this was a question of timing. Both the 2001 election and, 
in particular, the 2005 elections happened before the attacks in those years. In the 2010 election 
the Conservatives emphasised a critique of Labour’s economic management and whilst 
presenting a socially liberal form of conservatism. Ultimately, Prevent’s complexity and 
sensitivity excluded it from electoral platforms and it was never specifically addressed in the 
Labour or Conservative manifestos covered by this study. This is in part indicative of the 
benefits of a paradigmatic consensus that took complex decisions away from direct electoral 
 
	
scrutiny. At the same time Prevent was highly sensitive to political scrutiny from outside the 
core policy community. The dynamic can be traced from the initial concern about the electoral 
mobilisation of the Muslim community following the invasion of Iraq. The political positioning 
of Prevent can also be traced through the more assertive stance in the context of growing 
nativist political dynamics from 2005 onwards. 
In practice the concept of Prevent as a pre-criminal model of intervention was a point of 
consensus between the main parties but with different emphases. The Conservatives and New 
Labour both emphasised strong government leadership. For New Labour Prevent was a ‘third 
way’ strategy that mitigated the political impact of strong enforcement powers and the invasion 
of Iraq. The approach recognised the constraints on government but sought to exert influence 
on civil society and local authorities through a distributed model of networked governance. 
The Conservative approach was fundamentally wedded to the politics of compromise inherent 
to the Coalition. This balanced a more assertive approach to engagement whilst leaving more 
space for autonomous civil society and local decision-making, that was also linked to the wider 
strategy for implementing spending cuts. Crucially Prevent embedded the ideas of inadvertent 
social causes of terrorism and extremism through the model of radicalisation that contrasted 
with the traditional Conservative focus on individual responsibility. Even the shift to a targeted 
approach was framed by the safeguarding model behind Channel. 
The Conservative’s focus on upfront shared values contrasted with Labour’s initial adoption 
of a more tactical approach to engagement. In many respect New Labour’s own modernist 
reformist identity facilitated the original development of Prevent whilst also undermining trust 
in the way that it dealt with questions of extremism and social identity. New Labour’s framing 
of policy encouraged the evidence led debate about the causes of terrorism. In addition the 
neutral framing of extremism helped to establish a distributed policy community that extended 
the influence of central government, including with local civil-society organisations. At the 
same time this also led to conflict over the consistency of national and local decision-making 
and the coherence of the policy community that ultimately undermined Labour’s ability to 
 
	
move the extremism agenda forward in 2009. This produced conflict with the Muslim 
community around liberal values and attitudes from one dimension and the growing electoral 
pressure to reassert a national identity in definitions of extremism from the right. As a result 
New Labour struggled to navigate the tactical nuances that were central to the networked 
governance approach. 
The difficulty faced by both governments demonstrates the importance of leadership when 
dealing with complex questions of social integration. It highlights the difficulty of maintaining 
confidence in the neutrality and consistency of government across diverse social groups whilst 
also asserting shared social values and identity, particularly where there is growing competition 
between minority and nativist political identities. Ultimately Labour struggled to implement a 
more sophisticated model whilst the Conservatives focused on clarity and consistency at the 
cost of the agenda’s scope and reach. In reality, the challenge that faced Labour was the same 
problem that had motivated Prevent in the first place, i.e. the breakdown in trust with the 
Muslim community over the invasion of Iraq and anti-terrorism law. Iraq was such a divisive 
issue that Labour, and particularly Tony Blair, struggled to establish the necessary trust that 
Prevent was a genuine attempt to develop a collective response to terrorism. It is possibly 
arguable that a different international response post 9/11 may have made Prevent unnecessary 
but that is a counter-factual question and out of the scope of this study.	
Future research 
This study has examined the original development of the Prevent strategy. There would now 
be merit in examining how the policy has evolved in the years since 2011 (Thomas 2017). This 
research would use the same analytical framework to compare how the balance between the 
distributed consensual model and centralised government leadership and the associated trade-
offs have evolved in Prevent. The research would examine how the balance has responded to 
the evolving threat, including the rise of ISIS and the growth of the internet for recruitment and 
the dissemination of propaganda. In particular it would be important to assess the implications 
 
	
of the introduction of a statutory Prevent duty on public authorities in 2015, how this has 
reconfigured the policy community and the associated constraints and influence on decision-
making. There have also been on-going debates about the appropriate breadth of the policy, 
including approaches to non-violent extremism in education, as was illustrated by the ‘Trojan 
Horse’ case in Birmingham schools.40 
Building on this, many of the issues highlighted in the study are also contemporary issues of 
importance beyond the UK. It would be of interest to develop the analytical models of the state, 
Thomas and John, used in this study as part of a comparative assessment of preventative 
counter terrorism policy across different countries. This would include assessing how other 
western European countries have approached preventing terrorism, plus countries such as 
Australia, the US or Canada with similar liberal political traditions to the UK. At the same time 
it would also be of interest to examine how this framework would apply in non-western states 
with different traditions and relationships between government and civil-society. It would be 
important for this research to assess a case of dealing with violent political movements 
associated with a large minority, or even a majority group. The research would compare 
different approaches to the relationship between security and integration policy and how the 
structure of the relationship between government and civil-society shaped decision-making.  
A third area for further research would focus on the model of the policy process used in this 
study to improve the theoretical relationship between ideas and institutions in policy change. 
Specifically this research would focus more explicitly on the act of persuasion, including how 
ideas are used to align institutional interests and values, or vice versa, to create authority for 
decisions, as this represents a gap potential weakness in this study. This study would aim to 
contribute further to the debate between Hall, Schmidt and Blyth to explore the relationship 
	
40 The Trojan Horse case was based on an apparent Islamist plot to take over the governance of a series of 
Birmingham schools, including both faith and non-denominational schools. Inspections of the schools and 
academies by Ofstead and the Education Funding Authority and a subsequent review by Peter Clark, a former 
counter terrorism police officer, on behalf of the government highlighted concern about individuals with positions 




between ideas and institutions in a negotiated process (Hall 1993; Blyth 2013; Schmidt 2010). 
Of particular interest here would be the balance that is struck between aligning with dominant 
institutional and ideational framings to gain support whilst also driving change in line with 
paradigmatic ideas and associated values or interests. This would include the tactical and 
strategic trade-offs that face members of policy communities, including the role of utilitarian 
versus values based approaches, and what constitutes a successful advocacy strategy. 
The final opportunity for further research would be an examination of how policy making in 
relation security and integration is responding to populist political trends (Stoker 2018). The 
process examined in this study was largely framed by liberal ideas of networked governance 
that largely integrated autonomous decision-making around utilitarian ideas, often whilst 
minimising the explicit values question of non-violent extremism. However, populist trends 
across Europe and the US, both from the nationalist right and the socialist left, are challenging 
this model of government. Populist politics tends to focus on exercising the authority of the 
state on behalf of an indivisible view of the interests and values of society and claim to assert 
popular control of increasingly globalised economies and societies from unaccountable elites. 
This is in direct contrast with a more liberal models of governance that have emphasised the 
benefits of protecting the space between government, civil-society and economic interests over 
direct popular accountability. An updated version of this study, would examine how the 
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Annexe A: Interviews 
Interview sample 
This section provides further details on the individuals interviewed for the study. 16 semi-
structured interviews were conducted with individuals who were identified through literature 
or through recommendations during the course of the research. Interviews targeted a set of 
advisors primarily from Muslim backgrounds who worked in or with the civil service on 
Prevent, plus permanent civil servants involved in the original development of Prevent. 
Perspectives were also sought from organisations that were associated with decision-making, 
including at street level. 
The main weakness was the gender balance of the sample. This was in part a reflection of the 
male imbalance of advisors involved in Prevent, something that has been commented on in 
analyses and commentary at the time. There were women who were involved and influenced 
the development of Prevent who were not directly involved in this study but whose views I 
have attempted to record and represent in this study. The other weakness was related to the 
breadth of interviews, including those on the outside who were critical of the policy itself and 
the breadth of street level views. In these cases primary and secondary literature was used to 
support the study’s findings. 
Although the study was not affected notably by non-participation there are some important 
observations to share. Some individuals declined to participate, both actively and through non-
response. The most notable of these were individuals associated with the Muslim Council of 
Britain at the time. Other notable gaps included individuals involved in Policy Exchange and 
Quilliam. Some individuals deferred direct engagement by referring to reports that reflected 
their views of Prevent. 
The main challenge was generating trust with respondents. Access was facilitated by personal 
contacts and my professional credentials. However, there was a noticeable wariness of 
 
	
respondents at the outset of interviews. This was addressed through strong reassurance about 
anonymity and clarification about the research agenda and my personal credibility. Given the 
small sample pool and the sensitivity of participants extreme care has been taken to protect the 
identity of individuals who participated.	
1. Advisor 1: Male. Independent advisor to government affiliated with significant Islamic 
religious institution who worked with the Home Office and DCLG and other relevant 
bodies throughout the period. Interview held on 20 June 2014 
2. Advisor 2: Male. Academic and independent advisor to government who worked with 
the Home Office and DCLG throughout the period. 5 August 2014 
3. Advisor 3: Male. Independent advisor to government affiliated with Islamic 
organisations who worked with the Home Office and DCLG throughout the period. 14 
October 2014 
4. Advisor 4: Male. Former ministerial advisor from 2009 until 2012 on faith 
communities. 31 January 2015 
5. Advisor 5: Female. Civil servant who advised the Home Office and DLCG on the 
development of the initial prevent strategy. 22 October 2014 
6. Advisor 6: Independent advisor to government who advised the Home Office and 
DLCG on community cohesion and Prevent. 18 December 2014  
7. Advisor 7: Male. Former civil servant who worked with the Home Office during early 
development of Prevent and initial Muslim community engagement up to 2006. 22 
September 2014. 
8. Civil servant 1: Male. Former senior civil servant who joined DCLG team just prior to 
set up to develop the first full Prevent strategy. 15 December 2015 
9. Civil servant 2: Male. Former senior civil servant who transferred from Home Office 
 
	
to DCLG and worked on initial development of Prevent until 2007. 9 December 2014 
10. Regional government officer: Male. Civil servant involved in coordinating regional 
Prevent work from 2007 to 2011 plus previous experience of set up of a safer 
neighbourhood partnership in urban local authority between 2005 and 2006. 1 October 
2014 
11. Local government officer: Male. Prevent and community safety lead for inner London 
borough 2008 onwards.  5 November 2014 
12. Local government chief executive: Male. Former chief executive of large city local 
authority from 2005 to 2011 that had significant relevance to Prevent and wider 
Contest strategy. 30 September 2014. 
13. Police Officer: Male. Former investigating officer with the metropolitan police who 
had involvement in Muslim community engagement work. 5 August 2014 
14. Chief Constable: Male. Former chief police officer with active involvement of initial 
development of Prevent activity through the Association of Chief Policy Officers from 
2002 to 2007. 24 November 2014. 
15. Government minister: Male. Former Labour government minister, secretary of state 
and backbencher between 2001 and 2010. 2 December 2014. 
16. Political advisor: Male. Former political advisor to Labour government minister 





Interview topic guide 
Interviews were conducted using a semi structured topic guide. Interviews followed a broad 
structure to examine whether policy changed; in what way; and why. The interview was based 
around four main grand tour questions:  
a. Your role in it – your objectives, actions, any evolution 
b. Your observations about the policy – aims, instruments, outcomes 
c. How you think it changes over time – events, phases, trends 
d. Who was influential – how and why 
The interviews also tested the study hypotheses through questions that were tailored to the 
interviewee and their involvement in the process (see Annexe B, main hypothesis). Testing 
questions sought to clarify certain decisions and interrogate what they may say about whether 
the period represented a reframing of security policy from a narrow centralised model to a more 
consensual distributed approach. This included encouraging narrative reflection on: 
• How the policy and decision making evolved during the period across the main 
approaches – violent extremism v non-violent extremism & targeted direct 
interventions v developmental indirect approaches. (See Annexe B, Hypothesis A). 
• The ideas in the process including their origins  such as integration, social justice, 
national political identity, crime reduction, reform v. communitarianism, hearts and 
minds, clash of civilisations & risk. (See Annexe B, Hypothesis B). 
• The process that drove change – whether it was a centralised home office led and 
managed process or a decentralised process involving a variety of government and 
civil-society actors (See Annexe B, Hypothesis C. 
Testing questions for each interview were developed around the following topic framework 




Primary Question Sub question Themes 
Why did the interviewee 




What were the objectives of the policy? Stop terrorist attacks 
Mitigate the impacts of terrorism 
Address the causes of terrorism 
Reform security policy 
Who was involved? 
Who ultimately had the most influence? 
Security policy actors 
Social policy actors 
Civil society actors 
‘Uncivil’ society actors 
In what way did the 
interviewee think the policy 
changed over time?  






When did the changes occur? 2001 - 2005: prioritisation 
2005 - 2008: development 
2008 - 2011: implementation and review 




How did the interviewee to 
influence the process 
influenced? What about 
others in the process?  












Annexe B: Analytical framework 
Analysis of data, including interview transcripts and primary documents was guided by the 
study’s hypotheses and analytical frames. 
Main hypothesis: Prevent was an example of paradigmatic change 
The overall study was guided by the following hypothesis – Prevent represented a change in 
policy from model Thomas to Model John. This hypothesis acted as the main reference point 
for the collection and analysis of data and the overall conclusions. The following table sets 
out the expectations and features of a Prevent policy based on either of the models. 
Theory Hypothesis Coding examples 
Ideas: Paradigmatic change 
should result in a new 
internally coherent ideational 
framework for policy 
development and 
implementation that is 
incommensurable with a 
previously incumbent 
ideational framework (Hall 
1993).  
A new paradigmatic 
framework should include 
changes in all of the following 
Prevent was founded on the following ideas 
and beliefs: 
a. Security is achieved through the 
principles of consensual sovereignty – 
the tradition of Locke 
b. Terrorism is the manifestation of a 
social and political process of 
radicalisation that is caused by 
alienation and segregation 
c. Policy should prevent the causes of 
terrorism upstream by addressing the 
root causes of radicalisation 
d. Solutions must be non-coercive and 
developmental and should avoid 
“Radicalisation is a long term process of 
polarisation and alienation caused by the social 
and political structure of society” 
“It is achieved ‘upstream’ by addressing the root 
causes of terrorism that cause alienation and 
tacit support” 
“Long term models of social and political 
integration are essential for addressing these root 
causes” 
“Radicalisation is caused by foreign policy/ 
terrorism policy/ majority racism and prejudice” 
“Radicalisation is caused by Islamic 
fundamentalism/ extremism/ self segregation” 
 
	
elements (Daigneault 2013, 
Stone 2013): 
• Principles and values 
• Analysis of causes and 
phenomena 
• Aims and objectives 
• Hypotheses about 
solutions  
exacerbating the causes of 
radicalisation 
These ideas replaced the incumbent model 
of policy: 
e. Security is achieved by government as 
the sovereign protector of the rights of 
its citizens – the Hobbes tradition 
f. Terrorism is caused by the tactics and 
strategy of extreme groups 
g. Terrorism is prevented by disrupting 
groups and individuals who are active 
participants in terrorism 
h. Solutions must focus on identifying, 
tracking and controlling any individuals 
or groups suspected of being involved 
in terrorism  
“This was a radical rethink to our previous 
approaches to security and integration policy” 
“Security is the responsibility of almost all 
public agencies and civil organisations that work 
with society and Muslim communities in 
particular” 
 
Process: A paradigmatic 
change should involve a 
process that has the following 
features: 
• Increased volume of actors 
and inputs in the policy 
process 
• Increased authority of 
actors previously on the 
Decision-making should be plural and 
prioritise the development of consensus: 
a. The authority of security services to 
determine policy is undermined by an 
increase in domestic recruitment. 
b. A larger volume of inputs will be 
incorporated into the process from the 
following communities: 
• political and media sources 
“The events of the time meant it was essential to 
take a new look at how we did security policy”  
“There were a lot of new groups/ a free for all of 
groups trying to influence policy” 
“Many of the ideas of the time came from non-
security communities” 
“We had not previously tried to influence policy 
as our ideas were not listened to” 
 
	
margins of a policy 
subsystem,  
• Lessened authority of the 
arguments of dominant 
actors 
(Hall 1993, Rhodes 1997) 
• social policy community 
• community organisations 
• policy reform advocates 
• northern Ireland 
“This was an opportunity to influence security 
policy that we had not seen before” 
“There were lots of ideas around, many of them 
untested but many of them were potentially valid 
and useful” 
Outcomes: A paradigmatic 
change is associated with an 
increased volume of policy 
change that translates into 
practical and substantive 
change, including: 
• New or reformed 
institutions  
• Re-allocation of resources,  
• Statutory instruments  
• Front line implementation 
A high volume of change would be 
necessary in order to drive reform of across 
a new policy community: 
• A new policy community, and 
associated advocacy coalitions, that 
incorporates the CLG, Local authorities 
and community groups alongside 
security and policing. 
• New investment in solutions based on 
pre criminal preventative models of 
security. 
• New or reformed statutory instruments 
designed to address the root causes of 
radicalisation, including non-
discrimination and terrorism legislation. 
• New practices for policing, foreign 
policy, integration and community 
engagement, education and social 
services. 
 “We now work in much closer and constructive 
partnership with the police/ Muslim community/ 
local authorities/ education institutions” 
 “The local prevent boards were an important 
feature in developing a new coherent community 
to develop and implement policy” 
“There were shared allies for our approach to the 
causes and solutions of radicalisation in the 
police/ local authorities/ community/ education”  
“We now actively consider the potential 
negative impacts that our actions and policies 
may have on radicalisation throughout our 
work” 
“There is a broad consensus that a principled 
framework for defining non-violent extremism is 
an important basis for informing our work” 
“We changed our approach to security 
operations in order to take into account their 
 
	
negative impacts on communities and 
alienation” 
“We have a working consensus on the definition 
of radicalisation around against which we are 
able to evaluate the effectiveness of our work“ 
Incremental change 
Ideas 
An incremental or second 
order change would update 
some but not all of the 
ideational elements of the 
dominant security paradigm: 
a. Security is achieved by the 
state as the sovereign 
protector of the democratic 
and human rights of its 
citizens – the Hobbes 
tradition 
b. Terrorism is caused by the 
tactics and strategy of 
extremist groups 
c. Terrorism is prevented by 
disrupting groups and 
An incremental process would likely result 
in the following changes to model Thomas: 
• Security is achieved by government as 
the sovereign protector of the rights of 
its citizens – Hobbesian tradition (No 
change) 
• Terrorism is caused by the tactics and 
strategy of extremist groups (no 
change) 
• Terrorism is prevented by disrupting 
active terrorists and violent extremist 
groups – plus change to non violent 
ideological relatives and tacit 
supporters 
• Solutions must focus on tracking and 
controlling suspected terrorists and 
extremists - but will only be effective if 
supported by a wider community 
“Radicalisation is the rational and strategic 
process of groups and individuals adopting 
violent tactics to achieve political aims” 
“Preventing terrorism is achieved ‘downstream’ 
by catching criminals, isolating supporters and 
turning sympathisers” 
“Community policy is important for managing 
relations and producing intelligence to identify 
these groups and individuals” 
“There were community concerns that could be 
addressed as a trade off for cooperation in the 
policy” 
“We had to bring Muslim communities on board 




individuals who are active 
participants in terrorism 
d. Solutions must focus on 
identify, tracking and 
control any individuals 
suspected of being 
involved in terrorism 
“Ultimately non violent extremism that 
contributed to terrorist recruitment should also 
be a target for security policy”  
“Definitions of extremism should be used 
tactically based on the needs to disrupt terrorism 
and extremists” 
“Achieving security is primarily the 
responsibility of police and security services” 
Process: An incremental 
change is likely to be 
dominated by a relatively 
closed group of policy makers 
who negotiate the 
interpretation of external 
trends and signals through 
clearly defined transactional 
relationships of power and 
authority. 
In incremental change will likely involve a 
process where security policy makers 
sought updated their own policy and 
practice. Ideas would be drawn from the 
experiences of northern Ireland, with 
additional inputs sought from the CLG and 
community groups to establish viable 
models of implementation.  
 
“Home grown recruitment in the Muslim 
community was new issue to deal with” 
“The experience of northern Ireland showed us 
that we would only be effective if we took into 
account wider community issues” 
“The heightened security threat meant that we 
needed to try everything to make our work more 
effective” 
“The political profile of security and foreign 
policy meant that we needed to be seen to be 
doing something new” 
“We had to bring other policy communities on 
board in order to make it work as there would be 
aspects security and policing could not achieve”  
 
	
“This was a home office led agenda but they 
were looking for ideas and suggestions to inform 
their thinking” 
“We were already doing a lot of ground level 
community cohesion work with Asian 
communities after the summer riots of 2001” 
“Any definition of extremism needed to be 
based on the principles and practice of existing 
laws to maintain support through 
implementation” 
Outcomes: There is an 
updating of some of the 
elements of the policy: 
• New or reformed 
institutions  
• allocation of resources 
• statutory instruments and  
• front line implementation 
of solutions 
An incremental change would likely 
produce 
• Allocation of resources to a stand-alone 
policy to improve community relations. 
• Developing targeted solutions based on 
early interventions, such as youth 
justice support.  
However other elements of the policy are 
likely to see little change on the ground: 
• Security policy community continues to 
be distinct, with limited cooperation or 
exchange 
“In practice Prevention was a limited 
consideration in our work” 
“By doing work that would benefit the 
community we also helped to prevent 
radicalisation” 
“By addressing community concerns about 
crime also helped to prevent radicalisation” 
“Prevent helped us to improve soft intelligence 
relationships with community groups” 
“We used Prevent to monitor potential terrorist 
suspects and extremist groups more effectively” 
“We use definitions of extremism tactically to 
avoid controversy or isolate problematic groups” 
 
	
• Non security agencies continue to see 
prevention as secondary element of 
their work 
• Statutory instruments play a limited or 
second order political role in the policy  
 
“The local prevent boards were useful for a time 
but were not significant players in local or 
national policy” 
“There has not really been a substantive change 
in our relationship with other agencies locally on 
this issue” 
“we introduced the 2006 religious discrimination 
legislation to keep the Muslim community on 
side” 
“The glorification of terrorism offence was 
partly a political move to address concern about 
radicals” 
“The glorification of terrorism offence was 
important tool for framing the definition of 
extremism but ultimately has limited practical 






In order to examine whether Prevent was an example of paradigmatic change the study focused 
on the process of decision-making. To do this the study used a series of process tests to examine 
three indicators of paradigmatic change: the volume of decisions; the origins of ideas  and 
evidence of institutional change.  
Hypothesis A: Was there an increased volume of decision-making? 
This test represented a contextual indicator of paradigmatic change founded on the idea that 
intense decision-making is indicative of new inputs into decision-making, including 
endogenous and exogenous inputs. In addition it is also considered indicative that new ideas 
and institutional relationships will re-shaping decision-making.  
The study tested this hypothesis by tracing how the relative prioritisation and implementation 
of different policy solutions during the period. A paradigmatic change would be associated 
with an increased volume of first and second order changes in policy, this includes decision to 
• New or reformed institutions  
• Allocation of resources,  
• Introduction of new legislation 
• Changes to front line implementation 
In order to trace the volume of first and second order decision-making the study used a schema 
of different policy options against which different decisions could be traced. These models 






• Enforcement – “the priority was identifying and controlling individuals who are 
potentially involved in terrorism” 
• Community partnership – “the priority was improving relationships in order to develop 
effective policy and solutions” 
• Integration – “the priority was improving the condition and integration of Muslim 
community” 
• Isolating non-violent extremists – “the priority was defining and isolating extremist 
groups” 
Quadrants (anti clockwise from top left): 
• Means based engagement – “the priority was improving intelligence from the whole 
Muslim community regardless of religious or political views” 
• Multiculturalism – “the priority was developing diverse community identities to 












• Cohesion – “the priority was developing a stronger single cultural and political identity 
to improve resilience to extremism” 
• Principles based engagement – “the priority was improving links with culturally and 
politically moderate Muslim groups” 
Test B: Were new ideas were introduced into the policy making process? (ideas) 
The second test focused on the ideas that framed decisions, including their origins and 
foundations. For paradigmatic change the following conditions will need to be met: 
• Volume – larger number and more diverse range of ideas 
• History – that have limited prior application in security policy 
For paradigmatic change the study should find data in interviews and documents that indicates 
a greater presence of the following non-security ideas that have limited previous practical 
application in security policy: 
• Islam, integration and segregation 
• Social justice, inclusion and alienation 
• National identity and civic education 
• Preventative crime reduction 
• Public policy reform 
For incremental change the study should find data in interviews and documents that indicates 
continuing presence of the following ideas that have a history of practical application in 
security policy: 
• Hearts and minds 
• Consociationalism and communitarianism 




Test C: Did the institutional structure of decision-making change? (institutions) 
The third test examined the institutional structure of decision-making. A paradigmatic change 
should find evidence of changes in intuitional support for decisions, including alignment of 
values and interests and the advocacy strategies employed by participants. Paradigmatic change 
would include: 
o Increased volume and range of actors and inputs in the policy process 
o Increased authority of actors previously on the margins of a policy subsystem 
o Lessened authority of the arguments of dominant actors 
Test D: Comparison against the paradigmatic models 
The table below sets out alternative hypotheses for the tests and further detail of what would 
indicate paradigmatic or incremental change. It illustrates the different expectations for the 
framing of decisions, the patterns of institutional support and the ideational framing of 
arguments and decisions in a case of incremental or paradigmatic change. In this framework: 
• Model Thomas was positioned as the incumbent model therefore process indicators 
of incremental change or characteristics associated with model Thomas were treated 
as indicative of model Thomas.  
• Model John was positioned as the challenging model therefore process indicators of 
paradigmatic change or characteristics associated with model John were treated as 
indicative of model John.   
 
	
Process Narrative Inputs – events 
and trends that 
influenced 
decision making. 
Institutions – participants in 
the process and the alignment 
of their interests and 
priorities.  
Ideas – the concepts and 





• It was a 
negotiated 
plural process 
that set out to 
address the 
root causes of 
violence 



















home office and 
CLG that 
responded to: 














The majority of actors: 
• Saw the process as an 
opportunity to influence 
the trajectory of security 
and social policy 
• Believe that they had 
viable policy solutions 
that could justifiably be 
repurposed 
• Acknowledge that they 
have voluntarily taken on 
board certain elements 
from the policy 
Some actors exerted 
influence by: 
• Drawing on feedback 
from across the policy 
community to produce 
demonstrable solutions 
• Developing a definition 
of extremism that drew 
• Existing counter 
terrorism policy was 
causing more harm than 
good. Ultimately 
prevention means 
addressing the causes of 
alienation that are rooted 
in community 
experiences and needs, 
this was demonstrated 
by: 
o Foreign and 
home office 
briefing 2003 










in the CLG. 








n of objectives 
and solutions 
on the front 
line, which 












on/ appropriated the 
principles of opponents 
• Relying on political 
support to influence the 
agenda 
Other actors exerted 
influence by: 
• Resisting incorporating 
feedback from across the 
policy community to 
produce new solutions 
• Relying on discretionary 
powers to influence the 
interpretation and impact 
of the agenda 
o Demos 2006 
report 
o Academic and 
commissioned 
research 
• Although foreign policy 
is a cause of political 
alienation and 
recruitment, the solutions 
to radicalisation are to be 
found within the Muslim 
community itself: 
o Tony Blair 
o Cantle report 
o Policy exchange 
reports 
• The issue of 
radicalisation is evidence 
that multiculturalism has 
failed and it is essential 
that extremism be 
defined: 
o Media coverage 
o Political 
representation  




• It is possible to define 
extremism as separate 
from Muslim 
communities by drawing 
on/ appropriating the 




o Tony Blair 
o Policy exchange 
reports 
o Funding of 
Quilliam 
foundation 
• The association of the 
security agenda with 
models of community 
cohesion and counter 
extremism are counter 
productive to integration, 
key evidence: 





o Review of 
prevent by CLG 
select committee 















office that set 











The policy was 
primarily defined 
and led by core 
policy makers in 
the home office 
responding to  









The majority of actors: 
• Felt a duty to or were 
required to participate in 
the policy 
• Sought to prevent 
damage or promote their 
interests and priorities 
• Primarily contributed 
existing policy solutions 
with limited adaptation 
• Have largely disengaged 
from the policy apart 
from where directed to 
do so by the Home 
Office.  
• Existing policy was 
insufficient for 
addressing home-grown 
terrorism, this was 
demonstrated by  
a. Foreign & home 
office briefing 
2003 




c. Examples of 
home grown 
radicalisation  
• “Community support is 











root cause of 
terrorism from 
the outset but 



















Some actors exerted 
influence by: 
• Demonstrating direct 
impacts on the 
prevalence of home 
grown terrorism and 
extremism 
• Articulated a definition 
of extremism grounded 
in law 
• Relied on capacity and 
resources to influence the 
overall approach of the 
agenda 
Other actors exerted 
influence by: 
• Resisting the programme 
due to suspicions of its 
objectives and definition 
of extremism 
• Relying on discretionary 
powers to limit the reach 
and impact of the agenda 
 
intelligence and 
managing the impact of 
counter terrorism 
policing. Addressing the 
communities social 
concerns will be an 
important aspect of this. 
This was demonstrated 
by:  
a. Northern Ireland 
b. 2001 riots 





• Extremism must 
primarily be addressed in 
the Muslim community 
as it is this group that are 
the target of recruiters” 
• It is possible to define 
extremism as separate 
from Muslim 
communities by drawing 
on/ appropriating the 











o Tony Blair 






• Integration is important 
but its benefits are not 
direct and its association 
with security policy and 
politics can be counter 
productive. Key 
evidence: 
o Review of 
prevent spending 
in 2009/10 
o Review of 
prevent by CLG 
select committee 
o Conflict with 
key Muslim 
organisations 
 
 
	
 
 
